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ABSTRACT 
The general purpose of this study was to explore 
the reactions of Ss to situations requring a series of similar 
decisions. This was done within the framework of a mathematical 
analysis of situations; the framework owed much to game theory 
formulations. Particular purposes of the study were to observe 
the behaviour of individual Ss in a probability learning experiment, 
and in simple 2x2 games against nature. 
The observations made were considered in the light 
of some current theoretical notions about human behaviour in such 
situations. In particular, the stimulus sampling theory of Estes 
and his colleagues, the view of man as a processor of information 
according to Bayes' theroem, and the more general computer 
simulation views of behaviour were all examined. In general, 
neither stimulus sampling nor Bayesian accounts fit with the 
observations. All of the Ss studied were University students. 
They react in a fairly lawful way. The reaction depends on the 
structure of the situation. Given some information, many Ss 
approach an appropriate reaction and some achieve it. Even 
with no information, some Ss approach an appropriate reaction. 
This seems to occur by the elimination of likely hypotheses 
about the situation and, finally, by the use of an elaborated set 
of rules paying attention to consecutive rewards or non-rewards. 
Observations were also made of the Ss' declared purposes and 
of their ability to recognise a sequence of binary events as a 
(viii) 
random one. Suggestions for further research were made. 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
David Hume in his introduction to 1'A Treatise of Human 
Nature" (1739) wrote, "As the science of man is the only solid 
f~undation for the other sciences, so, the only solid foundation 
we can give to this science itself must be laid 6n experience and 
observation." Although there is some evidence that other social 
scientists and psychologists try to understand one another's 
language (Koch, 1963), it often seems that the more psychology 
develops empirically, the less use is made of it as the basis 
for other sciences studying man. Perhaps this paradox is most 
clearly seen in the relationship between psychology and economics. 
Classical economics developed its own "psychology" in 
those fields of study where some account of human behaviour had 
to be given. This account was necessary for the theory of demand 
and the "psychology" produced was known as utility theory, in 
general, and marginal utility theory, in particular (Blaug,1962). 
According to the general theory, goods were considered to vary in 
their utility to a person and these variations showed certain 
characteristics. Most importantly, it was considered that, given 
a set of goods to choose from, the individual would produce a 
consistently ordered preference list and that, in making choices, 
the individual would be maximising utility. Marginal utility theory 
also required that the utility of a given commodity would decrease 
as the amount available increased. These are, of course, assumptions 
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and it has been argued that they do not necessarily hold. Because 
of this, it is possible to argue that this "psychology" is not based 
"on experience and observation" so much as on mathematics and logic. 
Much of the subsequent work on utility theory in economics 
consisted of attempts to measure utility and of arguments over the 
sort of scale appropriate for such measurement (ordinal and cardinal 
utility). There were, however, some disturbing challenges to the 
theory which were sometimes ignored, and sometimes resolved by 
introducing other concepts. In particular, the St. Petersburg 
paradox and Bernouilli's treatment of it (Blaug, 1962) challenged 
the theory to account for the consumer's behaviour in conditions of 
uncertainty. The St. Petersburg gamble is described as follows: 
"A coin is tossed repeatedly until it first turn up tails (on the 
~th toss) at which point the pl~er is paid 2n ••••• dollars" 
(Jeffrey, 1965). And the question is what fee should a person be 
willing to p~ in order to pl~, assuming that the game is a "fair" 
one. The paradox is that the expected value of the game is infinite: 
and this contradicts the assumption that people act to maximise 
expected income. Bernouilli's solution to the paradox lies in the 
distinction between "mathematic expectation" and "moral expectation", 
between income and utility of income. The t'llernouilli hypothesis" 
claims that the total utility derived from income F is related 
logarithmically to the income F. The similarity of this claim to 
Weber's law in the field of "psychophysics was ignored by the classical 
-3-
economists who tended to derive from Bernouilli's claims the 
assumption that utility maximisation must be rejected in situations 
of choices involving uncertainties (Blaug, 1962). 
More recently, questions about the measurement of utility 
have led to a reconsideration of choices under uncertainty. The 
method of measurement makes us~f uncertainty in order to derive a 
scale for utility. The method is known as the Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
method, although Jeffrey (1965) and Arrow (1963) both claim that its 
orginator was Ramsey. Essentially, the method consists in presenting 
the subject with gambles (of known probability) and using the values 
of the gambles to which the subject is indifferent as the scaling 
device. For example, suppose it is known that Mr. A. has ranked 
preferences for whisky, coffee and tea in that order, it is possible 
to measure the utility of these commodities to him. He is asked 
to choose between "whisky with a probability E, and tea with a 
probability (1-p)", on the one hand, and "the certainty of coffee", 
on the other. If p=o, he will presumably choose coffee and if 
p=1, he will presumably choose whisky. If he .chooses the certainty 
of coffee at, say, p=i (e.g. if a 3 turns up on a die), then he is 
offered a new choice at, say, P=% (e.g. if a 3 or a 6 turns up on 
a die). For some value of E" he will be indifferent between the 
certainty of coffee and the uncertainty of the other two and this 
value of E, makes possible the calculation of a utility scale. So, 
if P=% represents indiffe~ence and U=1.00 represents the (arbitrarily 
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assigned) utility of coffee, the utility of whisky must, on this 
scale, be 1.67 and the utility of tea .67. 
Psychologists have come to look at utility theory as a 
particular example of the more general area of decBion-making. They 
have usually been concerned with the adequacy of such a theory as a 
description of human choice behaviour. This has led, in particular, 
to the introduction of the notion of "subjective probabilities" as 
well as "subjective utilities"; and to the use of Bayes' theorem as 
a general basis for choice theories in a sequential decision making 
situation (Becker and McClintock, 1967). There are now several 
models which purport to describe choice behaviour - and these models 
are derived by weakening some of the assumptions of the basic theory. 
For example, Becker and McClintock (1967) talk of a non-additive 
subjective expected utility model and a weighted subjective expected 
utility model. This sort of approach is certainly guided by 
empirical considerations but it is doubtful that it is providing a 
psychology properly based on "experience and observation". Nonetheless, 
the basic Bayesian theorem and the work of Edwards (1955,1956,1961, 
1962,1965), in particular, have had considerable influence in this 
field of study, not only in psychology but also among economists 
and political scientists (Koch, 1963). 
The work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) provided 
methods for measuring cardinal utility. But, more importantly, their 
work also provided economists with a powerful tool of analysis in the 
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form of game theory (Simon,1963; Tobin and Dolbear,1963). The 
importance of game theory is enhanced by the width of its application. 
Becker and McClintock (1967) describe it as a prescriptive mathematical 
theory of decision-making for situations of social interdependence 
and claim that it has had a "marked impact upon a number of disciplines 
in the social sciences." Certainly, some students of politics, war 
strategy and psychology have found the theory useful. 
Game theory does not provide a description of but a 
prescription for human behaviour in . so~.e situations. Two assumptions 
are made: that all players involved have perfect information and that 
all players are rational. Granted these assumptions, there is an 
immediate solution to the situation. This solution will be called 
"maximal reaction" of a player or players to the situation. From 
the point of view of empirical inquiry, game theory can provide both 
a formal analysis of a situation and a criterion (maximal reaction) 
against which a player's "actual reaction" may be measured. 
Venttsel' (1963) and Vajda (1961) provide an account of game 
theory from a mathematical point of view. Essentially, it is a 
theory that deals with conflict situations. In the broadest sense, 
a conflict situation may be defined as one where the outcome of the 
situation or the result of any action by one side or person is not 
completely under the control of that side or person. One of the 
assets of applying mathemati~teChniques to a problem is that one 
can simplify a given situation so that only the barest essentials 
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are left, thus allowing a later generalisation across a broad front. 
A game is a simple mathematical model of a conflict situation. 
The rules of a game specify the "plays" (or actions) open 
to the players and the outcomes of all possible combinations of 
plays. The outcomes can be "constant-sum" or''non-constant-sum''; 
that is, remain the same throughout the game or not. The constant-
sum games can be further subclivided into "zero-sum" games and "non-
zero-sum" games. In the former, the values given to each player add 
up to zero (in a two-person game', this means that what one player 
wins, the other loses): in the latter, the values add up to other than 
zero (as in most economic enterprises). All of these games can involve 
any number of players. The two-person game is the easiest to deal 
with and Rapoport (1966) provides an analysis of two-person games. 
The Italian game known as "The Morra" is a good example of 
a two-person zero-sum game and will be used to demonstrate some of 
the concepts of game theory. There are, in fact, several varieties 
of this game. The rules of the "Two-finger Morra" are as follows: 
"There are two players. Each one can erlend either one or two fingers. 
At the Same time, he is to guess how many fingers his opponent will 
show. If both are correct or both wrong, the result is a draw and 
neither wins. But if one of the players guesses correctly, he 
receives a sum of money equal to the total number of fingers showing." 
For each move, two distinct operations are required. Each 
time a player must extend either one or two fingers and each time he 
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must shout out either "one" or "two" as a guess at how many fingers 
his opponent will extend. There are four plays open to him, viz., 
he can extend one finger and shout "one" (1,1), he can extend one 
finger and shout "two" (1,2), he can extend two fingers and shout 
"one" (2,1), and he can extend two fingers and shout "two" (2,2). 
Since the game is a fair one, the same number of plays is open to 
his opponent. This gives the 4x4 skeleton of the pay-off matrix 
(Fig.1:1). The rules of the game also specify the outcomes or pay-
offs. The cells of the matrix are filled in according to these 
specifications. Thus, both diagonals are filled with zeros because, 
for each of the combinations of plays along those diagonals, the 
players are either both right or both wrong. When player I plays 
(1,2) and player II plays (1,1), player II alone is right and 
player I loses 2 units of money. The appropriate cell is filled 
with -2. Similarly, the other cells are filled in; each time the 
figure refers to player I's gain or loss. 
Game theory specifies "strategies" for the players. In 
game theory a strategy is a prescriptive "collection of choices 
for each possible situation" (Vajda,1961). If the game only involves 
one move, the strategy is identical with the move. The prescribed 
strategy is known as the minimax solution. This is essentially a 
pessimistic solution. Under it, a player tries to minimise his 
maximum loss. If this involves making the same play for every move, 
the strategy is said to be a "pure strategy". Over a series of moves, 
Fig.1 : 1 • P~y-off Matrix for Two-finger Morra 
Player I's plays 
O'l ( 1 ,1) (1,2) (2,1) (2,2) ~ 
r-f ( 1 , 1 ) 0 -2 +3 0 ~ 
O'l I 
- ( 1 ,2) +2 0 0 -3 en H I 
H 
H (2,1) -3 0 0 +4 Q) 
~ 
r-f (2,2) 0 +3 -4 0 p.., 
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however, minimax m~ require the pl~er to choose his pl~s in a 
particular proportion and to present them in a random order. Such 
a solution is prescribed for the Two-finger Morra, and is sometimes 
called a "mixed strategy". 
The minimax solution has been under attack as being unrealistic 
from many sources (e.g. Rapoport, 1964(a); Schelling, 1960). This is, 
in some senses, an attack on the "unrealistic" assumption that both 
pl~ers are rational. If one of the players is not rational, the 
minimax solution would not allow his opponent to exploit that weakness. 
Several studies have been made of experimental games (Rapoport and 
Orwant, 1962; Becker and McClintock, 1967). Lieberman (1960) and 
Brayer (1964) both reported that some Ss do achieve or approach a 
minimax solution. Kaufman and Becker (1961), using 2x2 games 
requiring a mixed strategy, found that the more extreme the solution 
was from requiring S to make each play for 50% of the time, the more 
improvement players showed over random performance. Linker and Ross 
(1962) found that improvement of performance shown by children between 
games requiring a mixed strategy was slower than that shown by students. 
All of these games were zero-sum and used p~-off functions which were 
certain and unchanging. 
The general conclusions of most of these studies was that the 
minimax theorem is, at best, a poor descriptive theory. They also 
showed that a process of learning appears to be involved and that one 
important factor affecting this process (and the strategy that is its 
end product) is the strategy of the opponent (Brayer,1964). Messick 
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way, he was able to discover more of the relationship between the 
strategy of his Ss and that of the computer. He found it useful 
to describe this relationship in terms of rules for changing 
strategies. 
There seems to be three uses of game theory in psychology. 
B.Y far the most important, in terms of volume of research output, 
is the use of experimental games as well-controlled interaction 
situations. The chief interest there lies in the effects of trust, 
motivation, communication and personality on behaviour in these 
situations (e.g. Deutsch, 1958; Deutsch, 1960; Deutsch and Krauss, 
1962). The games that generate most interest here are non-zero 
sum games, in general, and in particular, the prisoner's dilemma 
( Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). The second use consists in observing 
the behaviour of Ss in experimental games (usually zero-sum games). 
It is this use that was discussed in the last paragraph and 
Messick's (1967) paper is a good example of thE use. In both these 
uses, investigators accept the formal analysis and use it as the 
basis of empirical inquiry into human behaviour. They tend to 
reject the assumptions involved in prescription for action. The 
third use of game theory is to test some of these assumptions (e.g.) 
see Luce and Suppes,1965). It is not clear whether the intention , 
is to produce an axiomatic, descriptive theory of social interaction 
out of game theory in much the same way as Edwards, for example, 
has attempted to produce an axiomatic, descriptive theory of decision-
making out of utility theory. It may be that an adequate descriptive 
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theory of utility is required first since one of the criticisms 
of game theory as a prescriptive theory concentrates on assumptions 
about the utility functions of the players (Becker and McClintock, 
In a sense, both utility theory and game theory are theories 
which predict or prescribe asymptotic behaviour in choice situations. 
Psychologists traditionally have been more concerned with the process 
of change toward asymptotic behaviour, that is, with learning 
processes. Some writers (e.g. Katona, 1963; Arrow,1963) look to this 
tradition to provid! some answers to economic problems. One area of 
some interest is the formation of expectations by businessmen. This is 
generally agreed to be "a result of past experience ••• a learning 
process." (Arrow, 1963). In view of the tendency for economists L 
to use axiomatic deductive theories, it is not surprising that r, 
statistical learning theory has been thought to have some useful 
concepts. The theory of Estes has been remarkable not only for its 
application of a strict mathematical model to learning (Estes,1950), 
but also for its extension to choice situations (Estes and Straughan, 
1954; Estes et aI, 1957; Estes,1959; Atkinson and Estes,1963). This 
extension makes possible comparison of the theory with other theories 
of choice (such as utility theory). The comparison reveals a 
contradiction between the two theories. This is especially clear 
in the treatment of probability learning, where Estes and Straughan 
(1954) claimed that statistical learning theory predicted that Ss 
would not maximise expected utility but would show probability matching 
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in their reaction to the experimental situation. This claim has 
been somewhat relaxed in later accounts using more complex 
mathematical models (Atkinson and Estes,1963), but the evidence 
seems to indicate that Ss do not maximise expected utility. There 
are, of course, ways of "explaining" this result. The two that 
seem to have most currency are: that Ss attach high utilities to 
the less frequent event; and that Ss use a strategy to guard against 
a nonstationary event generator. Edwards (1956) and others have 
carried out experiments using different pay-offs to test the first 
of these hypotheses (Luce and Suppes, 1965). 
An important extension of stimulus sampling theory took 
place when Atkinson and Suppes (1958) used the basic theory of Estes 
to account for the behaviour of Ss in experimental games. Later, 
Suppes and Atkinson (1960) produced a full mathematical account of 
models of inter-personal interaction and tests of these models. 
The games were based on a probabilistic pay-off matrix. Since this 
extension widens the range of statistical learning theory consider-
ably, their 1958 experiments and results are worth noting in detail. 
They used three games. They called them lImixed", "pure" and "sure", 
words which refer to the strategies prescribed by game theory. The 
pay-off matrices and the minimax solutions are given in Fig.1:2. 
A1 and A2 refer to the plays or responses open to player A; B1 and 
B2 refer to the plays or responses open to player B. The cells of 
the matrix contain two figures. The first is the probability of A 
being rewarded and the second is the probability of B being rewarded 
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Fig.1:2. Games used by Atkinson and Suppes (1958) 
(a) Mixed Game 
B1 B2 
A1 
1 2 1,0 
-:3,:5 
A2 ..l...l. 12-2'2 6'6 
(b) Pure Game 
B1 B2 
A1 ..l...l. 1,0 2'2 
A2 1 1 1 
:3 
2,2" 4"'-4 
(c) Sure Game 
B1 B2 
A1 
1 1 1,0 2'2 
A2 ..l..>l ~..l. 4'4 4'4 
Minimax Solutions: 
(a) A plays A1 and A2 in ratio 1:2 ordered randomly 
B plays B1 and B2 in ratio 5: 1 ordered randomly; 
(b) A plays A1 all the time 
B plays B1 all the time; 
(c) A plays A1 all the time 
B plays B1 all the time 
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(the complement of the first figure). The pure game differs from 
the sure game because the sure game has a dominant play for each 
player, i.e. a choice which will always be better. The solutions 
are the same because in the pure game, the moves of the rational 
opponent shaUll eventually determine that A plays A1 and B plays B1• 
The Ss were run for 200 trials in pairs, but they were led 
to believe they were working independently. They worked in ignorance 
of the pay-off matrix. The group results were analysed in blocks of 
40 trials (observed proportions of A1 and B1) and these showed 
appropriate changes over the 200 trials. Atkinson and Suppes claimed 
that these results conformed closely in some respects to those 
predicted by statistical learning theory. 
From this, it would seem that Ss' reactions to game theory 
situations might be described in terms of statistical learning theory. 
Yet, this account by Atkinson and Suppes is, in some ways, a clumsy 
and even an unconvincing account. They do not seem to think that it 
matters much that the Ss are unaware that they are competing with each 
other and unaware of the pay-off matrix and the rules of the game. 
It could be argued that information about these is likely to make a 
difference to the Ss' behaviour over 200 trials, a difference which 
might create difficulties for an explanation in terms of stimulus 
sampling theory. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the chief 
statistics of such a theory - the proportion of trials per block of 
trials, when one response is made - would adequately describe what 
happens to a S under these conditions. Furthermore, it is not clear 
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how Ss would react to a simpler situation than the game between 
players, namely, a game against nature. 
Stimulus sampling theory is a psychological theory and 
claims to be a descriptive theory of change of behaviour. This 
means that it is based on "eJeperience and observation" and it 
would seem to be a good "solid foundat ion for the other sciences". 
Its extension over areas traditionally dealt with by prescriptive 
theories and the precision it derives from the axiomatic approach 
would seem to confirm this view. However, there are several critical 
points that may be made against it. As alrea~ stated, its observat-
ional basis (proportion of trials when a particular response is made 
per block of trials) is somewhat limited. It is possible to observe 
more than this in the behaviour of Ss faced with choice situations. 
A second criticism is closely related to this. Most of the results 
by which the mathematical models are tested are collected by a 
computer from a S seated in front of a machine. It is possible 
that this eJeperimental situation, instead of controlling the variables, 
actually distorts them, i.e.)Ss seated in front of machines may react 
differently from Ss seated in front of an experimenter. The third 
criticism concerns the difference between individual performance and 
group performance. Because of its very nature, statistical learning 
theory derives, in the first place, from group data. In the words 
of Skinner (1959), "Both the statistical treatment of group means 
and the averaging of curves encourage the belief that we are somehow 
going behind the individual case to an otherwise inaccessible, but 
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more fundamental, process." Skinner was making a general point but 
it is a point that can easily be made about stimulus sampling theory. 
It is true that Estes (1959) thinks that his general account is 
applicable to individuals and that occasionally the authors of such 
theories look at individual performance. There is, however, a tendency 
to ignore wide deviations from predicted performance. 
This last point - and the first one - are echoed by Newell 
and Simon (1963) when they say of statistical learning theory (in a 
probability learning context) that "the S's behaviour ••• is much 
richer and involves symbcls with a much wider meaning than is captured 
by these counts ••• some yiolence has been done to the behavior by 
translating it into numerical form •••• ". Of course, they later admit 
that numerical models of human behaviour can be generalised broadly 
and individual symbolic models (such as are obtained from computer 
simulation) cannot. 
Out of these broad considerations, the purpose of this thesis 
was conceived. There are several investigators and several theories 
concerned with overlapping problems which have implications for 
psychology ~nd economics, at least, and possible generalisation to 
other social sciences. The one approach that derived from "experience 
and observationR, statistical learning theory, seemed ill-suited to 
serve as a basis for further description in more complex situations. 
It soon became clear that some formal analysis of situations might be 
a necessary starting-point fo! empirical inquiry. The analysis by 
Bush, Galanter and Luce (1963) of experiments involving choice seemed 
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promising. But the analysis catered for some experiments that did 
not seem relevant to the inquiry (e.g. psychophysical discrimination) 
and did not properly cater for some experime~ts that seemed important 
to the inquiry (e.g. probability learning, experimental games). 
Accordingly, the next chapter provides the formal analysis for the 
experimental work •. Its basis is the terminology of game theory. The 
chief purpose is to stuqy the effects on behaviour of information 
about a game when it is played against nature. In terms both of the 
formal analysis and of precedent in empirical investigation, some 
description was first required of the behaviour of Ss in a probability 
learning situation. And it seemd necessary before this to look at 
the ability of Ss to recognise the nature of binary sequences presented 
to them (patterned or random). 
Accordingly, five experiments were carried out. The first 
looked at the ability of Ss to recognise bias in strings of binary 
digits. The second looked at the behaviour of Ss in four types of 
probability learning situations. The third was concerned to describe 
the behaviour of Ss in a game against nature under differing conditions 
of information about it. The fourth experiment attempted to discover 
the effects of behaviour of varying one of the parameters of the game 
(nature's strategy) and of information provided. The fifth considered 
long-term effects of playing games against nature by means of a 
repeated measures design. The last three experime~nts were carried 
out with individual Ss, although gross statistics were used to discover 
the effects of independent variables. In this way, some account was 
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built up of the behaviour of Ss in situations of interest both to 
psychologists and economists. 
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CHAPTER II - FORMAL ANALYSIS 
It could be argued that some psychologists are concerned 
with only one question whose general form is "How do organisms 
behave under differing conditions of uncertainty?" Certainly, 
some psychologists ask this question in more or less these terms. 
Information theory (see, e.g., Frick,1959) has provided a formal 
analysis for some uncertain situations. Granted this analysis, 
psychologists have been able to rephrase the questions they ask 
and have often had successful answers. Information theory 
especially prescribes a plan for search in a situation where S 
has to find one particular item among a lot of items. A good 
example of this is the "game" of "Twenty Quest ions" (Bendig, 1953). 
Recently, Davis (1965) has examined the strategies actually used 
by people acquiring information in this situation. He made 
explicit the set of possible events and the probabilities 
associated with them. One of his findings was that Ss were able 
to improve efficiency with experience. 
There are some situations which involve uncertainty to 
which information theory is difficult to apply. In particular, 
uncertain situations which involve repetition of a problem in 
time are not amenable to an information theory analysis. The 
situations studied by Atkinson and Suppes (1958) are of this type. 
Such situations might be called sequential uncertainty situations. 
Psychologists might like to know how organisms behave in such 
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situations. The first thing to do, however, is to provide a formal 
analysis of these situations: and this requires a fairly close 
control over the use of words. 
The term "reaction" will be used to refer to the behaviour 
of an organism exposed over a period of time to a sequential situation. 
In experiments, this period of time might be measured in number of 
trials. The reaction will include changes in behaviour over time. 
"Response" of an organism will refer to the act ions open to the 
organism at any given time. The word "state" or "state of affairs" 
will be used to denote any environmental event which is not under 
the control of the particular organism being studied but which has 
an effect on the outcome for the organism. The use of the word 
"response" is not to imply that the organism is necessarily 
responding to some given state, although it may do in some situations. 
In other situations, however, the organism may be required to act in 
ignorance of the state. The word "state" will be used loosely. 
All sequential situations can be expressed in terms of pay-
off matrices. A pay-off matrix shows the gain or loss to an organism 
when a given coincidence of state and response occurs, for all such 
coincidences. These are the outcomes of the situation. Since all 
the situations to be studied are uncertain ones, the cells of such 
a matrix will usually be probabilistic in natu~ i.e., there will 
not necessarily be a reward or pay-off on every trial and the 
numbers in the cells will range from 0 to 1. For convenience, the 
limiting conditions of never a reward (0) and always a reward (1) 
will be included: and the value of the reward will be kept constant. 
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There is a prescription for behaviour inherent in the 
formal analysis, a maximal reaction. It is based on the same 
assumptions as game theory, viz., perfect information and ration-
ality. Since organisms are adaptive, one might ezpect reasonably 
good correspondence between the actual reaction of organisms and 
the maximal reaction (Berlyne,1965). Put another way, one might 
ezpect that actual reaction will be predictable, to a certain 
eztent, from the formal characteristics of the situations. The 
eztent to which this is true will, presumably, depend on the nature 
of the organism being studied. 
The situations covered by the analysis are those involving 
states and responses and outcomes which are probabilistic in nature. 
They range from a simple learning ezperiment to a two-person game, 
in the present chapter. They differ in the kinds of matrices 
appropriate to the situations. 
Learning Situations 
It is possible to regard learning as having at least two 
meanings, classical and operant conditioning. Some psychologists 
(e.g., Gagn~,1965) would like to consider it as having many more 
meanings. For the purpose of formal analysis, however, a learning 
situation will be regarded as one in which a single response is 
matched with a particular state under conditions of reward. In 
terms of a pay-off matrix, a learning ezperiment is defined in 
Fig.2:1. 
-22-
Fig.2:1. Fgy-off Matrix for a Learning Experiment 
Appropriate response 
Non-appropriate response 
Appropriate state 
1 
o 
Non-appropriate state 
o 
o 
The values in the cells of the matrix refer to the probability 
of reward. The pairing of appropriate response to appropriate state 
(stimulus) is always rewarded: other pairings are (implicitly) not 
rewarded at all. Fig.2:2 shows a more general situation covering 
the case of partial reinforcement. Usually, in learning experiments, 
Ss are given as many trials as may be necessary for them to reach 
some criterion of performance. A trial usually consists of the 
institution of the appropriate state (or stimulus). Usually, the 
institution of a trial is under the control of the experimenter but 
it is sometimes under the control of S. 
Fig.2:2. General Fay-off Matrix for a Learning Experiment 
Appropriate state 
Appropriate response 
Non-appropriate response 
where 0 <p~1 
p 
o 
Non-appropriate state 
o 
o 
The basis of most theories of learning includes some 
assumption of competing responses (Hilgard and Bower,1966). This 
assumption reaches its most precise theoretical formulation with 
Estes (1950,1957,1959). According to him, what happens in a learning 
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organism can be thought of as a shift in the probability values 
associated with each competing response - a shift away from in-
appropriate responses to the most appropriate one. The phenomena 
of partial reinforcement are fairly easily accounted for by the 
statistical learning theory that Estes proposes. From the point 
of view of prescription, one would certainly expect this. If the 
competing responses (R) are labelled R1'R2'R3' •••••• ,Ri' •••••• Rn' 
and R. is the appropriate response to a given state, S, the pay-
1 
off matrix can be thought of as a column of reward, i.e. states that 
are not appropriate are not considered. This is shown in Fig.2:3. 
Fig.2:3. Theoretical Pay-off Matrix in a Learning 
Situation 
Responses 
of 
Organisms 
R 
R1 
R2 
R3 
R. 
1 
S 
0 
0 
0 
p 
o 
maximal reaction 
P (R) 
0 
0 
0 
where 
o<p~1 
1 
o 
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The reward probability values are 0 for all responses except R .• 
l. 
R. may be rewarded all the time (p=1) or part of the time (0 <p <1). 
l. 
The maximal reaction for both these cases is that the probability 
(p) of R. approaches unity and the probability of all other 
l. 
responses approaches 0 (Fig.2:3). Estes has an empirical theory 
which traces the actual reaction of organisms in such a situation 
and shows that they do approach the maximal reaction. 
A learning situation is one in which a single response from 
a repertoire of responses is rewarded in the presence of a certain 
state (or stimulus). The maximal reaction requires the probability 
of occurrence of this response to approach unity as the number of 
trials increases. Learning is said to have taken place if the actual 
reaction tends towards the maximal reaction. 
Discrimination and Probability Learning Situations 
A "discrimination learning" situation involves at least two 
states (stimuli) and a response which is rewarded for only one of 
the states. This simple situation is described by Fig.2:4. 
Fig.2:4. Simple Discrimination Learning Experiment 
R 
R is rewarded under state S1 but not under state S2. In a sense, 
the learning situation can be regarded as a special case of this; 
for, in it, the organism is required to discriminate from all other 
states (stimuli) the state (stimulus) to which the experimenter 
wants it to respond. In the diScrimination learning Situation, 
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the experimenter is usually concerned with the organism's ability 
to discriminate two particular states from all other states and 
to discriminate between these particular states. Theoretically, 
the repertolTe of responses m~ be considered and the matrix 
becomes similar to Fig.2:3. 
A two-choice discrimination problem might require the organism 
to make two different responses to the two states. Fig.2:5 illustrates 
this two-choice problem and gives the maximal reaction. R1 is 
rewarded under state S1' and not at all under state S2; and R2 
is rewarded not at all under state S1 and is rewarded under state 
Fig:.2:~. Pg.y:-off Matrix for a Two-choice Discrimination 
Problem 
Maximal reaction 
S1 S2 P(RIS1) P(R IS2) 
R1 p 0 1 0 
R2 0 q 0 1 
In psychological experiments the usual procedure is to 
train Ss up to a criterion of efficiency and s~ that Ss can 
discriminate; or, after an agreed number of trials, to come to 
the conclusion that Ss cannot discriminate. 
A "probability learning" situation can be regarded as a 
variant of a discrimination learning situation. In a two-choice 
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probability learning experiment, S is required to choose in 
ignorance of the (future) state. The problem would be easy 
otherwise. It would simply be a "say after me" game. As it is, 
it becomes a "say before me" game. Although it is arguable that 
human Ss do see it as a game between S and E, in fact, the order 
of the states is predetermined according to a random schedule. 
The situation is shown in Fig.2:6. For the first time, however, 
the probability of occurrence of the states becomes important. 
This is bracketed after each state in Fig.2:6. This determines 
the maximal reaction to the situation. Since the ordering of S1 
and S2 is random, the way to maximize reward is always to respond 
R1• In probability learning experiments, the probability of occurrence 
of one of the states is greater than .5 and on every trial one of 
states will occur. The usual procedure in these experiments is to 
set arbitrarily a number of trials and regard S's behaviour at the 
end of these trials as a terminal reaction. These situations are 
looked at in more detail later. 
P -.1 r2 
Fig.2:6. Pay-off Matrix for Probability Learning 
Problem 
S1 (p) S ( 1 - p) 2 
R1 0 
R2 0 o 0 
Decision-making Situations 
The word "decision-making" is used in psychology and other 
social sciences to cover many models of which the simplest is the 
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Bayesian model. The general situation consists of a set of 
states of some system, a set of possible responses open to the 
decision-maker, and a p~-off matrix defining the rewards associated 
with each coincidence of every state and every response. According 
to this model (see, e.g.,Jeffrey,1965), the probabilities of 
occurrence of the outcomes and the value of these outcomes are 
taken into account in coming to a decision. The principle under-
lying the prescription is, as usual, to maximize expected value. 
The p~-off matrix is given in Fig.2:7. For this sort of problem, 
the probability value associated with each outcome is required and 
these are bracketed after each outcome. The responses open to the 
decision-maker are designated R1, R2 •••• ,Ri •••• Rn ; the states are 
designated S1'S2' •••• ~ •••• Sm; the cell entries r11'r12' •••• rik' 
.... r refer to the probability of reward or p~-off; and the 
nm 
values P11'P12'····'Pik' •••• Pnm refer to the probability of occurrence 
of state ~ with response Ri • 
If the decision-maker knows the state under which he is acting, 
the prescription is for him to choose the response with maximum 
expected value for him. Thus, if the instituted state is S2' the 
decision-maker surveys the column headed S2 until he finds the 
greatest r value and this will indicate what response of his will 
p~ best (or, in an uncertain situation, is most likely to p~). 
But suppose the decision-maker is ignorant of the state to 
be instituted. He would then be required to calculate the expected 
R1 
R2 
R. 
~ 
R 
m 
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Fig.2:7. P~y-off Matrix for a Decision-Making Problem 
S1 S2-··············~··············· Sm 
r 11 (p 11 ) r 12 (P12)········r1k (P1k)········r 1m (P1m) 
r 21 (P21 ) r 22 (P22 )········r2k (P2k)········r2m (P2m) 
o ~ r ik .:;;: 
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value for each of his responses by multiplying the probabilities 
of occurrence of each response-state coincidence (the Pik) by the 
probabilities of reward for each such coincidence (the r ik ), over 
all states. That is, the expected value of any response i (EV.) 
~ 
can be calculated by 
EV. 
~ 
k=m 
L 
k=1 
Where the decision is made against nature and one, therefore, 
assumes that states and responses are independent, this implies 
EV. 
l. 
k=m ) 
k=1 
where Pk is the probability of occurrence of Sk. 
The prescriptive model would require the decision-maker 
to choose a response with maximum expected value. Many articles 
(see, e.g.,Edwards~962) have been concerned with the assumptions 
of this kind of model and have sometimes suggested other models 
incorporating a weakening of some of these assumptions, hoping, 
thereby, to get a descriptive model of a decision-maker's behaviour. 
In particular, the notions of subjective expected utility and of 
subjective probability have been introduced (SUppes,1954-5, Edwards, 
1955). The implication is that any given person has an essentially 
personal view of the value of a given outcome and probability. The 
product of these terms is the person's subjective expected utility 
(SEU) and it is the maximisatiorr"of this that is thought to take place. 
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While this notion is very plausible psychologically, it also opens 
up a whole range of difficult problems connected with attempts to 
measure SEU independently. Such an approach is considered necessary 
because decision-makers do not maximize EV. But if the purpose of 
an analysis is not to turn a prescriptive moael into a predictive 
model but only to serve up a criterion against which to evaluate 
behaviour, these difficulties can be largely avoided and the EV 
model used. 
There are, however, other reasons for matrices of this kind 
being ignored by the majority of psychologists. There are three 
types of decision-making problems based on this model. Rapoport 
(1968) has recently referred to these as static, sequential and 
multistage decision problems. In a static problem or Situation, 
the decision-maker decides only once: in a sequential problem or 
situation, the decision-maker decides again and again, and what he 
discovers in making his decisions may be used to improve future 
decision-making: in a multistage decision problem, the decision-
maker moves from one situation to another and the rewards are 
associated with the transitions possible. The only problem of 
concern here is the sequential situation. The multi-stage problem 
eludes the definition of state since the environmental conditions 
are partly dependent on the organism's response. The static 
situation lies outside the condition of repetition of a problem 
in time. 
Since the word "decision....making" includes problems 
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deliberately excluded from this work, and since there are two 
types of sequential decision-making situations that are of interest, 
it will be convenient to drop the generic term and substitute the 
specific terms "games against nature" and "games between players". 
Fig.2:7 shows the general matrix for a decision-making 
problem. In psychological terms, this means that the organism has 
competing responses each of which may be possible under any one of 
several states. The organism holds a certain control over any 
given outcome, but does not uniquely determine it. This is the 
typical situation for which game theory was developed. It is for 
this reason that the decision problems being investigated in this 
research will be called "games". 
The interaction between organism and environment can be 
regarded as a game between the organism and some unknown~ponent. 
For ease of communication, and following general convention, the 
name "nature" will be given to this opponent; and the successions 
of states the organism encounters may be described as the strategies 
of nature. In the laboratory, nature's strategies are, in fact, the 
strategies of the experimenter, i.e. the experimenter's carefully 
prepared states. 
The possible interactions between the organism's response-
repertoire and the states of nature can be represented by a pay-off 
matrix of the type rulown in Fig.2:7. Since states and responses 
are independent, the probability values associated with the outcomes 
can be dropped. Two additional ,vectors can be added: one denoting 
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the probability of occurrence of the states of nature, P (S) row; 
the other, P (R) column, denoting the maximal terminal probability 
of occurrence of the organism, i.e. the maximal reaction. The 
P (S) row will consist of probability values s1' s2' •••• 'sk' •••• 'sm 
denoting the probability of occurrence of states S1' S2' •••• 'Sk' •••• 'Sm. 
The P (R) column will, similarly, consist of probability values 
r 1 , r 2 , •••• , r i , ····'rn denoting the probability of occurrence of 
responses R1, R2, •••• , Ri , •••• , Rn. The sum of these probabilities 
will each be equal to unity, i.e., s = k 
i = h 
and y---
i = 1 
r. = 1. 
l. 
In the cells of the matri~, the reward probabilities can take any 
value from 0 to 1 (inclusive). Fig 2:8 summarises the situation. 
The fact that this is a game against nature not only means 
that states are independent of responses but also means that one 
of the assumptions of game theory, rational play, may not hold for 
at least one of the players, viz., nature. Over a series of moves, 
it would be reasonable to assume that nature's plays are played in a 
fi~ed, possibly discoverable, proportion - and perhaps in a fi~ed, 
possibly discoverable, order. That is, the order in which states 
occur may be discovered and the values of the vector P (S) may also 
be discovered. Clearly, this is likely to have some effect on the 
S's reaction to the situation. 
The pay-off matri~ for games between people has the same 
characteristics as that for games against nature. Since another 
human player is involved in the game, the states will not necessarily 
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Fig 2:8. P%y-off Matrix for Game Against Nature 
where:-
P (R) 
r 1 
r 2 
r. 
l. 
r 
n 
O"r < 
, ik' 
P ( S) 
R1 
R2 
R. 
l. 
R 
n 
1 , o 
6 1 6 2 .•••...• ~ •••••••• Sm 
S1 S2· •••.... Sk·· •••••• Sm 
r 11 r 12 ••••••• r 1k·······r1m 
r 21 r 22 ••••••• r2k·······r2m 
r· 1······r· 2••••••• r·k·······r. l. l. ). 1m 
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be independent of the responses, i.e., the states are unlikely 
to be instituted in a fixed, possibly discoverable order or 
proportion. The expected value can, therefore, not be worked 
out on the Bayesian model. Under the assumptions of full in-
formation and rationality for both players, however, a minimax 
solution can be worked out. This solution specifies the reaction 
of the players, i.e. prescribes the P (R) vector for each player 
(thus, also specifying the P (S) vector for each player, since 
the states for one players are the responses of the other). 
There are reasons for believing that this solution will seldom 
be achieved in experimental games (see, e.g. Simon,1956) but it 
may serve as a criterion against which actual reaction may be 
measured. 
General Purpose of Thesis 
In terms of the above framework, the main concern of this 
thesis is with a simple game against nature. The chief object is 
to achieve some empirical information about the reaction of 
human Ss to this game under different conditions of information 
about it. In the process, it is hoped to discover something about 
the strategies used by Ss in collecting information and using it. 
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CHAPTER III - EXPERIMENTAL PROBLEMS 
The simple game against nature that is the chief concern 
of this thesis is the mixed game of Atkinson and Suppes (195S). 
This is simple insofar as it involves only two states and two 
responses. It was decided to use only one of their games and the 
mixed game is the most complex of the three. The other games 
would become trivial for the Ss used (University students) if 
they were given full information about the pay-off matrix. It 
was thought that problems of boredom might arise and the effects 
of boredom might obscure the results. In any case, the mixed game 
is the most general situation and it was thought that results in 
this situation might well apply to the other games. The mixed 
game, with pay-off to the S, is represented by Fig.3:1. This is 
a game against nature and there are, therefore, five independent 
variables. 
Fig.3:1. Mixed Game Used 
1 
"2 
1 
1 
"6 
Two of these concern information given to S. All Ss are 
told the basic rules of the game, i.e. that they have two responses, 
which, together with two .states, determine, on every trial, one 
of four outcomes and that these outcomes are related to monetary 
reward. In addition, S.ay be told, in advance, of the state of 
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nature on every trial (i.e., be required to play after nature) and 
of the pay-offs involved as the outcomes. This means that there are 
four variable conditions of information, derived from these two 
independent variables. Ss may know the pay-offs of the game and play 
after nature (1 1), or know about the pay-offs and play before nature 
(1 0), or be ignorant of the pay-offs and play after nature (0 1), or 
be ignorant of the pay-offs and play before nature (0 0). It is 
hypothesised that these information conditions are likely to have an 
effect on the actual reactions of Ss to the situation. 
Another two independent variables concern the pay-offs used 
and the plays chosen for nature. These affect the maximal reaction 
and might, therefore, be expected to affect the actual reactions of 
Ss as well. Even within the constraints that the game should remain a 
mixed one, there are mathematically an infinite number of pay-off 
variations possible. It was thought that the reaction of Ss to the 
game would depend not so much on the actual values of reward as on the 
relationship between them. In the game used, this relationship is 
expressed by saying that the game is a mixed one. Consequently, the 
same random pay-offs were used in all experiments except the last one 
where different values were introduced (within the constraint that the 
game should remain a mixed one), partly as a check on this assumption. 
Variations in the plays of nature also give rise to an 
infinite number of possibilities. It was decided not to introduce 
patterning of the states of nature and this reduced the number 
considerably. When the states B1 and B2 are played in random order, 
the maximal reaction depends on the proportion of B1 plays to B2 plays. 
This dependency is best shown by means of a graphical representation. 
Fig.3:2 is constructed for this purpose. The line B1 B2 represents 
unity, and points on it the playing of B's plays. If B1 is played 
all the time, A will gain t or t according as he plays A1 or A2• If 
B2 is played all the time, A will gain 1 or ~ according as he plays 
A1 or A2• Lines joining the outcomes of each of A's plays are drawn 
and labelled A1 and A2• Any point P on the line B1 B2 represents a 
game strategy for B (the limiting cases are the pure strategies B1 
and B2). The proportion into which the point P divides the line 
represents the mix of plays B1 and B2 involved in the strategy. For 
example, if the point P is t of the way along B1 B2 from B2 , the line 
is divided in the ratio 2:1; and the point represents the strategy of 
mixing B1 and B2 in the ration 1:2. A perpendicular to B1B2 drawn 
from P will intersect the lines A1 and A2 at points which represent 
the outcome to A of playing these pure strategies respectively. If 
B's strategy is fixed at this point (i.e. B plays B1 and B2 in a fixed 
proportion,as might be the case if B represents nature) ,then A's maximal 
reaction is to play A1 all the time, since he gains more from this 
strategy than any other. If B does not have a fixed strategy (i.e. 
B may play B1 and B2 in any proportions) and is rational, then the 
point V represents the minimax outcome and the point Q (the point on 
B1B2 through which a perpendicular to B1B2 from V passes) represents 
the minimax strategy for B. In this case, it is to mix B1 and B2 in 
the ratio 5:1. If B's strategy is fixed and represented by a point 
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between B1 and Q, then A's best strategy is A2• If B's strategy 
is fixed and represented by a point between Q and B2• A's best 
strategy is A1• Since B's strategy is under the control of the 
experimenter, this can be varied and the effects on reaction noted. 
This was done in some of the experiments. 
The fifth independent variable is the variable of time. 
The procedure adopted was to split the time up into trials and, as 
far as possible, to let S institute each trial. In effect, this 
variable becomes a dependent one. The number of trials, however, 
was decided by the experimenter. This was set at 200 trials for 
three reasons. First, because of reports that Ss do not approach 
a maximal reaction in a probability learning situation until after 
many trials (Edwards, 1961), it seemed more appropriate for the game 
situation to set a limit to the number of trials rather than train 
Ss to some criterion. Second, it is necessary to have a fairly large 
sample of behaviour from each S if individual measures are to be 
meaningful; on the other hand, S might become bored after many trials. 
This was the reason for hav~200 as the limit to the number of trials. 
Third, 200 trials were given by Atkinson and Suppes in their experiment. 
The dependent variables are not so easily summarised. Two 
levels of description can be identified, and two problems were, there-
fore, faced. 
The first problem was to find a way of expressing the reaction 
of S to the situation. Perhaps inevitably, this will be a superficial 
dependent variable. For ease of comparison, it was necessary to devise 
-~-
a statistic which would be applicable to all the results under the 
various treatments. The statistics also had to be psychologically 
plausible. It was decided that the most important aspect of as's 
reaction to the situation would be the change in behaviour which 
occurred over the 200 trials. Consequently, it was decided to use 
one figure, a coefficient of change of behaviour, to represent this 
aspect. The details of this statistic were worked out experiment by 
experiment. It was hoped that if the independent variables were 
having an effect, gross variations in them would be reflected in this 
gross measure of reaction. This scheme places considerable stress on 
the number of trials given. It could be that over 200 trials, the 
behaviour of all Ss becomes similar; or that it requires more than 
200 trials for differences to show up between Ss under different 
treatments. To meet the first objection, it is possible to take 
readings at an earlier number of trials, say, at the end of the 150th 
trial. The only way to meet the second objection is to increase the 
number of trials and run the risk that effects of boredom will confound 
results. These considerations were borne in mind during the carrying 
out of the experiments. 
The second problem is to give a descriptive account of 
changes in S as S proceeds from the first trial to the two hundredth. 
There are several possible accounts available in the psychological 
literature. Since these are the dependent variables that are more 
likely to be readily generalisable, some attention has to be given 
to the descriptions of change of behaviour used by other psychologists. 
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Descriptions of Change of Behaviour in Sequential Situations 
Since the main concern of the thesis is with a game against 
nature, descriptions which are confined to learning situations will 
not be considered. Even with this exclusion, many descriptions are 
available. For convenience, they can be divided into two main types, 
which are not, however, mutually exclusive. The first type can be 
classed as a "sampling" description. The second type are characterised 
by an attempt to use "logical oprations" to describe what happens. 
The best example of the first type is the "stimulus sampling" des-
cription of Estes while computer simulation attempts are a good 
example of the second type. 
The model proposed by Estes (1950) was, in the first 
instance, developed to account for group results in a learning 
situation. An important extension of this model took place when 
Estes and Straughan (1954) used the model to account for probability 
matching in a two-choice probability learning situation. The 
relevant equation (Eq.3:1) expresses 
[ IT - P (0)] (f - e) n 
for a group of Ss the expected probability of occurrence of 
prediction of the more frequent event at the end of n trials 
In this equation, 1T is the probability of 
occurrence of the more frequent event, p (0) is the initial 
probability of occurrence of prediction of this event, and e 
is a theoretical parameter which represents rate of learning. 
Theoretically, 19 is "the average proportion of stimUlus elements 
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sampled per trial from the stimulus set ••••• representing a given 
stimulating situation" (Estes, 1959). Since the value of 9 lies 
'" between 0 and 1, the term G - {)) approaches zero as g, the 
number of trials, increases. Thus, the terminal reaction of Ss 
will be at the value IT , the probability of occurrence of the 
more frequent event. ~lis is the probability matching result 
reported, for example, by Grant, Hake and Hornseth (1951) and 
Jarvik (1951). 
The equation (Eq.3:1) also gives values for the course of 
behaviour and Estes and Straughan carried out 240 trials in a 
probability learning experiment in order to check the prediction 
against the results obtained. In order to do this, they had to 
obtain estimates of e from the data. At best, this constitutes 
a mild test of their_ theory, since only the theoretical form of 
the learning curve and the terminal reaction are predicted without 
reference to the data. They were, however, well pleased with their 
results, concluding that not only group means but also individual 
curves could be described satisfactorily by their tharetical functions. 
In doing this, they required to estimate separate values of & for 
each S and even then admitted that two out of sixteen curves reported 
deviated considerably from the theoretical form. It is possible to 
argue that 9 depends for its value not only on the learning situation 
but also on organismic differences (Estes,1959), but this means that 
in a learning situation the only dependent variable that is predicted 
is the shape of the learning curve. In a probability learning 
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situation, both learning curve shape and terminal reaction are 
being predicted. In that case, it is surprising that Estes and 
Straughan were not worred about "a few widely deviant cases" where 
the, values of individual Ss did not approach the theoretical 
asymptote. At best, all that can be said is that some of the 
individual curves conformed to expectation. 
The exceptions become more worrying when one considers 
the report of Edwards (1961) that, over 1,000 trials, Ss go beyond 
the probability matching point and approach maximal reaction, i.e., 
consistent prediction of the more frequently occurring event. 
Atkinson and Suppes (1958) applied the basic theory of 
Estes to predict simultaneously the behaviour of two players in 
games. A critical account of this experiment is given in Chapter I. 
Details of individual Ss are not given in the article. One might 
suppose that difficulties similar to those encountered by Estes and 
Straughan (1954) would turn up again. A probability learning 
situation is a simple one compared to the compleIity of a game 
situation. 
Another approach under the general heading of "sampling" 
descriptions is that inspired by Bayes' theorem. Suppes (1954-55) 
expressed early the belief that subjective probability and utility 
should somehow be recognised in decision-making. This quickly 
became a controversial issue. Becker and McClintock (1967), in 
their review, show that this question is still not settled. The 
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use of Bayes' theorem in the revision of hypotheses is a 
prescription. Somewhat less controversial is the suggestion 
(e.g., Rapoport, 1964(b); Edwards,196S) that man is a processor 
of information according to Bayes' theorem, or a model based on it. 
Differences have been found between the optimal strategy prescribed 
by Bayes' theorem and the actual behaviour of SSe These differences 
gave rise to modifications of Bayes' theorem in an attempt to 
provide a descriptive model of human behaviour. Some studies 
(e.g. Rapoport, 1964(b); Pitz,1968j Peterson, DuCharme and Edwards, 
1968) test these Bayesian models in experimental situations. 
The paper by Edwards, Lindman and Savage (1963) provides 
a simple and adequate account of Bayes' theorem. If D represents 
a datum, H an hypothesis, then the probability of H given D 
[P(H\D)] (the posterior odds) is related to the probability of 
D given H ~(DIH)] (the prior odds). A basic form of the theorem 
is given by Eq.3:2. In the equation. 
P [H I DJ p (n)t-I) p{f1) 
P (D) 
P(H) and P(D) are respectively the probabilities of the hypothesis 
being true and the datum occurring. Psychologically, this might be 
thought of as saying that the feeling of certainty about an hypothesis 
is increased if an event occurs which is likely under that hypothesis. 
The typical experiment presents S with data and requires 
him to choose between two hypotheses. It might be that in the game 
situation, S is choosing between the hypothesis that A1 pays best 
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and the hypothesis that A2 pays best. Experiments inspired by 
Bayes' theorem would then be directly relevant. When the behaviour 
of human Ss is compared to the behaviour prescribed by Eq.3:2, the 
evidence (Edwards,Lindman and Phillips, 1965; Peterson et al,1968) 
suggests that Ss are slow to draw conclusions from data. Meyer 
(1967) has shown that, in general, Ss improve in efficiency with 
practice, that giving Ss knowledge of results significantly increased 
efficiency but actual monetary reward did not. Pitz (1968) asked 
his Ss to decide which of two data-generating devices was being 
used. He found that his Ss seemed to adopt the strategy of deciding 
in advance on a fixed sample size on which basis they would make a 
decision. He found the subjective odds on the "correct" hypothesis 
increased as sample size increased, whether the information was 
confirming or disfirming. When the amount of information was small 
(an independent variable in this study), Ss were willing to come to 
a decision on a small amount of information. 
These are interesting results and may well suggest 
generalisable descriptions of what happens when S is presented 
with a sequential situation. Since the group data in such experiments 
do not conform to Bayes' theorem, attempts are sometimes made to 
utilise the theorem as a description by weakening or altering the 
assumptions of the theorem. In particular, the problems involved 
in subjective utility are often pointed to and examined. It is 
not the purpose of this research to use models that generate group 
data when attempting to describe what is happening to an individual. 
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Group measures too often obscure iml)Ortant differences. Since 
B~es' theorem is designed to deal specifically with subjective 
probabilities, it seems especially inappropriate to test models 
derived from it by reference to group data. Indeed, as Becker and 
McClintock (1967) point out, "combining the raw choice data and then 
estimating group utilities and probabilities •••• implicitly assumes 
some type of probabilistic choice model in which the utilities and 
probabilities are defined by random vectors rather than fixed 
constant s." It might be worthwhile using this model for a description 
of grouped choice data, but the psychologically plausible notions of 
subjective probabilit~~and utility come under considerable stress. 
For these reasons, derivative models of Bayes' theorem were not 
closely studied. The theorem itself, however, and some of the 
results obtained suggest descriptions of change of behaviour which 
might be applicable to a game situation. 
The concern with hypotheses is not conf~ed to psychologists 
using Bayes' theorem. Another approach which seemed of interest to 
the writer is the approach of Erickson (1968). He considers that 
it is not stimuli nor data that are being sampled by hypotheses. 
In the 1968 paper, his purpose was to find something out about the 
nature of hypothesis sampling in a concept identification task. 
That is, he assumes that it is reasonable to describe a SiS reaction 
to such a task in terms of hypothesis sampling. He misinformed his 
Ss after they produced their first hypothesis, i.e. he told them 
it was wrong, and, at the same time, made it right for the rest 
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of the trials. The Ss found this problem more difficult than a 
control one but did manage to solve it. B,y way of explanation, 
Erickson suggested a 1flocal consistency" model. The argument is 
that Ss make fairly efficient use of recently acquired information 
and try to make forthcoming hypotheses consistent with recently 
tried hypotheses and/or recently seen data. In other words, Ss 
use a short-term memory store as well as a pool of hypotheses in 
a task like this. 
Erickson's description can also be couched in the language 
of "logical operations". S can be regarded as having a collection 
of hypotheses with differing probability values attached to them. 
The most likely hypothesis is first tested against the data and is 
either disca~ded or accepted. If it is accepted, the problem is 
solved: if it is discarded, the next most likely hypothesis is tested. 
This process is very similar to the TOTE unit (test-operate-test-exit) 
that Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) suggest. Their book was 
based on the computer analogy and they write quite extensively about 
d 1 · " "plans for searching an so v~ng • If this kind ofdescription is 
to be used, the questions to be asked include one of especial interest, 
i.e., "Does S sample or search until he maximises his gain or does 
some 'satisficing' principle intervene which ends search operations 
if S is merely satisfied with the gains?" This question has been 
posed - not quite in these terms - by Simon (1957) whose interest 
lay not in monetary reward or reward-for-reward's sake (self-esteem, 
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perhaps) but in the primary motives of hunger and thirst. It is 
a question not unrelated to the problems of subjective expected 
utility. 
Another attempt to provide a computer-like model of the 
organism lies in Broadbent's (1958) account of "Perception and 
Communication". The information-flow model suggested by him is 
shown in Fig. 3:3. He postulates a "store of conditional 
probabilities" which, he suggests, is susceptible to change 
over time by meafts of reinforcement. The sp~ed with which it is 
altered will depend partly on whether there is full or partial 
reinforcement. This model is not inconsistent with the other 
models that have been examined. The difference lies in the width 
of applicability of the models. Whereas Estes is concerned only 
with describing learning processes, the Bayesian theorists only with 
describing decision-making and Erickson with the Sa hypotheses, 
Broadbent is concerned with all that an organism can do and his 
model is an attempt to break down the organism into sub-systems. 
Perhaps it is a worthwhile attempt not because it produces a testable 
theory but rather because is stresses that in every situation, a 
com,:'Plete organism is involved not just a "selective filter" or 
a "store of conditional probabilities of past events". In a game 
against nature (or a probability learning situation), one might 
concentrate on expected simultaneous changes over time in several 
of the conditional probabilities of past events. Giving Ss 
Fig. 3: 3. Broadbent's (1958) Tentative Information-
Flow Diagram. 
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information about the situation they are facing will presumably 
have the effect of "adjusting the internal coding to the probabil-
ities of external events" (Broadbent, 1958) i.e., setting the 
selective filter. One might then expect such Ss to react 
differently from Ss who are given no information about the 
situation. 
Finally, there are de script ions <f human thinking and 
behaviour derived from the computer programs used in computer 
simulation studies. Newell and Simon (1963) give a good summary 
of such programs. The first was the General Problem Solver (GPS) 
devised by Newell, Shaw and Simon (1958,1959). The GPS simUlates 
human thought processes by setting up sub-goals and achieving them 
in the course of a solution to a problem. The evidence on which 
this rests is a comparison between protocols produced by Ss 
asked to "think aloud" when solving a problem, and a "trace" 
obtained from the computer which prints out the principal steps 
(logical operations) taken during the solution of that problem. 
In this way, an account of the operations involved can be obtained 
and the account checked against a S's behaviour. In the long term, 
the operations generally involved in problem-solving can be 
di scovered. 
Of the programs reviewed by Hunt (1968), one is of 
especial interest, the binary choice program. This program was 
devised by Feldman (1961) to simulate human behaviour in a 
probability learning situation. He produced a program for each S 
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and gives a full protocol of one S in mappendix to his paper. All 
the programs are very much alike but there are some features specific 
to each program. One of his assumptions was that Ss had hypotheses 
about the nature of the sequence being presented to them. This is 
one way to test claims (e.g.,by Goodnow,1955) that Ss in a probability 
learning situation might well be trying to solve a problem. 
These are the main descriptions of change of behaviour which 
seemed likely to be useful. It is from among these descriptions that 
the second-level dependent variables are to be found. It does not 
necessarily follow that if one of them is "right", all the others 
must be "wrong". As with any description, all may be equally valid 
accounts of what is happening. When this is the case, other 
considerations come into play when selecting among them. These 
considerations might be simplicity, generalisability, ease of 
communication and so on. Inevitably, some of the descriptions have 
alrea~ played a part in calling this research into being. It 
has alrea~ been recorded that dissatisfaction with the theoretical 
application of Estes' model to the game situation inspired this 
research. Nonetheless, all of the descriptions are to be evaluated 
in the light of the experimental findings. 
Initial Problems 
Two experiments were carried out preliminary to the main 
enquiry. They were designed to deal with two problems, which were 
likely to be recurring problems. 
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The first problem is the probability learning situation. 
In terms of a formal analysis of situations, this is a simpler 
situation mathematically than the game situation. In a probability 
learning situation, Ss are required to predict on each trial which 
of two states is about to be instituted. The order c£ the states is a 
random order. The game situation (with no information) can be 
thought of as involving two tasks - the task of predicting the next 
state and the task of responding to that state in the best possible 
way. Although there have been many experiments on probability 
learning, the results are far from clear. This is especially true 
of the reaction of individual SSe Accordingly, a probability learning 
experiment was carried out. 
Before this was done, however, the second problem had to be 
dealt with. This arises out of the nature of the sequence of states 
in both probability learning situation and the game situation. The 
problem is whether Ss can recognise a random sequence. If they 
cannot, they might spend the whole time in sequential situations 
looking for patterns. If this is so, it will set a limit to the 
relationship between actual and maximal reaction which might obscure 
the effects of independent variables. If it is not the case, it 
will exclude one possible expla:nation for any discrepancies noted 
between actual and maximal reactions. 
Hence, the first experiment is intended to answer the 
question "Can Ss recognise random sequences?"; and the second experiment 
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is intended to answer the question "How do individual Ss react to 
a probability learning situation?". 
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CHAPTER IV. RECOGNITION OF BIAS IN STRINGS OF 
BINARY DIGITS* 
The problem of randomly ordered sequences is closely 
related to the problem of bias in sequences. Indeed, one is 
often defined in terms of the other as, for example, when a 
sequence is said to be random if there is an absence of bias. 
This is an especially useful definition if the experimental 
purpose is to discover whether Ss can produce random sequences 
because this problem was raised by the problem of response bias. 
Several papers (e.g. Weiss,1964; Tune, 1964; Baddeley,1966) have 
been published which report experimental investigations of 
response bias. The method used usually involves asking Ss to 
produce a random sequence of elements and these sequences are 
then measured for bias, (using, for example, information measures). 
The general findings are that human Ss are not very good at 
producing a random sequence of responses, but that certain factors 
(varying the time interval between individual responses, for 
example) seem to improve them. There is also evidence (Weiss, 
1964; Gerjuoy and Gerjuoy, 1965; Cook and Friis, unpublished) that 
some individuals are very much better at such a task than others. 
The problem of recognition of bias and recognition of the 
random nature of sequences has not been so closely studied. This 
is a perceptual-judgmental problem and the two forms of the question 
are alike, viz., lICan Ss detect bias in a sequence of events?lI 
* The experiment reported here has been published separately. ~Cook,1967) 
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and "Can Ss recognise a random sequence of events?" In this 
prooem, the generation of the sequence is an independent variable. 
It is convenient, therefore, to consider, as standard sequences, 
those derived from random number tables, and to define bias in a 
sequence as deviations from these standards. Baddeley (1966) noted 
that, under appropriate instructions, his Ss were able to select the 
random digit sequences from a miIture comprising sequences derived 
from random number tables and also sequences (presumably, biased) 
generated by other Ss under random response inst~uctions. This seems 
to be the only report on the recognition of bias in the literature. 
The problem of recognition of bias is central to several 
topics in psychology, especially to certain kinds of sequential 
situations. The formal models prescribe maIimal reactions, but 
these prescriptions are based on assumptions about the nature of 
sequences. Indeed, it could be argued that the formal models make 
different prescriptions for ordered and for random sequences of 
states. This is so even in the comparatively si~e probability 
learning situation. It could be that the reactions of Ss to such 
situations are affected by an inability of Ss to recognise the random 
nature of the sequences presented. This preliminary eIperiment was 
designed to discover whether Ss can recognise random sequences. 
B,y a random sequence is meant a sequence of elements where 
the order of the elements is derived from random number tables, i.e., 
the probability of occurrence of each element is independent of 
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preceding and succeeding elements. The definition covers not only 
the cases where the probabilities of occurrence of the events are 
equal, but also cases where these probabilities are unequal (cases 
sometimes classed as biased). Where the order is not derived in 
this way, the sequences are said to be patterned or partially 
patterned, or to be showing biased order. Since these definitions, 
together with the purpose, could give rise to many experimental 
investigations, it is necessary to exclude some of these deliberately. 
To begin with, the number of elements to be used in the sequences 
was restricted to two (0 and 1) because, in the game situations later 
presented, the number of states is two. A second problem concerns 
the length of the sequences. This problem is closely related to 
another one, whether the elements of the sequences are to be 
presented simultaneously or successively. It might be thought that 
since the game situations are sequential ones, the elements ought 
to be presented successively. It this were don~, however, problems 
of memory might start to intrude, unless the length of the sequences 
we~kept small. But if the length were kept small, it might be 
difficult for Ss to come to a conclusion. For example, how could 
even a well-programmed computer decide about a sequence 1 whose first 
ten element s were "1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1" without requiring to sample 
further? Under these constraints, it was decided to use sequences 
of length 100 elements and to present their elements simultaneously. 
These sequences were given tbemore specific name of "strings". 
It was tho~t that this would perhaps be an eas~ task than a 
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successive presentation task and, thus, Ss might not find it too 
frustrating. If Ss cannot recognise randomness under these conditbns, 
it would seem unlikely that they ever could. 
Experimental Design 
The characteristics of this experiment, in terms of the 
formal analysis of situations, are those of a test series following 
a discrimination learning experiment. The question to be answered 
is whether the test states are differentiated by the Ss along the 
dimensions of interest. Conclusions drawn about Ss' perceptual-
judgmental reactions depend on the nature of those states, and the 
training ~als. In this experiment (as is usual with human Ss), 
the training trials are replaced by well-defined instructions. 
These were presented at the top of a paper headed "Questionnaire" 
which was given to all Ss (see Appendix Ia). They consisted of one 
example with the required response, and instructions for responding, 
as follows:-
"Example 
String A 
String B 
010 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 1 0 0 001 1 1 0 000 1 
Since string A is more obviously patterned than string B, 
you would write 'more' opposite the question, i.e. String A v. B more. 
If you thought A was less obviously patterned than B, you 
would write 'less' opposite the question. If you thought they were 
about the same, write 'same' opposite the question. But try not to 
use the 'same' response." 
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This means that the instruc±ions to S did not use the 
word "random", and that Ss were "rewarded" for choosing a string 
which was "more obviously patterned". The ne1Ct section of the 
"Questionnaire" or comparison sheet contained the tes:t trials. 
Materials. These were twelve test states. These consisted of 
twelve strings of one hundred binary digits each, drawn up and 
printed on twelve separate sheets of paper, each sheet consisting 
of three rows of digits. String 1 was truly random, i.e. half the 
digits were zeros, half were ones, the order being determined by 
a table of random numbers. Three more of the strings were random 
in the sense that the order was derived from a table of random 
numbers, but in them the proportion of zeros to ones was altered, 
these proportions being 55-45, 75-25, and 90-10 for strings 2, 3 
and 4 respectively. 
String 5 consisted of a pattern, 0 1 1 0, repeated, and 
string 9 consisted of 0 0 1 repeated. Strings 6, 7 and 8 were 
derived from string 5 by obliterating respectively every fourth, 
every third and every second digit and replacing these with digits 
derived from a random number table (50-50 proportion). Similarly, 
strings 10, 11 and 12 were derived from string 9. 
The first thirty elements of each string are shown in 
Table 4: 1 • 
The method used was the method of paired comparisons 
(David,1963) which requires S to compare each of the twelve states 
(Strings) with every other one. Thus 66 comparisons were required 
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from each S. The dependent variable with this method is the 
number of times each string is preferred to the others, i.e. judged 
to be more obviously patterned. The method allows for inconsistency 
in Ss' choices. The actual comparisons required were numbered 1 to 
66 on the questionnaire sheet and labelled, e.g., .String I <v. II. 
To avoid some of the possible effects of the order of the 
comparisons, the twelve strings were randomly assigned Roman numbers 
I to XII. Thus, string 1 was labelled string VII, string 2 was 
labelled string IX, and so on. (Table 4:1 gives all the labels). 
It is not possible to avoid all the possible effects of the order 
of questions.except by randomly assigning different string numbers 
for each S. This would have taken considerable time to organise 
and it was thought that these effects were probably not going to 
confound the results. So, all Ss did the comparisons in the same 
order. 
A second part of the questionnaire sheet attempted to get 
some information about the individual S's approach to the situation. 
Two questions required S to mark on a four-point scale how easy 
and how interesting the task was, while the third question was an 
open-ended one, viz., "How did you decide that a given string was 
less patterned than another?" 
Subjects. The Ss were forty-four (44), male and female, undergraduates 
studying Psychology at the University of Keele. Their average age 
was about twenty years. 
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TABLE 4.:1. Showing the firat thi.rt7 el_nta of eaah 
atring at digitso 
String Label, 
1'0. 
1 
2 
, 
it-
S 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
VII 
IX 
XII 
VIII 
x 
v 
VI 
III 
IV' 
I 
XI 
II 
first thirty elements at string 
1 1 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 111 1 1 1 1 101 001 
o 1 0 1 1 101 1 1 1 1 1 1 000 0 1 000 001 1 001 1 
o 1 001 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 100 1 1 1 101 011 1 1 
111111100101011110111111011110 
01100 1 1 001 1 001 100 1 100 1 100 1 1 001 
o 1 100 1 1 1 0 1 1 001 100 1 1 1 0 1 100 1 100 1 
o 1 1 001 1 011 100 1 100 1 101 1 1 101 1 001 
o 1 1 000 1 100 1 100 1 1 001 1 001 101 1 101 
00100 1 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 
001 001 001 0 0 0 001 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 101 
000001000001000000001000000001 
011 101 0 1 100 000 1 1 0 0 001 0 0 000 1 001 
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Procedure. Ss were issued with a sheaf of papers containing all 
twelve strings of one hundred digits, labelled with Roman numerals 
in the order I - XII. The papers were held together by a paper-
clip and any individual string could be detached from the rest. 
Ss were also given a copy of the questionnaire. The instructions 
were given orally, along with the example, and it was pointed out 
that these instructions were printed at the top of the questionnaire. 
When all Ss claimed that they understood what was required of them, 
they started the comparison task. No time limit was imposed. When 
this task was completed, they were asked to answer the questions in 
the second part of the questionnaire. When all Ss had completed 
both tasks, the questionnaires were taken in by the experimenter. 
There were three separate groups of Ss involved, as the 
experiment was carried out as part of a laboratory class. In each 
case, the experiment lasted for a little over half-an-hour. All 
Ss were treated in the same way with one exception. The 11 Ss in 
the first group complained at the end of the experiment tnt they 
found it difficult to think in terms of "more" and "less" and 
would have preferred to have written the number of the string which 
was more obviously patterned. Accordingly, Ss in the other groups 
were instructed to put down the number of the string which they 
judged more patterned. 
(The materials used in this experiment can be found 
in Appendix Ia). 
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RESULTS 
The basic dependent variable is the number of times Ss 
prefer one string to the others and the theoretical interest lies 
in the ordering of these strings. The total number of preferences 
per string are given in Table 4:2. (Individual results are given 
in Appendix II(i)). 
The strings can be ordered according to these scores and 
an overall test of equality can be carried out (David,1963). This 
was done and significant differences between the stri~were 
obtained. The method of contrasts of scores was used; this controls 
the probability of any erroneous declarations of significance at 
.05. Based on increasing scores, the following pattern of difference 
was found:-
1 3 2 4 12 7 10 8 11 6 
Any two strings not underlined by the same line may be considered 
diSinguishable for the SSe 
To the questions "How easy did you find the task?" and 
"How interesting did you find the task?", Table 4:3 gives the answers 
made. 
The answers to the third question, concerning how Ss went 
about the task, revealed some individual differences. Most Ss 
reported rather vaguely that they used a general visual impression. 
One or two, trying to be more specific, said that they paid attention 
String 
Score 
String 
Score 
TABLE 4:2. Showing number of times each string is 
preferred to oihers. N = 44. Maximum 
score possible for any given string is 
484 and minimum score is O. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
83.0 119.5 113.5 162.0 460.0 311.5 220.5 285.5 456.0 
10 11 12 
225·5 303·5 163.5 
I 
0\ 
Y' 
-64-
to the overall impression of the "regularity of appearance of the 
o a1.d 1". Some Ss reported that they had no difficulties when 
comparing strings IV and X with the other strings. There was some 
evidence of an attempt by some Ss to erploit the nature of random 
sequences. For example, strategies reported included resorting to 
counting, predicting the 101st digit, and paying particular attention 
to unbroken sequences of numbers. Some Ss reported using only the 
first part of the string, while others used this part of the string 
as a comparison standard for later parts. Some Ss changed their 
approach as the experiment proceeded, e.g. one S wrote "At first 
an almost 'number' by 'number' comparison and later by a far more 
immediate global pattern. 11 
TABLE 4:3. 
Question 1 
very easy 0 
easy 27 
difficult 59 
very difficult 14 
Answers to 2)estions 1 and 2 
(percentages • 
Question 2 
very int ere st ing 
interesting 
boring 
very boring 
0 
25 
50 
25 
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DISCUSSION 
Perhaps the most striking result is the way in which 
the four strings which were compiled using random number tables were 
judged to be the l,*st patterned. The low score of the first string 
suggests that for most Ss the paradigm of non-pattern is a random 
fifty-fifty string. It might be argued that Ss who had a clear idea 
of randomness would, using this string as a standard, find the task 
comparatively easy. Some evidence in favour of this hypothesis is 
derived from an analysis of the preferences of those Ss who found 
the task very difficult and those who found the task easy. Despite 
the slight change of procedure introduced for some of the Ss, there 
is no difference between the answers to the first question of the 
first group and the other two groups: if anything, the first group 
found the task slightly easier. Using all Ss, the average score for 
the basic random string from Ss who answered "very difficult" is 
3.00 compared with 1.08 from Ss who answered "easy". 
In general, the results are as one might expect on an 
hypothesiS that Ss could recognise degrees of randomness. The randomly 
ordered strings are judged least patterned, the only significant 
difference among them being between string 1 and string 4. That 
string 4 should be judged different from string 1 suggests that 
Ss are responding not only to order but also to the probability of 
occurrence of the elements. String 4 contained 90% of the element '1'. 
Of special interest are the orders of the strings derived 
by obliteration of parts of a patterned string. The orders (from low 
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to high scores) which one might expect are 8, 7, 6 and 5, from the 
pattern of string 5, and 12, 11, 10 and 9 from string 9's pattern. 
The orders obtained are 7, 8, 6 and 5 and 11, 10, 11 and 9. String 
7 is significantly different for the Ss from strings 5 and 6 but not 
from string 8; string 8 is significantly different from string 5 but 
not from string 6; and string 6 is significantly different from 
string 5. This means that the string with every third digit removed 
is judged to be less patterned than that with every second digit 
removed, and although this particular difference is not significant, 
it disturbs the general pattern of significance (especially when 
comparisons are made with string 6). The reason may be in the original 
pattern. The removal of every second digit from list 5 leaves intact 
a repeating pattern 0 - 1 - whereas the removal of wery third digit 
leaves intact a more complex pattern 01 - 00 -10 - 11 - (see Table 4:1). 
It may be that in order for the pattern to be perceived, it has to be 
confined to a few repeating digits. In a similar way, the string where 
every third digit is removed from the three-digit pattern of string 9 
leaves intact a simpler repeating sequence than the string where every 
second digit is removed, and the string where every fourth digit is 
removed. It is possible that more satisfactory results would be 
obtained if the selection of the item to be replaced were not patterned 
but random, e.g. instead of replacing every fourth item in string 5, 
replace 25% of the items, the particular items to be replaced being 
selected at random. 
It would seem from the results that Ss can to some extent 
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recognise randomness, although there is evidence of individual 
differences. Some Ss appear to be very good at this task. Where 
and under what conditions they learned the meanings of the words used 
in the instructions is of no immediate concern, although it might be 
interesting to try and train Ss t~o this task. They seem to have such 
a clear idea of what was meant that they even exploited the nature of 
random sequences in making their choices, according to their reports. 
How generalisable are these results? It may be that it 
is not possible to generalise beyond the population from which the 
sample of Ss was drawn, and it may even be that it is not possible 
to generalise beyond the conditions of the experiment. Since the 
Ss to be used in future experiments will also be University students, 
it is enough for the preliminary purposes of this experiment that the 
results can be generalised to that population. A more difficult 
problem is whether Ss involved in sequential situations can be said 
to be able to recognise the random nature of the sequences of states. 
To answer this question, successive rather than simultaneous states 
might be used. This is likely to place some burden on the short-term 
memory of the individual S and ~ result in a different answer to the 
question. But if one takes this line, it leads to the argument that 
there is no answer to the question outside the sequential situations 
of interest for each situation could be thought of as placing further 
burdens on the short-term memory store and channel capacity of the 
individual Ss involved. 
The tentative conclusion of this experiment is that Ss can, 
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under some circumstances, recognise the random nature of sequences. 
The best check on the generalisability of this conclusion will come 
from close attention to the reaction of Ss to the sequential situations 
themselves. 
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CHAPTER V - REACTIONS OF Ss TO PROBABILITY LEARNING 
SITUATIONS 
The way to experimental games from learning theory seems 
to be through probability learning experiments. Suppes and Atkinson 
, 
(1960) deliberately chose the conditions for their experimental games 
because these conditions most closely resembled probability learning 
conditions. Estes and Straughan (1954) had alreaqy applied the 
statistical learning model to probability learning. Suppes and 
Atkinson (1960) wanted to treat this application as a special case 
of a more general application. On the other hand, some authors 
(e.g., Rapoport, 1963) refer to the probability learning situation 
as if it were a special case of a game against nature, the specialness 
usually being described by the qualifier "simple". In terms of the 
formal analysis, one can certainly regard a probability learning 
experiment as a special case of a more general situation. Its 
specialness lies both in the pay-off matrix (with its limiting values 
of zeros and unities) and in the fact that Ss pl~ before the state 
of nature is known to them. The situation is also of some interest 
to those psychologists who stuqy human choice behaviour in terms of 
utility and subjective probability (Luce and Suppes,1965). These 
are the reasons for looking more closely at this situation before 
presenting Ss with games against nature. It is necessary not only 
to discover what the reactions of Ss are, but also to try and decide 
what descriptions of change of behaviour best fit the reactions of Ss 
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to this simple sequential situation. 
The basic probability learning situation requires S, on 
each trial, to make one of two responses. In the case of human Ss 
the responses "b" and "w", say, are the prediction of occurrence of 
state "B" or state "W', for example. S is rewarded, or deemed to be 
rewarded, if he makes response "b" before state ''B'' and response "w" 
before state "W', but not if he makes "b" to state "W' and response 
"w" to state ''B''. In the case of human Ss, the instructions given 
usually make this pay-off matrix explicit. Sometimes, monetary 
pay-offs are made but usually S is assumed to be rewarded by the 
knowledge that his prediction is right. 
When making the formal analysis, the distinction between 
two-choice discrimination learning and probability learning was made 
in terms of the information available to Ss, i.e., knowledge about 
the state of nature. It has been suggested by Bush and Mosteller 
(Bush and Wilson, 1956) that a further distinction provides two types 
of probability learning situation, a contingent and a non-contingent 
situation. For example, Brunswik (1939) used rats in a contingent 
situation because the choice of the Ss cut them off from information 
about the alterntive outcome, i.e., information presentation was 
contingent upon the response of S. On the other hand, Humphreys 
(1939) used human Ss in a non-contingent situation because, irrespective 
of their choice, they found out about both outcomes, i.e., information 
presentation was non-contingent upon the response of S. This 
-71-
distinction can be rephrased more succinctly for human Ss by 
reference to information about the p~-off matrix. Ss given such 
information are in a non-contingent situation. Ss not given this 
information are in a contingent situation. This distinction is 
especially important in the conditions of later experiments 
(Chapters VI, VII and VIII). It allows for a comparison of results 
in those situations with stimulus sampling theory predictions. 
Early non-contingent experiments with human Ss were 
carried out by Grant, Hake and Hornseth (1951), Jarvik (1951), 
and Brunswik and Herma (1951). Their results suggested a probability 
matching hypothesis. This states that Ss learn to respond to the 
more frequently occurring event and that the increase in response 
reaches an asymptote equal to the probability of occurrence of 
that event. It is this hypothesis that fitted in so well with 
derivations from Estes' stimulus sampling model that Estes and 
Straughan (1954) put it to the empirical test. They claimed the model 
was successful in predicting asymptotic behaviour and the course of 
learning not only for the group data but also for most individual SSe 
These experiments are all of the non-contingent, non-monetary reward 
type. Even within this type of experiment, questions were raised about 
whether th~really was an asymptote. In 1961, Edwards showed that, 
over one thousand trials, probability matching did not take place 
and that the final response probability was more extreme than the 
probability matching hypothesis suggested. Since the maximal reaction 
is to predict, for every trial, that event which occurs more frequently, 
these results suggest that Ss approach more and more the maximal 
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reaction. 
There is also evidence that in non-contingent situations 
where actual monetary pay-offs are made, probability matching does not 
appear to be the rule (see, e.g., Edwards, 1956; MYers et ~, 1963). 
There is some evidence that the behaviour of Ss depends in some way 
on the pay-off functions (Galanter and Smith, 1958). This is 
corroborated by putting Ss into a contingent situation either without 
monetary reward (Detambel, 1955) or with monetary reward (Edwards,1956). 
There are at least two ways of describing behaviour in 
these situations. One derives from the stimulus sampling theory of 
Estes, in particular, and the use of Markov learning models, generally. 
This approach makes assumptions about behaviour, especially about change 
of behaviour, and tests an axiomatised mathematiai model against 
empirically obtained data. The success of such models depends partly 
on how well they fit the data and partly on the number of parameters 
that have to be estimated from the data. For the probability learning 
situation, the model of Estes was the first to be used and others are 
derived from it. The trouble with such models is their concern to 
predict group data. Now and again, cautions are made about the 
acceptability of such data as representing individual processes. For 
example, Luce and Suppes (1965) claim that the distribution of the 
individual probabilities of response (at asymptotic level) is bimodal 
and that the group means reported are roughly in the valley of the 
distribution. The only detailed report of the results of individual 
Ss was given by Estes and Straughan (1954) when they were claiming 
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that the Estes' model accounted for most of these results. Even 
when stimulus sampling theory is used to predict gruup data, many 
investigations (e.g., Anderson, 1966) have come to the conclusion 
that the "weight of evidence has been against the theory". Nonetheless, 
the theory does make specific predictions that can be tested. 
The other way is to talk in terms of what S is trying to do. 
Goodnow (1955), for example, thought that Ss m~ be trying to solve a 
problem. They may be trying to recognise some pattern in the sequence 
of states. Galanter and Smith (1958), using patterned sequences in a 
situation similar to a probability learning situation, found that Ss 
required more and more trials before theJ "saw" the structure of the 
sequence as these patterns become more and more complex. It could be 
that Ss in a probability learning situation are trying to d&a 
"rational" thing, i. e., they try to crack the code of pattern sequence. 
Once this is done, the pay-off is to be right on every trial. Only 
when they fail to do tis will Ss consider that the sequence might well 
be a random one and only then react maximally. Some Ss might not be 
able to recognise the nature of the sequences although the experiment 
reported in the preceding chapter suggests that many Ss will be able 
to recognise randomness. The success of Feldman's (1961) program 
implies that something like this reaction set of events m~ be going 
on. Other experiments (Bruner, Wallach and Galanter, 1959; Wolin 
et al., 1965) have studied the behaviour of Ss in similar situations 
--
using patterned sequences. Generally, their findings suggest that 
human Ss react successfully by looking for patterns or rules derivable 
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from patterns of states. It is reasonable, therefore, to suppose 
that a similar reaction takes place in the probability learning 
situation. 
There is one more point that should be made. Some Ss, 
while realising that there is no pattern to the sequence, may regard 
that sequence, not as an independently generated one, but as one under 
the whim of the experimenter. That is, the experimenter and not nature 
may be regarded as the opponent. If such a set is induced in S, then 
S may well imagine that the institution of states is not independent 
of S's responses. The instructions given to S and the way S interprets 
them l~not unrelated to this. In other words, the presentation of the 
situation is likely to be important. Some corroboration of this derives 
from experiments in which instructions to Ss have been varied (McCracken, 
Osterhout and Voss, 1962) and information about the sequence of states 
has been differently presented (Nies, 1962). 
The purposes of the probability learning~eriment were 
four, all determined by the purposes of later experiments and the need 
f~ a general account of Ss' behaviour in sequential situations. First, 
because of the controversy over probability matching, it was required 
to discover whether this phenomenon took place in the reactions of the 
Ss used. Second, in view of the doubt about the relationship between 
individual and group data, it was required to discover whether group 
data can be regarded as representing individual processes. Third, 
it was required to discover whether the presentation of the situation 
had an effect on Ss' performance. And fourth, it was required to 
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discQver whether the amassing of information about the situation 
was likely to affect reactions of SSe 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The situation presented to the Ss was a non-contingent 
one with no monetary p~-off. There were two reasons for choosing 
this situation. One was that such a situation does not have to be 
presented individually to Ss and, therefore, more Ss could be studied. 
The other was that this situation was used by Estes and Straughan 
(1954) and would, therefore, allow for a check on their findings 
that the results are predictable from stimulus sampling theory. 
There were two independent variables, i.e., type of situation 
and amassing of information. The situation presented by Estes and 
Straughan (1954) required Ss, seated in a booth facing a panel of 
lights, to press one of two telegraph keys on a "ready" signal in an 
attempt to predict whether a lamp on the right or the left would flash. 
For this experiment, two quite different types of situation were 
devised. S noted his response on a prepared sheet of paper in both 
situations (the response sheet). In one situation, E then read out the 
state from a prepared list of states. In the other, E withdrew a ball 
from a box, thE\ball indicating the state (similar to the "box of 
marbles" procedure used by Nies, 1962). It was hypothesised that Ss 
would be more inclined to see that states and responses were independent 
if the states were drawn from a box than if the states were read 
from a list. The second independent variable was varied by giving 
different instructions to SSe In one case, Ss were told to keep a 
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record of the predicted outcome while, in the other case, Ss were 
told to keep a record of the predicted outcome and of the actual 
outcome of each trial. This was intended as a check on the recog-
nition of randomness in • sequential situation. It was hypothesised 
that Ss who were keeping a record of the sequence of states might 
see that the order was random sooner than Ss not keeping a record. 
The number-of trials, known in advance to all Ss, was kept at 200. 
The dependent variables are all derivable from the 
response sheets of SSe Traditionally, the chief dependent variable 
in such an experiment has been the probability of occurrence of one 
response traced, in some way, over the total number of trials. 
Estes and Straughan (1954), for example, took 6 blocks of 40 trials 
each and worked out, over the group of Ss, the proportion of trials 
when one response was made. It is about the behaviour of this 
dependent variable that the Estes theory predicts, particularly, 
its asymptotic value and the shape of its curve over trials. Because 
of the need to compare the results with those of Estes and Straughan 
(1954), this dependent variable was looked at. But the chief 
interest of this ~ries of experiments on sequential situations lies 
in the reaction of the individual S to the situation. For this 
reason, a change of behaviour statistic was planned for each S. 
This represented the change in the extent to which S was willing 
to be wrong for each of the two possible responses. Further details 
are given in the results section. It was these figures that were 
subjected to statistical analysis. Since the situationswere 
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presented to groups of Ss, it was not possible to get any detailed 
account of what the Ss considered they had been doing in the situation, 
although a general conversation was held with each group of Sa after 
the experiment was over. This means that the only reliable guides to 
what individual Ss were doing are to be found in the individual 
statistics and the general effects of the independent variables. 
The design was a 2x2 factorial design. The four groups 
were treated as follows:-
Group 1 were given the sequence as read from a list 
and were not instructed to record the actual 
sequence; 
Group 2 were given the sequence as read from a list 
and were instructed to record the actual 
sequence; 
Group 3 were given the sequence by use of a black box 
and were not instructed to record the actual 
sequence; and 
Group 4 were given the sequence by use of the black 
box and were instructed to record the actual 
sequence. 
Materials. A response sheet of paper was prepared with trial 
numbers 1 to 200 on it. A second column headed "Predicted Outcome" 
provided a blank space opposite each trial number of the S's 
response to that trial. For groups 2 and 4, an additional column 
headed "Actual Out come" provided a space where Ss could record the 
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sequence of states. 
A list of 200 elements, named "Black" and "White" was 
drawn up, using a table of random numbers. The elements or states 
were in the proport ion of 3 ''Black'' to 5 "White". The same list was 
used with both Groups 1 and 2. 
A black box with an aperture for a hand was constructed. 
Into this bo~ were placed 5 white table-tennis balls and 3 table-
tennis balls which had been painted black. The box was used with 
Groups 3 and 4. Naturally, different sequences of states occurred 
on these two occasions. A tape-recorder was used to record the actual 
sequences. 
Subjects. Ss were 55 undergraduates stu~ing psychology at the 
University of Keele (average age about 20 years). The Ss were alrea~ 
divided into four groups for laboratory instruction purposes: and 
the experiment was carried out as part of the laboratory course of 
the SSe The numbers in the four groups, determined by the size of 
the classes, were respectively 16, 16, 10 and 13. About half of the 
Ss in each group were men and half were women. No S in this experiment 
had par~ipated in the experiment reported in the previous chapter. 
Procedure. All Ss were handed a response sheet. The Ss in Groups 
1 and 2 were told: "Today the experiment consists of 200 trials, as 
you can see from the sheet I have given you. On each trial, I want 
you to predict whether I am going to say 'Black' or 'White', and 
I want you to write down your prediction in the space provided. 
That is, on trial 1 you will write down a 'B' or a 'W' opposite 
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trial 1 in the column headed 'Predicted Outcome'. I shall give you 
plenty of warning when I went you to predict by saying 'Trial number 
x. Rea~?' I will then wait for a few seconds to give you time to 
make your prediction and write it down. I will then tell you whether 
it was 'Black' or ' Whit e' titr that trial." Ss in Group 2 were told, 
at this point, "You should then fill in the appropriate space in the 
column headed 'Actual Outcome' with a 'B' if I say 'Black' and with 
a 'W' if I say 'White'. This column is provided to help you with 
your task of prediction." Both groups were then told, "There will 
be 200 trials. Each trial is either 'Black' or 'White'. You are to 
try to make as many correct predictions as possible." A:ny questions 
were then answered until it was clear that all Ss knew exactly what 
was required of them. 
Ss in Groups 3 and 4 were shown the black bozo E, with-
drawing a white b:all, said, "The boz contains at least one white 
table-tennis ball" and, replacing it and withdrawing a lhck ball, added, 
"And at least one black table-tennis ball. TodaJr the experiment consist s 
of 200 trials, as you can see from the sheet I have given you. On each 
trial I want you to predict what colour of ball will be drawn from the 
box and I want you to write down your prediction in the space provided. 
That is, on trial 1 you will write down a 'B'ar a 'W' opposite trial 
1 in the column headed 'Predicted OUtcome'. I shall give you plenty 
of warning when I want you to predict by saying 'Trial number X. Rea~?' 
I will then wait a few seconds to give you time to make your prediction 
and write it down. I will then take a ball from the boz, let you all 
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see it and say whether it is 'Black' or 'White' for that trial." 
Ss in Group 4 were told, at this point, "You should then fill in 
the appropriate space in the column headed 'Actual Outcome' with a 
'B' if it is a black ball and with a 'W' if it is a white ball. This 
column is provided to help you with your task of prediction." Both 
groups were then told, "There will be 200 trials. The box contains only 
white and black balls and only one will be drawn from it on each trial: 
and that will be put back before the next trial. You are to try and 
make as many rorrect predictions as possible." A period was then 
allowed for questions. When Ss asked how many of each colour were 
in the box, E said that that was something for them to discover. When 
it seemed clear that all Ss understood the instructions, the experiment 
began. 
E asked the group, first, to predict "black" or "whit e" for 
trial 1. A time-lapse of several seconds was allowed until it was clear 
that all Ss had written their prediction. The state was then declared 
either by conspicuous reference to the list (Groups 1 and 2) or by 
shaking the box on the table beside E and withdrawing a ball from it 
with eyes averted from it (for Groups 3 and 4), and then saying what 
the colour was. For Groups 2 and 4 a short time-lapse was allowed for 
them to note the actual state. Then E said "Trial number 2. Ready?" 
to initiate trial 2. All 200 trials were done successively. Soon, 
a time-lapse of about 3 seconds was allowed between trials. A tape-
recording was taken of the process for Groups 3 and 4. This was 
later used to relate Ss' responses to the sequence of s;tates. At the 
-81-
end of the session, the response sheets were taken in. The session 
lasted for about half an hour in each case. 
RESULTS 
The response-sheets were treated individually. A cross 
was placed opposite each wrong prediction. The responses were then 
divided by drawing a line into alternating blocks of predictions of 
black and white. The number of wrong predictions within each block 
was counted up. This was regarded as a measure of how tolerant of 
error S was when making this response, e.g., how many times he was 
willing to be wrong while predicting "white", before he changed his 
prediction to "black". It is obvious that it S is learning some-
thing of the probabilistic nature of the situation, he will clearly 
come to have a greater tolerance for being wrong when predicting 
"white" and less tolerance for being wrong when predicting "black". 
This is a better measure than a simple count of "black" and "white" 
responses, since these responses are sometimes artefacts of the 
sequence. This is especially so with long runs of one element of the 
sequence and is one reason for the need in such experiments to average 
out the proportional values over trials and SSe The tolerance 
statistic takes into account the relationship between Ss' responses 
and the actual sequence. Corroboration that this is a psychologically 
meaningful statistic comes from Ss, some of whom later described 
their behaviour in such terms, e.g. "If I got it wrong twice, I 
would change to black." 
From these tolerance figures a statistic measuring change 
of behaviour was calculated, and this statistic was regarded as being 
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a description of the S's reaction. It was decided to take the 
first 50 trials and the last 50 trials of the 200 and compare them. 
This was, to some extent, an arbitrary decision constrained by two 
considerations. The first was that a large enough sample of each S's 
initial and terminal behaviour was required to make the statistics 
reasonably reliable. The other was that, even over a few trials, 
it was conceivable that S's behaviour was changing. This meant that, 
in order to get reliable measures of initial and terminal behaviour 
as uncontaminated as possible from ongoing change of behaviour, the 
number of trials on which these were based had to be kept small. 
Accordingly, the first 50 and the last 50 trials were taken, for 
each of which two values were calculated, i.e. the number of times (w) 
S was willing to be wrong while predicting white and the number of times 
(b) S was willing to be wrong while predicting black. The difference 
between these two (b-w), related to the total number of errors in the 
50 trial block (b+w), was taken as a rate of tOlerance(~ - w). Thus, 
+ w 
an initial rate of tolerance and a terminal rate of tolerance were 
calculated, and the difference between these is a measure of the change 
of rate of tolerance of error. If this measure is positive, it means 
that S has become more tolerant of losing while predicting white 
(a tendency to maximal reaction); if it is negative, it means that S 
has become more tolerant of losing while predicting black (a tendency 
away from maximal reaction). 
The value of this statistic depends on the values of its 
two components. The maximum value of the initial rate of L 1 
... -0 erance 
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is +1, the minimum value being -1. These correspond to Ss who 
predict black for the first 50 trials and Ss who predict white for 
the first 50 trials. Similarly, the terminal rate of tolerance ranges 
from +1 to -1, the maximal reaction of predicting white for all 50 
trials being denoted by a -1 value. Subtraction provides limits of 
+2 and -2 for the change of rate of tolerance statistics. If S 
scores +2, this is taken to mean that his original tendency to predict 
black all the time (which Can be conceived as a response bias) has 
given way to the realistic tendency to predict white all the time 
(the maximal reaction). If S scores -2, this means that he has 
started off predicting white all the time and, after exposure to the 
sequential situation, has ended up playing black all the time (a 
counter-rational reaction). Because the blocks consist of 50 trials, 
it is unlikely that extreme initial rates will occur. (A fuller 
discussion of this statistic will be found in Appendix III.) 
Nevertheless, the limits within which the statistics fall suggest 
that the distribution is unlikely to be normal. Fig.5:1 shows the 
distribution obtained over all Ss to be surprisingly close to normal. 
There are, of coure, the two extreme cases on the right of the 
distribution. Because of ~s, the data were treated as being ordinal 
and a Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance was carried out. The 
results and the analysis are shown in Table 5:1. The value of 
H is 10.94 and the probability of obtaining such results on the null 
hypothesis is less than p = .02. Since the level of significance 
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required is p = .05, the differences found must be explained by 
variations in treatment of the groups. Table 5:2 lists the initial 
and terminal rates for all SSe 
Figs. 5:2, 5:3 and 5:4 show the variation over trial 
blocks (40 trials per block, following Estes and Straughan) of the 
prediction of white as a proportion of all predictions. Fig 5:2 
shows this variation~r all Ss and for Ss under each type of 
presentation of the situation. Fig 5:3 shows this variation for 
all Ss with the list sequence (Groups 1 and 2 together) and for 
Ss with this presentation who were given different instructions 
about amassing information (Groups 1 and 2 separately). Fig 5:4 shows 
this variation for all Ss with the black box sequence (Groups 3 and 
4 together) and for Ss under this condition who were given different 
instructions about amassing information (Groups 3 and 4 separately). 
These are appended because of the need for direct comparison with 
the results of Estes and Straughan (1954). No tests of significance 
were planned for these statsitics. (Appendix II(ii) provides the 
results on which the grap~s are based.) 
DISCUSSION 
The test of significance on the change statistic suggests 
that at least one of the treatments was effective. The mean ranks 
obtained by the different groups (Table 5:1) provide the best indication 
of how to interpret the data. Group 4 performed best, then Group 3, 
. and then Group 1 and then Group 2. The difference in rank between 
the groups presented with the sequence of states by means of the black 
box and those presented with the sequence by means of a list suggests 
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Figure 5: I DISTRIBUTION OF 
CHANGE STATISTIC 
GROUP 1 
Change Rank 
(R) 
-50 54.0 
+23 18.0 
+26 14.5 
+02 36.5 
-32 51.0 
+03 34.0 
+26 14.5 
-19 46.5 
+27 13.0 
+16 23·5 
+05 32.0 
-08 42.0 
+02 36.5 
+1-> II.. 0 
+16 23.5 
+07 30.0 
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TABLE 5:1. Showing Change-Statistic (50-200) 
for Different Groups. (Percentages) 
GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4 
Change Rank Change Rank ~hange Rank 
(R) (R) (R) 
+15 26.0 -34 53.0 +24 17 .0 
, 
-17 45.0 -19 46.5 +16 23·5 
-30 50.0 +22 19.5 +16 23·5 
+05 32.0 +36 11.0 +02 36·5 
+02 36.5 -05 40.5 +46 8.0 
+42 10.0 -10 43.0 0 39.0 
-56 55.0 +29 12.0 +22 19·5 
-13 44.0 +125 1.0 +44 9.0 
+13 27.0 +53 5·0 +50 6.0 
-21 48.0 -05 40.5 +58 4.0 
-33 52.0 109 2.0 
+48 7.0 +18 21.0 
+09 28.0 +78 3.0 
t-o~ 31... () 
-24 49.0 
+08 29.0 
R c:: 30.34 R 0: 35.66 R 27.20 R -= 16.31 
o (, o lr oq "1...4-
Kruskal-Wallis H =: 10.94 ~ < .02 
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TABLE 5:2. Showing Initial and Terminal Rates 
for Different Groups and their 
Average Ranks. (Percentages) 
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4 
Init. Term. Init. Term. Init. Term. Init. Term. 
Rate. Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate 
-05 +45 +33 -18 +14 +47 +24 0 
+18 -05 +39 +56 0 +19 +45 +29 
+30 +04 0 +30 +13 -09 +26 +10 
+28 +26 +18 +13 +36 0 +74 +72 
+04 +36 -03 -05 +04 +09 +20 -26 
+31 +28 +33 -09 +33 +43 +17 +17 
+31 +05 +15 +71 +43 +14 +27 +05 
-04 +15 0 +13 +25 -100 +11 -33 
+14 -13 +33 +20 +40 -13 +50 0 
+26 +10 +25 +46 +19 +24 +44 -14 
+10 +05 -33 0 +33 -76 
+12 +20 -52 -100 -15 -33 
+29 +27 +04 -05 +41 -37 
+25 0 +25 +20 
+21 +05 +16 +40 
+21 +14 +41 +33 
Average Ranks 
31.31 30.37 32.00 32.87 26.5 27·5 20.15 19.46 
0'71 
0-63 
!0'625 
o 
~ 
u 
:0 
! 
~ 
0-59 
0·51 
0'47 
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Figure 5:4 VARIATIONS IN PREDICTIONS 
OVER BLOCKS OF TRIALS IN SELECTED 
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that the hypothesis that presentation of the situation gives rise 
to different reactions is correct. Had the hypothesis been correct 
that recording the actual sequences would produce a better reaction, 
then Group 2 would have been better than Group 1. This suggests 
that only the method of presentation had an effect, although one 
cannot rule out the possibility of an interaction effect (see 
the difference in mean rank between Groups 3 and 4). 
The change statistic was taken to represent the reaction 
of Ss to the sequential situation. The change statistic depends on 
the two rates of tolerance, as calculated from the response sheets. 
It could be argued that what happens is not a change in response 
from the initial to terminal 50 trials, but that a different set 
is established in Ss under different conditions. Some evidence 
about this might be provided by looking at the initial and terminal 
rates. If the initial rates (Table 5:2) are ranked from highest 
positive to highest negative and the means of these ranks taken for 
each group, these are, respectively, 31,31,32.00,26.50 and 20.15. 
It would, of course, be improper to test this statistically but it 
can be noted that these means confirm that the major determinant 
of initial behaviour is also the method of presentation. This would 
mean that Ss in Groups 3 and 4 give more negative recency responses 
(i.e. stick to black despite high error rate) in the first 50 trials 
than Ss in Groups 1 and 2. In other words, different sets m~ have 
been established in different groups of SSe In order for it to be 
shown that set is the sole determinant of reaction, no difference 
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between the groups in their terminal rates would have to be argued. 
Theawerage ranks from the terminal rates were, accordingly, calculated 
and these, too, are shown in Table 5:2 (30.37, 32.87, 27.50 and 19.46 
respectively). The contribution of the terminal rates to the overall 
change statistic is a negative one: so, the ranking was done from 
highest negative to highest positive. These ranks again show up the 
difference between Groups 1 and 2, on the one hand, and Groups 3 and 
4 on the other. This means that Ss in Groups 3 and 4 tend more to 
positive recency responses in the last 50 trials than Ss in Groups 
1 and 2. 
The above considerations suggest something of what might 
be happening to the individual Ss in a probability learning situation. 
In nearly all Ss at the start of the sequence, a negative recency 
response set seems to be established. This set is stronger in Ss 
in the black box presentation groups. But in those Ss, the set is 
not so persistent as in the other groups who were still responding 
in terms of such a set at the end of the sequence. It may be that 
Ss have to undergo a period of negative recency response set bef~e 
reaching a positive recency response set: and it may be that the 
effects of the presentation can either slow down or speed up the 
establishment of such a set. One rather obvious objection to these 
generalisations is the presence of wide individual differences in 
the Ss studied. Two Ss were responding na:timally 'by the end of the 
sequence, one in Group 3 and the other in Group 2. There are also 
cases in Groups 3 and 4 where the negative recency effect continues 
to the end of the sequence. 
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The change statistic has a distribution which closely 
resembles a normal one but it also shows up individual differences. 
The two extreme cases on the distribution come from Ss in Group 3 
and Group 4. The S in Group 3 was the one who was responding 
maximally by the end of the sequence. The value of 125 was given 
to him because his initial rate was +25. This compares with the 
S in Group 2 who was given the value +48 because his initial rate 
was -52. Insofar as detecting "rational" Ss is concerned, the change 
statistic is a rather crude instrument (see comments in Appendix III). 
This is, of course, because of the arbitrary decision of taking the 
50th trial as the end of the initial measure. The other eItreme 
case derives from a S who scores +33 initially, and -76 terminally. 
With these tWo.; exceptions, the values of the change statistic could 
easily be treated as normally distributed. 
The other source of information about Ss' reactions came 
from conversations with Ss after the experimental session. The most 
interesting remarks indicated that some Ss felt themselves to be 
involved in a game with E (this despite the presence of others in the 
group). This occurred in all groups. In the black box groups, some 
Ss assumed that there must be a difference of touch between the white 
and black balls and that E used this to retrieve the ball he wanted. 
Considering all this, it seems likely that the difference between the 
presentation groups lies not so much in the extent to which Ss felt 
E was playing a game with them as in the fixed nature of the contents 
of the black box versus the unknown nature of the contents of the 
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paper. It m~ also be that Ss recognised the random nature of the 
sequence-generator in the black box. 
Is the stimulus sampling theory of Estes a good description 
of the change of behaviour of Ss? To answer this question, Figs.5:2, 
5:3 and 5:4 were prepared, based on blocks of 40 trials. The results 
taken together (Fig.5:2) seem to indicate that it is. The asymptote 
of prediction of white seems to be at the point of the probability 
of occurrence of the white state (.625), and the graph joining the 
points could be smoothed out into a function such as Estes predicts. 
The value of e could then be estimated. There seems little point 
in doing this, however, for the graphs drawn separately for different 
modes of presentation of the sequence, could not possibly be said 
to be predictable by Estes (Fig.5:2), neither the prediction of an 
asymptote nor the prediction of the shapes of the curves. For Ss 
presented with the sequence by means of a prepared list of states, 
there is evidence of a drop in the prediction of white over the 
last 80 trials. This is reminiscent of the "paradoxical" decline 
phenomena reported, for example, by Jarvik (1951). If "paradoxical" 
decline occurs in the results of Estes and straughan (1954), it is 
~ated as an unusual point in a curve that has to be fitted to minimise 
such points. This could be argued in this case but the point is 
unusually high and would certainly cause difficulties. Similarly, 
the low rate on the last 80 trials could be argued away by saying 
that, with more trials, the asymptote of .625 would be reached. 
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For those Ss who were presented with the sequence by means of the 
black box, no such argument is possible. The predicted asymptote 
of .625 is over-reached by the third set of 40 trials, and the best 
fit to the points would be a straight line. Both contradict the 
account given by Estes and Straughan (1954). There is little doubt 
but that the explanation for this difference must lie in the method 
of presentation of the situation. Estes and Straughan (1954) used 
fairly complex equipment, involving switches and flashing lamps. 
The results which most gravely contradict their theory are obtained 
under conditions where Ss are left in little doubt about the nature 
of the sequence generated. It is likely that their Ss were left in 
considerable doubt whether their responses were independent of the 
states produced. 
The data also suggest that a Bayesian approach to the 
problem was not adopted by most Ss (see Appendix Na). It can be 
argued that this is because of the admitted tendency of some Ss to 
look for patterns and that the case against S as a Bayesian processor 
of information is not proven (see Appendix IVb). 
Figures 5:3 and 5:4 confirm the suspicion that the 
instructions to Ss to keep a record of the actual outcome did not 
make much difference to the reactions of the Ss. Since many Ss 
in the uninstructed groups kept a record of their own accord, this 
independent variable would seem to be vitiated by self-instruction. 
The curious finding that Group 2 was worse than Group 1 on the change 
statistic is made less curious after inspection of Fig.5:3. It 
-96-
is only at the end of the sequence that Group 2 become worse than 
Group 1. Since the change statistic emphasises the last 50 trials, 
it is not surprising that on the change statistic, Group 1 are out 
of the expected order of the groups. It might be that if more Ss 
were used, the presumably small effect of different instructions 
might be detected by a suitable statistical test. But the 
difference is a small one and, therefore, not worth too much 
attention. 
Inspection of the distribution of the proportion of 
white predictions, p(W), at the end of the sequence (Fig.5:5) does 
not suggest the bimodal distribution mentioned by Luce and Suppes 
(1965). The distribution is, however, less close to a recognisably 
binomial or normal distribution than the distribution of change 
statistics. This adds yet another caution not to treat the group 
results as if they were representative of individual results. 
The main conclusions to be drawn are that the probability 
matching results reported by some other psychologists do not occur 
in this experiment: that individual reactions are not necessarily 
indicated by group results: that the method of presentation of the 
situation had considerable effect on the reaction of Ss: and that 
instructions to amass information had little effect on the reactions 
of Ss. 
In terms of underlying descriptions of changes of 
behaviour, the experimental evidence suggests that the stimulus sampling 
theory of Estes is not adequate to account for the reactions of Ss , 
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either individually or in groups. Analysis of the differences 
in change statistics between the experimental groups suggests that 
a description in terms of strength and persistence of negative 
recency response set might account for the differences found. It 
may be that this set is controlled by the interpretation by Ss 
of the situation (some form of hypothesis control). 
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CHAPTER VI - REACTIONS TO GAME SITUATIONS 
The preliminary experiments have cleared up some of the 
problems involved in sequential situations. Ss can recognise a 
random sequence of states but their reactions to a probability 
learning situation depend on the characteristics of the situation. 
It has been suggested that the best way to describe these reactions, 
in general, is in terms of set and persistence of set. If this is 
the case in a probability learning situation, it is likely that a 
similar description of reaction will be obtained in a game against 
nature. The purpose of the experiment reported in this chapter is 
to explore game situations in order to achieve a descriptive analysis 
of S's reactions. 
There are four game situations, depending on the information 
made available to S and the information he has to discover. That is, 
S may be told about the pay-offs and required to play after nature 
(situaocion 11): S may be told about the pay-offs and required to 
play before nature (situation 10); S may be told nothing of the 
pay-offs but required to play after nature (situation 01); S may 
be told nothing of the pay-offs and required to play before nature 
(situation 00). These situations have analogies for the pay-off 
matrix that characterises the probability learning situation. These 
may be called a contingent discrimination situation (11), a contingent 
probability learning situation (10), a non-contingent discrimination 
situation (01) and a non-contingent probability learning situation (00). 
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Research on human Ss requires different instructions for each of 
these situations. In this way, different sets are established and 
different reactions to the situations may be obtained. Even within 
the same situation, the set established by instructions may be 
modified by the way the situation is presented, as one of the 
preliminary experiments has shown. Typically, discrimination 
situations are investigated not for their own sake but in order 
to discover something about the S's perceptual-judgmental character-
istics. This implies that reaction to such a situation depends on 
some dimension of difficulty of discrimination between the states: 
and the S's reaction to the situation is some measure of this 
difficulty. Conversely, in experiments where the reaction of S 
is the chief interest, the states are kept as simple as possible. 
For this reason, easily discriminable states are used in probability 
learning situations. Similar considerations led to the choice of 
simple states for use in the game situation. It was thought that Ss 
used in the experiments would have no difficulty in discriminating 
between a state called "A" and a state called ''B''; and their 
reactions to the situation would not be confounded by a discrimin-
ation difficulty between the states. 
Only three of the four situations were studied. The first 
situation (11) would be trivial for the Ss (University students), and 
the only experimental information it would yield would be whether 
the Ss understood the instructions. In the other three situations 
(10, 01 and 00) some description could be obtained of how Ss acquire 
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information they do not have. Since there is no information in the 
literature on how Ss might be expected to react, the studies are of 
an exploratory nature. The dependent variables were obtained from 
Ss' response sheets and from their reports of their reactions. 
The game matrix is reproduced in Fig.6:1. 
Fig.6:1. Game Matrix 
a 
b 
A B 
1 
2" 1 
"6 
The states are "A" and "B", the responses "a" and "b" and the pay-
offs are on a random schedule. If S does not pl~ after nature (as 
in situations 10 and 00), there is a strategy for nature at which 
the value of the game is kept at a constant. This strategy is the 
minimax solution for the mixed game. If it is adopted, then Swill 
not be able to increase his gain by altering his strategy, i.e. any 
strategy played by S has precisely the same outcome. This strategy, 
represented by the point Q in Fig.3:2, consists in pl~ing A and B 
in random order in the proportion of 5 A to 1 B. For this experiment, 
this strategy was adopted on the grounds that any differences observed 
in strategy under the two conditions would be clearly attributable 
to the information made available to S on the pay-offs. 
Materials. Experience of probability learning situations suggests 
that the presentation of the situation is likely to have considerable 
effect on S's reaction. This is partly because of the tendency 
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of Ss to regard the game as being against E and not ~ainst nature. 
So, it was decided to make it as explicit as possible that S's 
responses are independent of future states. This was done by 
using apparatus consisting of three wooden stands with five closed 
boxes on them (see Fig.6:2). 
Two of the stands were labelled "A" and "B" respectively 
and on each of them there were two boxes labelled, respectively, 
"a" and "b". The third stand had one box mount ed on it and was 
unlabelled. The boxes were filled, prior to the experimental session, 
with white cards which could be removed one at a time through a slit 
in the bottom of the box. A metal square was placed on top of the 
cards and the lid put back on each box. The four labelled boxes 
represent the four outcomes of the game. They were filled with 
cards bearing the symbol "1" and cards bearing the symbol "0", in 
fized proportions and random order. Thus box "a" on stand "A" was 
filled with cards bearing "1" and "0" in the proportion 1:2. The 
order of the cards was randomised by shuffling them. Boz "b" on 
"A" had cards bearing "1" and "0" in equal proportions: and so on. 
The number of cards in each boz was alw~s more than the number 
needed if S consistently chose that box every time he could. The 
fi~th box, the sequence boz, was filled with 200 cards bearing the 
symbol "A" or "B", the cards being in the proportion 5:1. The 
order of these cards, too, was randomised by shuffling them. 
A response sheet was drawn up in advance. This consisted 
of a space at the top for information about the S (name, sez) and 
-10 3-
Figure 6:2 PHOTOGRAPH OF 
GAME APPARATUS 
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the game situation he was reacting to (see Appendix Ib). There 
were three columns, one for the trial numbers, one for S's response 
and the state of nature, and one for the outcome of the trial. 
These were headed "No. of trial", "Response" and "Reward" respectively. 
The first column was already filled with numbe~ 1 to 200, in blocks 
of five. 
Subjects. The Ss used were 15 undergraduates at the University of 
Keele, male and female. All of the Ss were experimentally naive. 
They were assigned at random to one of the three situations 10, 01 
and 00 in such a way that there were 5 Ss in each situation, and 
some men and women in each group. 
Procedure. Each S was treated individually and the experimental 
session lasted a little under half an hour. On entering, S was told 
to sit down at a table-desk on which the three stands were already 
placed, the cards being already in the boxes, face~own. E sat 
opposite S. The two outcome stands faced S and the sequence box 
faced E but was visible to S. E made the necessary notes on Sand 
the situation on a response sheet, placed in fron of him, on the 
desk. 
Ss in the si tuat ion 01 were instruct ed as follows: "In 
this experiment I will take a card from this box" (indicating the 
sequence bOx) "and this card will have either a capital "A" or a 
capital "B" printed on it. I will let you know which it is. If 
it is 'A', then you go to this stand" (indicating the outcome stand 
labelled 'A') "and choose between the box marked little 'a' and the 
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box marked little ' b '. That is , every time I take a card, I will 
tell you what it is and you will say either ' little a ' or ' little b '. 
And this will decide which box is to be used . For example , if I take 
a card from here which says ' A' and you say ' little a ', then the box 
is little ' a ' on ' A'. You will then go to that box and take a card 
from it ." (This was demonstrated to S without actually removing the 
card. ) " It will be marked either with a ' 1' or with a '0 '. If it 
is a ' 1' then that is a reward card; if it is a ' 0 ' it is not a r eward 
card . Keep these cards in separate piles . At the end of the experiment , 
the reward cards will be ' cashed in ' at the rate of five a penny . In 
addition , you have two shillings for coming along . Your job is to 
try and get as many reward cards as possible . There will be 200 
trials ." E then got S to repeat what he was r equired to do andooy 
misunderstandings were cleared up . 
To Ss in conditions 10 and 00 , the instructions were : "In 
this experiment , there will be several trial s . On every trial , I 
want you to choose between little ' a ' and little ' b '. You will see" 
(pointing to the outcome boxes ) "that there are four boxes here , two 
of them marked little ' a ' and two marked little ' b '. So , even aft er 
you have made your choice , you won ' t know precisely what box you have 
chosen . That will be determined by a card drawn from here" (indicating 
the sequence box ) "and that card will have either a capital ' A' or a 
capital ' B' on it . You will see that the stands have capitals ' A' 
and ' B' on them . This card will decide which box is to be used . So , 
for example , if you choose little ' a ', i.e . one of these two boxes" 
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( indicating) " and I draw a card marked capital ' A', that means 
that box ' a ' on ' A' has been chosen . You will then go to that 
box and draw a card from it ." (This was demonstrated to S without 
actually removing the card. ) "This will have either a ' 1 ' or a ' 0 ' 
marked on it . If it is a ' 1', then it is a reward card; if it is a 
' 0 ', then it is not a reward card . Keep these in separate piles . 
At the end of the experiment , the reward cards will be ' cashed in ' 
at the rate of five a penny . In addition , you have two shillings 
I 
for coming along , anyway . Your job is to choose so as to get as 
many reward cards as possible . There will be 200 trials ." Ss 
were than asked to repeat what they were required to do and any 
misunderstandings were cleared up . Ss in the situation 10 were 
then told , "To help you in your choice , here is some information 
about what the boxes contain . Box ' a ' in ' A' has , on average , one 
card in three as a reward card." (A piece of paper with 'i " on it 
was placed in front of box "aA".) ' 'Box ' bA ' has, on average , every 
second card as a reward card." (Similarly , a piece of paper with 
"-~." marked on it was placed in front of this box . ) "Box ' aB ' has 
all reward cards . Every card is a reward card here ." (A piece of 
paper marked " 1" was placed in front of the box . ) "And box ' bB ' has , 
on average , one card in six as a reward card." (A piece of paper 
marked " 1/6" was placed in front of this box . ) " Is that quite clear? 
Do you have any questions?" If S did not understand , E explained 
again . 
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The time interval between trials was deteroined by S's 
reaction . In the case of Ss in condition 01 , E produced the next 
state as soon as he had made a note of the outcome of the previous 
trial . In the case of Ss in the other two conditions , the next state 
was produced after S had made his or her choice . In general , this 
time interval decreased with increasing trials , and over the last 
one hundred or so trials , the trials succeeded each other almost 
instantly . When E drew a card from the sequence box , he did so in 
full view of Sand S could see the card that E withdrew as well as 
hearing its type called out . A record was kept of S' s response , 
the state of nature and the outcome of the trial , for each trial . 
If S did anything during the session , this was noted . At the end 
of each session , S was asked " Now , would you tell me , please , just 
what it was you were doing? How did you decide to choose ' a ' or 
' b ' ?" The S' s remarks were noted. The reward cards were counted 
and S was paid . The apparatus was then prepared for the next S. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The nature of the experiment requires that the results of 
each situation are looked at separately . Consequently , this section 
contains four sub-sections , one for each situation and one general 
section . 
Situation 01 . In this situation , S responds to the state of nature . 
S can respond in one of two ways to each of the two states . In terms 
of the pay-off matrix , the appropriate responses are "b" to "A" and 
"a " to "B". Ss in this situation maximise best by responding 
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differentially . A measure of the "appropriateness of response" can 
be worked out by counting the number of times Splays "b" to "A". 
Dividing this by the number of times the state " A'! occurs will give 
a coefficient of apprQpriateness of response to "A", ranging from 
0 .00 to 1.00 . A similar procedure gives a coefficient of appropriate-
ness of, response to B. The response sheet was divided into four 
blocks of 50 trials , each , and coefficients for each block were 
worked out . These are given in Table 6 : 1. Since the "B" coefficients 
are based on very few trials , they are not so reliable as the "A" 
coefficients . A coefficient of appropriateness of reaction was also 
worked out by adding up and dividing by 50 the number of trials on 
which either response "b" to "A" or "a'! to "B" was made . The values 
for the Ss are given in Table 6 : 2. If Ss are reacting appropriately , 
the value of this statistic should approach unity . The results 
show that two Ss react appropriately to the situation . More detailed 
accounts of what was happening can be obtained from a scrutiny of Ss ' 
accounts of their reactions and their response sheets . 
S1 was quite explicit about what he did. He said that h e 
started with either box under each state and tried to decide from which 
box he was getting more . He said that he soon discovered that box 
"aB" was better than box "bB". Confirmation that this is so is 
obtained from Table 6 : 1. The coefficient of appropriateness of 
response to B reaches unity for the second block of 50 trials while 
for A, the coefficient does not reach unity until the third block of 
trials . In fact , the response sheet shows that the last "bB" response 
Ss 
M S1 
tF S2 
F S3 
M S4 
M S5 
I 
M 
F 
F 
M 
M 
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Table 6 : 1. Coefficients of 'Appropriateness of 
Response over Trial Blocks . 
Response to A up to trial Response to B up to trial 
50 100 150 200 50 100 150 
. 25 . 73 1.00 1.00 . 30 1. 00 1.00 
. 55 1.00 1. 00 1. 00 . 88 1.00 1.00 
. 52 · 57 · 54 . 48 • 11 . 39 · 55 
. 49 . 74 .84 . 62 . 88 1. 00 
· 59 
. 65 . 44 .76 · 55 . 88 1. 00 1.00 
Table 6 :2 . Coefficients of Appropriateness of 
Reaction over Trial Blocks . 
Reaction up to trial 
Ss 50 100 150 200 
S1 . 28 . 76 1.00 1.00 
82 · 58 1. 00 1. 00 1.00 
83 . 48 . 48 · 54 . 48 
84 . 56 . 78 . 80 . 72 
S5 · 74 · 54 . 80 . 62 
200 
1. 00 
1. 00 
. 33 
1. 00 
1.00 
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was made at trial 40 . He said that he thought that "aA" was bett er 
than "bA" to begin with , and it wasn ' t until he had a long run of 
non-reward cards that he changed to "bA" which he then exploited 
for the rest of the session . If the assumption is made that S 
separates the outcomes into four and counts for each of them, S ' s 1 
response sheet should show a temporary relative gain for "aA" over 
"bA" in the first few trials . This , however , is not the case . S1 
does not try response "bA" so often as he tries response "aA" but 
if he were keeping an account of the proportion of rewards from 
each , he would , in any case , have come to the conclusion that "bA" 
is better for him than "aA". In other words , any description of 
his behaviour in these terms is not a uiid description of the way this 
S processes information . Neither Bayes ' theorem nor Broadbent ' s 
information-flow diagram fits the facts . This S' s "store of conditional 
probabilities of past events" does not build up gradually under the 
schedule of reinforcement . Rather , he appears to pay particular 
attention to runs of reward cards and runs of non-reward cards . Some-
times , these runs are broken up by the interception of "B" states , 
but since these are usually for one trial only , this S appears to 
remember them through this interception. Looking at his record, it 
seems that "aA" became dominant because early on (at trials 11 and 
12 ) two "aA" responses in succession produced rewards . Hereafter , 
S changes to "bA" only after two consecutive non-rewards from "aA". 
The change back , however , from "bA" to "aA" is occasioned by rece:hr ing 
one non-reward card from "bA". This disparity of criteria for change 
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appears to increase to three ' 0 ' cards and even four for the change 
"aA" to "bA", while one ' 0 ' card remains the criterion for change 
"bA" to "aA". Presumably , the alteration of the criteria for change 
reflect S' s confidence that " aA" is better for him . This takes 
place after another run of two consecutive rewards from "aA", but 
a similar run of two consecutive rewards from "bA" does not produce 
an alteration in the other criterion . On one occasion when S 
changed from "aA" after three consecutive ' 0 ' cards , he encountered 
a run of six consecutive rewards cards on "bA". This must have had 
the effect of putting the disparity of criteria for change into 
reverse for S thereafter always chose "bA" even through five '0' 
cards , at one point . The last "aA" outcome was on trial 61 . 
For the "B" states , a similar rule would leacbo an early persistence 
of response "a " because all the cards in "aB" were reward cards 
while very few were reward cards in "bB". If S is trying to get 
"as many reward cards as possible", then he knows that he cannot do 
better than get one every trial . It would seem , then , that this S 
uses a decision rule which exploits the characteristics of random 
sequences of outcomes . 
82 was not so clear about what she was doing . To begin with, 
she thought that it would not matter what she chose since the r ewards 
were probably equal . But later , if she was rewarded , she st~ed on 
the choice she had made . If she was not rewarded , she changed her 
choice . Table 6 : 2 shows that she was reacting appropriately by trial 
51 , and the response sheet shows that her last inappropriate response 
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was for trial SO . Her account of change after a ' 0 ' card best fits 
her response to "B". She responded to "B" by choosing "aB" the first 
time "B" appeared (trial 12 ). Despit e being rewarded on it , she 
chose "bB" when "B" occurred again on trial 16 . She was not rewarded 
on this response and , thereafter , chose "aB" whenever "B" appeared . 
She started off with a readily established tolerance for ' 0 ' cards 
on the "A" boxes of two , i.e ., she changed her choice after getting 
two ' 0 ' cards . She was unlucky for no reward card occurred until 
trial 11 (this was from "bA" ) . She then changed every time she 
encountered a ' 0 ' card , despite now encountering fairly long runs 
of ' 1 ' cards from both "aA" and "bA". This rule continued in 
operation even from trial 39 to SO when she got no rewards in an 
"A" state at all. At trial S1 , she chose, in accordance with this 
rule , the box "bA". She was not rewarded but , at this point , her 
rule no longer works . Possibly , she abandoned it or , possibly , she 
forgot what her response to trial 51 had been because of the inter-
vention of a "B" state . At any rate , on trial S3 she chose "bA" 
again and was rewarded by a run of six consecutive reward cards . 
She never returned to "aA" despite receiving as many as five 
consecutive non-reward cards on "bA". Her behaviour can be described 
in terms similar to those used for S1 ' Of the other three Ss , two 
(S4 and SS ) end by responding appropriately to "B" but not to "A". 
The behaviour of one of them (S4) can also be described in the same 
terms . 
S4 said he changed every time he received two non-reward 
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cards . Sometimes , he felt he was having more success on "bA" 
than "aA". At these times , he ·changed from "aA" to "bA" after 
one ' 0 ' card . In general , he thought there were more rewards in 
"bA" than "aA" but felt he wanted to use both boxes . Of "B" 
states , he said that he didn ' t try "bB" because of his success on 
"aB" but he didn ' t not ice that all "aB" cards were reward cards . 
This he put down to the fact that he used it so infrequently . 
Study of his response sheet suggests that his behaviour is not 
quite as he describes it . In the first 50 trials , for example , 
he takes , at one point , three "0" cards on "bA" before changing 
to "aA" and , at another point , four "0" cards on "bA" before 
returning to "aA". Later , he does appear to stick to his "two 
'0' cards on "bA" criterion except that sometimes the intervention 
of "B" states appears to disrupt his count . On these occasions , 
he starts again with "bA" , presumably because of his belief that 
"bA" is better than "aA". Sometimes , especially in the third block 
of trials , hi~ double criterion seems to be "three ' 0 ' cards on 
' bA' aria one ' 0 ' on ' aA ' before change". An apparent loss of 
confidence in this rule leads to the re- institution of the earlier 
rule "two ' O' s on either before change". This might be a reflection 
of his "feeling" that he has to use both "aA" and "bA" or of a 
fairly good run of rewards on "aA". This accounts for the drop in 
the value of the coefficient of this state over the last 50 trials . 
One curious phenomenon is his unawareness that , in the third block 
of trials , he did try box "bB". It may be that he was so occupied 
- 114-
trying to solve the "A11 state problem during this block that he 
regarded the "B" states as interfering with the information he 
wanted. Not surprisingly , the "bB" outcomes are embedded in a 
run of "bA" trials ; and if these were thought by S to be "bA" 
outcomes , this might partially account for his subsequent loss 
of confidence in his preference for "bA". 
S5 also thought that "bA" contained more reward cards 
than "aA" but failed to apply this knowledge . In his case , the 
reason would seem to be that he was looking for a pattern in the 
reward boxes "aA" and "bA" but he 1lcouldn ' t get hold of either 
because , jumping from box to box , it was easy to lose track". 
He seemed to have no difficulties over the "B" boxes . After one 
"aB" and one unrewarded "bB" response , Splayed "aB" all the time . 
One must presume that S had in mind an aim of being rewarded on 
every trial : and this led him to adopt the "aB" response and to the 
search for pattern in the "A" boxes . This S fastened on to an 
irrelevant aspect of the situation and it is impossible to guess 
what "pattern hypothesis" this S had . Unlike the other Ss , S5 
sometimes changed his response after getting a reward card. The 
coefficient of this S can only be explained in terms of S shifting 
his interest periodically from the search for patterns in box "aA" 
to that for patterns in box "bA". 
S3 shows no improvement in performance at all . In her 
description of her behaviour , she said that she first noticed there 
were more "A" s than 11B" s (this is largely irrelevant to this situation), 
She realised that "bA" was better than "aA" but said that as soon as 
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she got a "0", she went back to "aA". As for the "B" boxes , she 
"more or less forgot which of the 'B' boxes had what ". The 
failure of this S to react appropriately seems due to two factors : 
limitation of memory and a change criterion which is not responsive 
to general beliefs about the preponderances of reward cards . Her 
response sheet shows that her stated criterion for change is not 
always followed but there does appear to be some tendency towards 
a balanced criterion , e . g ., if she does not change to "bA" until 
after two consecutive "O" s on "aA", she will not change back until 
after two consecutive "O"s on "bA". There are also points of change , 
in the record , which follow a reward card but again this occurs both 
on "aA" and "bA" responses . 
In general , it would seem that Ss set themselves to pay 
particular attention to certain aspects of the situation . To be 
successful , Ss have to treat "A" and "B" states separately , and 
remember a choice rule which refers to the states separately . Most 
Ss seem to adopt the "reinforcement " rule , "if successfUl, stay". This 
account s for the success of four of the five Ss on the "B" states : 
the "aB" response provides a maximum value of a reward every trnl. 
The big problem for Ss appears when they find that such a goal is 
not attainable on the "A" states . It seems that the "reinforcement " 
rule is altered to a "change when" rule . The least successful 
" change when" rules relate to irrelevant aspects of ths situation 
such as patterns of rewards in the boxes . The usual rule relates 
to the number of consecutive "0" cards rather than to a count of 
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"0" and " 1" cards . The rule refers to the two responses separately . 
If this reference is kept balanced , S is unlikely to be successful . 
Disparity of reference , which leads to success , seems to depend on 
an alteration of the rule following a run of consecutive reward 
cards . Limitations of memory , especially through intervening "B" 
states , appear to have an effect on some Ss t reactions . 
Situation 10 . In this situation , S is given information about the 
frequency of rewards in the boxes but has to choose before the state 
is known to him . In the experimental situation , the states of nature 
are ordered randomly and in approximately game solution proportions . 
Therefore , there is , strictly speaking , no appropriate reaction ; 
or , rather , any reaction is as good as any other in terms of 
maximising reward . For purposes of comparison , values for coefficients 
of response "b" to "A" and "a" to '!B " and for coefficients of reaction 
of "bA and aB" have been worked out in the same way as the coefficients 
of appropriateness f~ condition 01 . These are noted in Table 6: 3 and 
Table 6 :4 , respectively . The values for response l'aB" are not very 
reliable since very few "B" states occur per 50 trials . One might 
expect all these values to be around . 50 since there is no objective 
reason for S choosing either "a" or "b" on any trial . And the 
reaction of Ss is not far removed from this expectation . The 
exception is S7 . 
In a way , S ' s is the easiest case to deal with . For 7 
13 trials , S7 chose "a " and , thereafter , he chose "b". After 50 
trials of choosing "b", E asked S if he intended always to choose 
"b". SIS affirmative reply ended the experimental session . When 
F 
M 
F 
F 
M 
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Table 6 : 3. Coefficients of Response "bA" and "aB" 
over Trial Block~(Situation 10) . 
Response "bA" up to trial Respons e "aB" up to trial 
Ss 
S6 
S7 
S8 
S9 
S10 
F 
M 
F 
F 
M 
50 100 150 200 50 100 150 
. 43 . 44 . 43 · 54 . 20 . 57 . 15 
.76 1.00 1.00 1.00 . 33 .00 . 00 
. 48 · 50 . 36 . 31 . 60 . 67 · 57 
. 37 · 55 . 48 . 43 . 33 . 17 · 59 
. 51 · 51 . 41 -39 1.00 . 71 · 77 
Table 6 :4 . Coefficients of Reaction "bA and aB" 
over Trial Blocks (Situation 10) 
Reaction up to trial 
Ss 50 100 150 200 
86 . 38 . 46 . 36 · 54 
S7 . 68 .83 .83 .83 
88 · 50 · 52 · 42 . 36 
S9 . 36 · 50 · 52 . 44 
S10 . 58 . 54 · 50 . 48 
200 
. 55 
. 00 
· 55 
. 50 
. 71 
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asked what he did , S said that he noticed that the state cards were 
heavily weighted in favour of "A", that "b" had the highest probability 
of reward under "A" and , therefore , he chose "b". To 'Qegin with, he 
chose any one (actually "a") , let it run for a long time (actually , 
13 trials) and saw how often "A" and "B" came up . This account , fully 
supported by his response record , is dominated by one assumptio~ , viz ., 
that the weighting in favour of "A" was sufficient to ensure greater 
probability of reward on "bA plus bB" than on "aA plus aB". In fact , 
the weighting had been deliberately balanced to keep these probabilities 
equal . A slight reduction of the weighting in favour of "A" would 
mean that the appropriate r eaction would be "a". An interesting 
quBstion is at what point this S would consider the weighting to be 
in favour of reaction "a", for on this his appropriateness of reaction 
would depend . 
S8 and S9 gave reports which suggested they were 
reacting in much the same way . Both said they were trying to predict 
the occurrence of "B" states . The hypotheses they have about the 
occurrence of such states have to do with patterns (S9) or positive 
recency ( S8 said that if "B" came up , she thought it likely it would 
appear for a second time) . If the Ss thought "B" was likely , they 
would choose "a". At least one of them (S9) preferred "a", in 
general , because of the "bB" box . It is likely that S8 is also trying 
to do this although she prefers to put it in terms of "trying for 
the ' aB ' box". This approach can be characterised as trying not to 
maximise one ' s gain but to minimise one ' s regret : and this , along 
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with prediction attempts , is characteristic of this approach . 
S6 started off by deducing from the pay-off matrix that 
she stood "a better chance with ' a' than with ' b '''. She then tried 
to find some pattern in the outcome boxes . She tried to predict the 
next state on a negative recency hypothesis for "B", i.e ., if there 
was a "B" on a given trial , she thought " All was likely on the next 
trial . Her response sheet shows that she did not always choose "b" 
(for "A" ) after a "B" state . Presumably , this is partly due to her 
concern throughout the session with hypotheses about reward cards but 
partly , too , it may be becauSe of her stated belief that the "bA" box 
was not better than the "aA" box . Why she should not accept the pay-
off matrix values as given is something of a mystery . It may be that 
finding out that she was not better off with "a " than "b" shattered 
her belief in the veracity of these figures . Another possible 
explanation is that there was a confusion effect induced from the 
"bB" box . 
S10 was not at all clear about what he was doing . 
He said he was "trying to work out a system of three ' a ' s and three 
' b ' s but this didn ' t work out ." He then "tried to follow a run" . 
Looking at his response sheet suggests that the system he refers to 
occurs between trials 54 and 71 . It is not clear what criteria he 
used to determine whether it "worked" but presumably his conclusion 
that it "didn ' t work out " has somethi~ to do with the 14 ' 0 ' cards 
he received out of 18 during these trials . It appears that he is 
imposing his pattern of response choice independently of the state 
occurrences . Certainly, parts of the response sheet suggest this . 
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For example , for trial 14 to 25 he makes a simple alternation sequence 
of choice . It is impossible to di scover from the response sheet why 
he changes his sequence of choice , and it is impossible to discover 
any sense behind the order in which these sequences are tried out . 
The appropriateness of his reaction to a situation where "A" and "B" 
are not in game solution proportions would depend on these factors 
plus his repertoire of sequences of responding . 
Ss under this condition seem to indulge in various 
sorts of activity . They may pay attention to the relative appearances 
of "A" and "B" and , using the information available to them , come to 
a once- and- for- all decision , independently of the rewards actually 
received. They may use the information to minimise their regret 
and combine this with an attempt to predict the next state . They 
may reject or ignore the information given and concentrate on aspects 
of the situation t hat may be relevant (number of reward cards for a 
given response or sequence of response) or irrelevant (patterns of 
reward cards in the boxes) . 
Situation 00 . In this situation , S is given no information about the 
pay-off matrix and is required to choose before the state is known . 
Again , there is no appropriate reaction to this situation , since all 
reactions produce the same reward. Tables 6:5 and 6:6 give the 
coefficients of "bA" and "aB" responses , and the coefficients of 
reaction "bA and aB", respectively . The same cautions apply to these 
values as to those for situation 10 . 
M 
M 
F 
M 
F 
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Table 6 :5 . Coeffi cients of Response "bA" and "aB" 
over Trial Blocks (Situation 00 ). 
Response to A up to trial Response to B up to trial 
Ss 50 100 150 200 50 100 
S11 . 65 .83 . 59 . 59 . 29 . 27 
S12 . 61 . 52 . 31 . 49 .00 . 50 
S 
. 62 
· 54 · 51 . 56 . 64 · 55 13 
S14 . 46 . 60 . 46 . 56 . 15 . 20 
S1 5 . 59 . 35 . 54 . 47 . 64 · 50 
Table 6 : 6 . Coefficients of Reaction "bA and aB" 
over Trial Blocks (Situation 00) . 
Reaction up to trial 
Ss 50 100 150 200 
M S11 . 60 · 70 . 52 · 50 
M S12 · 50 . 52 . 32 . 50 
F S13 . 62 · 54 . 38 · 56 
M S14 . 38 . 54 . 46 · 54 
F S15 . 60 . 38 · 58 . 50 
150 200 
. 22 . 36 
· 40 . 56 
. 00 
· 59 
. 46 
· 50 
. 69 . 86 
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S11 said that he was looking for patterns , both in the 
boxes and in the order of the states . He noticed that "A" usually 
appears and that there were a large number of reward cards in box 
"aB". He said he concentrated on state "A" and would carryon with 
response "b" through three "0" cards or would switch to "a " to help 
him find the pattern (presumably , in the "aA" bOx) . His response 
sheet shows him changing his response at first after two non-reward 
cards . This consideration then appears to be modified by his need 
to discover over larger runs the "patterns" (by which he might mean 
merely preponderances ) in the various boxes . Thus , he does not 
change from "a" until after four consecutive "0" cards . Thereafter , 
he appears to have a preference for "b" , as can be seen from the 
high value of the "bA" coefficient of response in the second block 
of trials . This preference is most notably changed when four 
consecutive "0" cards give rise to a change to "a". After one 
"0 " card on "a", S receives seven reward cards on this response . 
He does not then go back to "b" until after nine consecutive "0" 
cards on response "a" (trials 145 to 153) . He then reverts to his 
preference for "b" but seems less certain about it , as his criterion 
for change does not appear stable . 
S12 was also trying to work out a pattern and also 
noted that there were more "A"s than "B"s . He realised that all the 
cards in "aB" were reward cards , and that "bA" was more favourable 
than "aA". He discovered this first and claimed that because of this , 
he played "b11 at the beginning but later he tried for "aB". This 
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means presumably that the lack of '']3 '' states left him unaware until 
lat er of the cont ent s of the "aB" box . His response sheet shows that 
his initial concern was with the "A" boxes : and his reaction , at this 
time , can be accounted for by a changing criterion that favoured 
:change to "b~' more and more as S found longer runs of reward cards 
under this response . His claim that he later tried for "aB" is 
borne out by an inspection of tolerance for error rates for this S. 
This is computed by adding up the number of non-reward cards for 
each response and taking the difference between these as a proportion 
of the total non- reward cards . This rate is in favour of "b" over 
the first hundred trials and reaches as high as . 18 for the second 
block of trials . During the third block "b" loses this advantage 
almost completely and by the fourth block the tolerance of error 
rates show in favour of "a" to the extent of . 18 . His later reaction 
is not unlike that of the Ss given the pay- off matrix information. 
S13 did not concern herself with predicting whether "A" 
or "B" was likely on any given trial . She said she stuck to the 
same box if she was rewarded ; and , if not rewarded , she tended to go 
to the other box . (This suggests that , for her , the "B" states were 
regarded merely as disruptive of her concern with the "A" boxes . ) 
If "bB" was the outcome , however , she was more likely to choose 
"a " afterwards . Despite her declared change criterion , she sometimes 
changed her response even if the last card had been a reward card . 
She changed often although the number of changes diminished from 
35 in the first 50 trials to 26 in the final 50 trials . Again , 
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her concern to avoid "bB" is reminiscent of the reports of Ss in 
the situation 10. If the solution to the situation required her to 
choose one of her responses consistently , it is doubtful whether her 
method would be successful . 
S1 4 thought he recognised a pattern of 3 "A"s followed 
by a "B" , to begin with . (The states on trials 2 to 11 did follow 
this "pattern".) He realised that "aB" was better than "bB" and 
"bA" better than "aA" for rewards . He thought that "bB" was 
filled with non-rewards even although he received five reward cards 
from this box in the course of the session . His behaviour seems to 
have been dominated by the need to predict the next state and he 
often changed his response after a reward card . 
S15 began by trying to find a pattern in the reward 
boxes and soon realised that this was not the case . She decided 
they must bear an even chance of reward and so , she made "a few 
random effortl'. A long sequence of "aA" with a lot of non-rewards 
(not necessarily consecutive) convinced her that this was not so . 
Thereafter , every time she was on "aA" and got a non-reward , she 
changed response. She felt that "bA" was better than "aA" and "aB" 
than "bB" but did not realise that all the cards in "aB" were reward 
cards . She said she tended to neglect the "B" board. 
In general , some Ss in this situation appear to consider 
the task in two partsj finding the best boxes and finding the state 
likely to occur next. Sometimes these appear to be done successively 
and sometimes simultaneously. Once the first part is successfully 
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results from Ss in the former situation trying to get to box 
"aB" and j or trying to avoid box "bB": and from Ss in the latter 
situation responding , in a general way , to the lack of "B" states 
(with the result that they learn to play "b" to "A" and , thus 
persist with "b"). The details of the reactions of individual 
Ss show that there are some Ss in group 10 who are concerned about 
the lack of "B" states (and one , in particular , who used this as 
the basis of a long- term decision) just as there are some Ss in 
group 00 who become aware of the pay- offs under "B" and start to 
react in much the same way as Ss in group 10 . But the timing of 
this is different for each group and could be used to explain drops 
and rises in each graph . This experiment used only a few Ss , 
however , and it would be ras~o draw too many conclusions from it . 
It does suggest , however , that changes in measures of rates of 
tolerance over the experimental session might hold up as different 
for the two situations : and that the basic motivation might better 
be described as minimising regret than as maximising gain . 
The behaviour of Ss under condition 01 is fairly 
straightforward and can be described in terms of set and decision 
rules which alter during the experimental session (but the evidence 
goes against a Bayesian account) . Something similar appears to 
be happening in the other situations . Unfnrtunately , these situations 
did not have an appropriate reaction and so it is not possible to say 
whether the sets and decision rules of Ss are valid (in that they 
lead to maximal reaction). Nevertheless , it is possible to derive 
a way of describing reaction in these situations ; and it would be 
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possible to write a computer program to simulate reaction . For 
some of the Ss , the task would be very difficult , since the wealth 
of hypotheses that Ss might have in a probability learning task 
(Feldman ,1 961 ) are also present in the reactions of some Ss . For 
other Ss , the task would be fairly easy . The set induced by the 
instructions and the presentation of the situation appear s to 
establi sh other sets in the Ss, i.e ., the Ss become "tuned" to 
particular aspects of the information in the situation , they make 
assumptions about the states (patterned or random , for example ) 
and they establish a criterion for changing response ( " if not 
rewarded , change", for example ). The information that Ss attend 
to alter these other sets and , in particular , alter the criterion 
for changing response . The success of the Ss in the situations 
depends on the relevance of the sets and changes in the sets to 
the characteristics of the situation . 
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CHAPTER VII . APPROPRIATENESS OF REACTION TO SITUATIONS 
WHERE THE STATE IS UNKNOWN. 
It would seem that Ss have a plan for dealing with a 
game against nature , in the sense that Miller , Galan~er and Pribram 
(1960 ) use . That is , Ss undertake a series of operations in a 
certain order until the required goal is reached . In the previous 
experiment , Ss who are required to choose before they know the state 
of nature are of particular interest . These Ss have to construct 
some model of t he futur e and act upon it , i . e ., these Ss are doing 
more than merely responding to events , as they occur . In the last 
experiment , however , the game solution proportions of the states 
kept the reward constant , on average , for any reaction . No 
appropriate reaction was possible . In thE experiment , appropriate 
reaction will be made possible by choosing the proportions of states 
accordingly . 
There are two independent variables in this experiment . 
The first of these is similar to that of the last experiment , i . e ., 
information about the pay- offs and no information about the pay-offs . 
These are labelled, as before , 10 and 00 respectively . All Ss are 
required to play before knowing the state of nature , and the game 
pay- offs are the same as before (see Fig . 6 : 1) . The other variable 
is the proportion of "A" states to "B" states . These were fixed 
at values of 70 : 30 and 65 : 35 respectively ; and were labelled 70/30 
and 65/ 35 . At these val ues the appropriate reaction is to play "a" 
all the time . The proportions were chosen for two constraining 
reasons . One was that values were needed which would be far enough 
- 130-
removed from the game solution proportions of approximately 83 : 17 
for differences in pay- off under the different responses to be 
noticeable . On the other hand , proportions of 50 :50 would possibly 
make these differences so large that all Ss might make the appropriate 
reaction without being sure why they chose as they did. It was 
thought that both 70 : 30 and 63 : 35 proportions would provide enough 
difficulty for the situations to be seen as problems by S. Two 
values were chosen to see whether a small decrement in the proportion 
would lead to an earlier reaction . 
The dependent variables were again to be derived from 
the response sheets . However , this time a test of statistical 
significance was planned. ~le statistics being tested were the 
changes of tolerance of error rates for each S. These were 
calculated by discovering for the first 50 and last 50 trials the 
extent to which S was more willing to tolerate a non-reward card 
on one response than the other . The change statistic was the 
difference between these . Also , the statements made by Ss would 
be used as a check on the earlier descriptions . 
Materials . The apparatus is the same as that used in the previous 
experiment (see Fig . 6 : 2) . The orders of all the cards were randomised , 
the cards c·in the sequence box being in the proportions dictated by 
the experimental conditions . The response sheets used were the same . 
Subjects . The Ss were 36 undergraduates at the University of Keele , 
20 male and 16 female . Their average age was about 20 years . The 
Ss were experimentally nuive . There were four experimental treatments : 
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these were labelled 00 70/30 1 00 65/35 , 10 70/30 and 10 65/35 , 
according to the combination of independent variables presented. 
The Ss were assigned at random to one of the four treatments , with 
the proviso that each groups should have some women in it . 
Procedure . The procedure is the same as that for situations 00 and 10 
in the last experiment (see Chapter VI) . Each S was treated individually 
and a session lasted for a little under half an hour . The monetary 
rewards were a little different from the previous experiment . The 
" cash- in" value of the reward cards was at the rate of four for a 
penny , and each S was paid two shillings and sixpence for participating 
in the experiment . Before each session , the required proportions of 
"Ail s and "B" s were placed in the sequence box and the outcome boxes 
were replenished . After the two hundred trials were completed, E 
asked each S to say how he went about the task . A record of this 
was added to the record of his behaviour through the 200 trials . 
If S started to play one response consistently , E asked 
him after 50 trials of consistent play if he intended always to use 
that response . An affirmative response ended the sequence . It 
occasionally happened that S would himself say that he intended 
always to make a particular response before 50 trials of consistent 
play were completed. If this happened , E let the sequence run for 
ten trials and then stopped the sequence if S was still quite sure 
of his intention. This was done rather than insist on 50 trials 
of consistent play since S usually accompanied his intention with 
the remark " Is there any need to go on?" 
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RESULTS 
The statistic , change of preference of respons e , was worked 
out for each S separately (see Appendix III for a discussion of 
this type of statistic ). This was done by computing over the 
first 50 trials and the last 50 trials the number of non-reward 
cards accompanying the response "b" and response "a ". The 
difference between these was then converted into a ratio by 
division by the total number of non-reward cards received . These 
\.dues are the " initial rate" and the "terminal rat e", respectively . 
The difference between them gives the change of preference over the 
two hundred trials. This was taken to be the chief descriptive 
statistic of SIS r eaction . The terminal rates should approach 
minus unity , if Ss are r eacting appropriately . The taking of a 
fixed number of initial trials is a fairly clumsy procedure ,however . 
Some Ss adopt a consistent approach earlier than others and some 
adopt a consistent approach from the first trial . This is perfectly 
reasonable if S knows the pay-off matrix , since any response will 
give him the information about the proportion of states . Because 
of this , these Ss would be indistinguishable from other Ss who do 
not achieve the appropriate reaction . So , the general procedure 
was modified by awarding the maximum value of 2 .00 to any S who 
r eacted appropriat el y over the last 50 trials . The values of these 
statistics are shown in Table 7: 1, along with their ranks . 
Table 7 : 2 shows t he initial rates and terminal rates for all Ss , 
(page 134a) 
and the average ranks for the groups of Ss . Fig 7 : 1 "Shows the median 
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Table 7 : 1. Change Statistic for Experimental 
Groups . 
Information Proportions 
Condition 65/35 70/30 
Value Rank Value Rank 
-- --
10 2. 00 3· 5 2.00 3· 5 
2. 00 3. 5 . 17 19 · 5 
. 23 17 . 0 .01 27 · 5 
. 89 7 . 0 2 .00 3. 5 
. 42 12 . 0 .09 23 · 5 
. 45 11.0 . 34 16 . 0 
2. 00 3· 5 . 38 15 · 0 
. 48 10 .0 2 .00 3. 5 
-. 37 36 . 0 . 17 .l2.!.2. 
R -= 11.5 R = 14. 6 
11 cA '" , ' 4-1 "1J .... . z...~ 
Value Rank Value Rank 
-- --
00 . 41 13 .0 - .09 29 . 0 
-. 27 34 ·0 · 53 9 .0 
-.11 32 . 0 . 39 14 .0 
. 20 18 . 0 . 58 8.0 
.02 26 .0 .01 27 · 5 
-.10 30 · 5 .07 25 . 0 
. 09 23 · 5 • 11 22 .0 
-. 20 33 . 0 . 16 21 .0 
-.10 30 . 5 - . 28 l2!Q 
R"" 26 . 7 R = 21 . 2 
, MtA .... 
- .10 M ~ ... • Dq I 
H = 11 . 26 d . f . = 3 p < . 02 
I 
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Table 7 :2. Initial and Terminal Rates of Preference 
for Experimental Groups . 
Informat ion Proportions 
Condition 65/35 70/30 
Init. Term . Init . Term . 
Rate Rate Rate Rate 
--
-- -- --
10 -1.00 -1.00 
-
. 28 -1.00 
. 36 -1.00 .00 
- · 17 
.1 3 - . 10 - . 22 - . 23 
.09 - .80 - . 65 -1.00 
. 33 - .09 . 22 . 13 
. 56 • 11 . 19 - . 15 
. 36 -1.00 - .04 - . 42 
. 23 
- . 25 -1.00 -1.00 
-~ - -!..l1. .10 . -....!.9l.. 
R=23 . 4 R=12 . 6 R=12.9 R=12.9 
Init. Term . Init . Term . 
--
-Rate Rate Rate Rate 
--
00 . 31 - . 10 • 11 . 20 
-
. 42 - .15 . 20 - . 33 
. 27 . 38 . 31 - .08 
.07 - . 13 · 47 - .11 
.1 7 . 15 -.07 
-
.08 
• 11 . 21 .04 
- .03 
- · 33 - . 42 - .03 - . 14 
.00 . 20 . 08 
-
.08 
- .:JL -~ . 00 . 28 
-I;::; R= 17.3 R=24 . 8 R=20 . 3 R=23 .7 
·ao 
~75 
·70 
• • 
.;0 
.... 
o 
~ 
'0 
.c 
u 
·65 
·60 
'5 
c: 
o 
:;; -55 
c... 
o 
0-
o 
c... 
a. .50 
·45 
-1 34a.;-
40 eo 120 
Trial numbers 
10 70/30 
10 65/35 
00 70/30 
Ii065/35 
160 200 
Figure 7:1 MEDIAN VALUE FOR RESPONSE 
-a· OVER BLOCKS OF TRIALS FOR 
DIFFERENT SITUATIONS 
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values of response " a" fDr Ss under different experimental 
conditions , over blocks of 40 trials each (Appendix II(iv) gives 
fuller details ). No test o§ significance was carried out on these 
stat ist ics . The nature of the change statistics and , in particular , 
the modification made to detect appropriate reaction , result in a 
badly skewed distribution. No parametric analysis of variance is 
possible , so the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was 
carried out . This yielded a probability value almost equal to 
p = . 01 on the null hypothesis (H = 11 . 26 , p <: . 02) . With a level 
of significance of p = .05 , the null hypothesis may be rejected. 
DISCUSSION 
If Ss are paying attention to the relevant information 
in the situation , they should tend to favour "a" , since this would 
provide a maximum reward , under a random sequence of states for all 
experimental conditions . Figure 7 : 1 shows the median value for 
response "a" over blocks of 40 trials for the four different 
experimental groups . It can be seen that all groups show a tendency 
to improve from the initial median value (first 40 trials) to the 
final median value (last 40 trials) . Moreover , the two groups given 
pay- off information are clearly producing higher "a " responses than 
the two groups not given such information . The effects of the 
other independent variable (the proportions of event states) are 
difficult to estimate . It would appear that over most trials 
the 65/35 proportion produces more "a" responses than the 70/30 
proportion and this would be in keeping with the hypothesis 
suggested in the introduction to this chapter , viz ., that the 
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further away event proportions are from game solution proportions , 
the sooner an appropriate reactbn would be produced. For this 
game , the minimax solution (the point at which any strategy of the 
player is appropriate ) comprises the random production of events in 
the proportion 83 : 17 . The proportion 65 : 35 is farther from this 
value than the proportion 70 : 30 . However , for the last 40 trials 
the production~·. of response "a" is actually higher for the 70/30 
condition than for the 65/ 35 condition in both information and 
non-information groups . This suggests that after 160 trials , the 
disadvantage of proportions closer to game solution may have been 
overcome . 
Inspection of Table 7 : 1 confirms these impressions . 
Using the overall descriptive statistic , the change of tolerance 
of non-reward on response "a", it is possible to reject the null 
hypothesis . This statistic takes into account the preference of the 
S related to the actual sequence of rewards and non-rewards obtained 
by the S. Differences between conditions are fairly clear and the 
the 
statistical test allows for "alternative hypothesis to be accepted , 
that the differences are due to the differences in the independent 
variables . The test does not , however , allow for independent 
estimates of the effects of each of the independent variables . 
It is obvious from the average rankings , however , that the chief 
cause of the differences is the providing of pay-off information to 
Ss in the 10 groups . It is doubtful that the variations in proportions 
are having much effect on Ss ' reactions . On the change statistic 
Ss in group 10 65/ 35 are reacting more appropriately than Ss in 
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group 10 70/30 while Ss in group 00 65/35 are reacting less approp-
riately than Ss in group 00 70/30 . This result might well be an 
artefact of the statistic itself . The statistic has two chief 
disadvantages : one is that it stresses the first 50 and last 50 
trials and the other is that it is comprised of two parts, an 
initial and a terminal rate of preference . 
Table 7 :2 provides information on the two component 
parts of the overall change statistic . If Ss prefer collecting non-
reward cards on response "a " to collecting non-reward cards on 
response "b" (i.e ., if they are reacting appropriately) , then the 
values of the terminal preference rates should be negative. 
Inspection of these rates in Table 7 : 2 shows that almost all Ss 
were reacting terminally in this way . The Ss who fail to do thi s 
are mostly in group 00 65/35 , although Ss in group 00 70/30 also 
produce very low terminal rates of preference for response "a". 
This partially accounts for the results shown in Table 7 : 1, 
particularly for the lower values of the change statistic for group 
00 65/ 35 compared to those of group 00 70/30 . Inspection of the 
initial rates of preference "a" shows that Ss in group 10 65/ 35 
did not have so high an initial rate of preference as Ss in the 
other groups , and that Ss in group 00 65/35 had a higher initial 
preference rate for "a" than Ss in group 00 70/30 . This also 
goes some way to accounting for the results in Table 7 : 1, 
particularly for the higher values of the change statistic in 
group 10 65/ 35 compared to group 10 70/30 . 
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Taking the results shown in Table 7 :2 in conjunction 
with the results shown in Fig . 7 : 1 , it is possible to speculate 
about the course of r eaction in the various groups . It is also 
dangerous to do so in view of the individual reactions discussed 
below . However , if a general account of behaviour under the 
experimental conditions is required, there is one that would make 
most sense of all the information which was not used in the test of 
significance . As reported in the explG~tory experiment of the 
previous chapter , two factors seem to be of paramount importance . 
One is the tendency of Ss to play for "aB" and avoid "bB"; and 
the other is the availability of information about the most 
frequently occurring state ( "A" in this experiment) . One could 
hypothesise a general course of reaction events which comprises 
three stages . In the first stage , there is no information about 
pay-off and preponderance of state operates chiefly . This would 
give , in this experiment , a response set favouring "b" which would 
be stronger in the 00 70/30 group than in the 00 65/35 group 
(since the preponderance of "A" states is greater in the former 
group)' • In the second stage , some information is given or 
acquired about pay-offs and the S operates to minimise regret 
(avoiding "bB" and trying for flaB"). In this experiment , one 
would expect this stage to result in a response set favouring "a" 
at an early point for the 10 70/30 and the 10 65/35 groups and at 
a much later point in time for the 00 70/30 and 00 65/ 35 groups . 
It is also at this stage that some attempt is made by some Ss 
to predict the next state . These predictions are to begin with 
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mostly on a negative recency basis ( "If ' A' has turned up twice , it 
is limy that ' B' will turn up next " ) . And it is this that explains 
the difference between group 10 7/30 and group 10 65/35 in the first 
40 or 50 trials . The group with the greater preponderance of "A" 
states produces most "a " responses because Ss in this group expect 
"B" to turn up more than Ss in the other group . It is interesting 
to note that this also happens with the 00 70/30 and 00 65/35 groups 
towards the end of the experiment , when these groups are likely to be 
in the same stage . Indeed , it would seem that the perceived 
difference between the proportions 70 : 30 and 65 : 35 is much greater 
than the numerical difference . During the third stage , Ss may 
recognise that the states are not individually predictable and may 
instead concentrate on a way of extracting maximum gain given such 
a re-appraisal . This will lead eventually to an increase in the 
strength of response set for "a" although it seems to have led to 
an initial small decrement in strength of response set "a" in 
the 10 70/ 30 group . This may be because of the difficulty of 
determining an appropriate strategy at proportions nearer the 
minimax proportions . 
Such an account gives prominence to the interaction 
effect of the proportions of states of nature . From Table 7 : 1, it 
is clear that only an interaction effect is possible . It is only 
possible to see this effect by a consideration of Table 7 : ~ and 
Fig . 7 : 1. However , in terms of the chief descriptive statistic alone , 
it seems likely that the~fect of proportions is negligible and 
until further evidence accumulates , it will be as well to consider 
that the differences obtained between experimental conditions are 
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entirely due to the effects of information and general sampling 
error . 
One of the interesting questions to ask is why Ss 
in the 00 conditions did not do better than they did . Many of them 
actually moved away from maximal reaction , as evidenced by the number 
of negative signs in these groups . Of the seven Ss in these groups 
whose change statistic was negative , five were concerned with finding 
a pattern in the sequence of states . Of these, four would have 
responded appropriately in the latter part of the session if they 
could have known the coming state . The exception believed , at the 
end of the session , that box "aA" was better than box "bA" , that 
"aB" was about as good as "aA" and that box "bB" was the worst box . 
He did not realise that if this was the case there was no point in 
trying to predict the coming state . He said that he decided, at 
one point , to stick to " a" but , apart from generally favouring 
"a" throughout the trials , there is no evidence of this . It may be 
that if the trials had continued he would eventually have reacted 
appropriately . Some Ss mentioned looking for a pattern , but those 
Ss who obtained a negative change statistic continued to look for it 
until the end . This is confirmed by looking at the reaction of the 
S in the 10 groups who has a negative change score and the S in those 
groups with the value . 01 for his change score . Both reactions were 
dominated until the end by a search for pattern . 
This leaves two Ss with negative scores (00 groups ) 
who were not looking for a pattern. They did not have the correct 
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ordering of the outcome boxes in terms of reward. One of them 
thought that "aA" was better than "bA" and "aB" better than "bB" , 
but failed to draw the obvious conclusion that she should pl~ 
"a" al l the time . It seemed that these were her recollected 
impressions at the end of the experimental session but that this 
information played no part in her choices during the trials . She 
had a change criterion which seemed to become quite definite in the 
middle of these trials . This was that she should change after three 
consecutive "0" cards . By using this rule , she had long stretches 
of "a" responses from trials 99 to 135, 138 to 152 , and 157 to 178 , 
interspersed with rather unsuccessful "b" responses . These , 
however , did not break the balanced nature of her criterion. Towards 
the end , she had a r un of fairly successful "b" responses without 
three consecutive "O" s , and this is why she obtained a negative score . 
Had the third block of trials been taken as her terminal reaction , she 
would have ranked with the best reactors . The other S had reacted 
similarl y . He thought that " aA" was the best box with nothing to 
choose between "bB" and "aB". Again , this seemed irrelevant to his 
reaction for he , too , adopted a change criterion. His criterion was 
also bal anced : it was also , according to him , a diminishing rather 
than an increasing one . That is , he claimed he started with a rule 
t o change after four consecutive "O" s , later , altered it to three 
and , final l y , to two consecutive "O"s . The response sheet does not 
quite bear out ~s account , but the claim of having a diminishing 
balanced criterion of change is confirmed , in general , f rom his 
response sheet . In terms of appropriate reaction , an increasing 
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balanced criterion of change has some chance of leading S to the 
right long- term decision , but one that is diminishing and balanced 
will certainly not do so . 
All the other Ss had positive scores of varying values . 
This does not mean , of course , that all these Ss would necessarily 
reach the right long- term decision or that they were not looking 
for a pattern. Thirteen of the eighteen Ss in the 00 situations and 
five in the 10 situations mentioned pattern in their talk with E. 
Similarly , all Ss in the 00 situations who had a pos itive score did 
not come to the right conclusions about the contents of the boxes . 
A common mistake was the belief that box "aA" contained more " 1" s 
than box 1'bA"j and hardly any of the Ss realised that all the cards 
in the "aB" box were reward cards . There appears to be a confusion 
effect whereby the beliefs of S about one box are influenced not 
only by its actual contents but also by the contents of the other 
box open to S under that response . This indicates that some Ss 
are concerned only with the outcome of the response under 00 
conditions . 
All of the Ss who produced the maximal reaction were 
in the 10 conditions . There were six of these, three in each group . 
Their accounts of their reactions can be divided into two types . 
The first account was an argument similar to the following . " If 
' A' and ' B' are in equal proportions , then on ~ Hriori grounds 
' a ' is a better response than 8b ' because ' a ' gives rewards 
' 1~ ' whereas ' b ' gives rewards 'i+i'. I didn ' t know how the 
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' A' s and ' B' s were weighted , however . So , I took some trials to 
find out . I discovered there were more ' A' s than ' B' s but ' a ' was still 
the better response . So , I chose ' a "'. This account sometimes 
involved a reference to "working out from the odds". The other 
account uses an argument similar to this but shows an unawareness 
of the importance of the proportions . For this reason , some Ss 
thought the task ridiculously easy because " 1 + i " is obviously 
greater than 'i- + i". It is difficult to say how many of the Ss 
pursued this latter argument , but certainly two of them appeared to 
give little or no consideration to the proportions of "A" and "B". 
These Ss would , presumably , react inappropriately if ' b ' were the 
appropriate reaction . 
Some Ss appeared to make little or no use of the 
matrix information. One claimed he considered it at the beginning 
and forgot about it until the middle of the session. One S piled 
up the cards drawn from each box , separately , in an attempt to check 
on the matrix information. Where the information was used , it was 
in conjunction with a search for pattern and took the form of minimising 
the regret of S, Le ., he wanted to avoid "bB" and get "aB". This 
was not often reported in the 10 condition and diminished with the 
lapsing interest in patterning. Some Ss in the 00 conditions , 
however , did mention this , often with annoyance . One S said , for 
example , that he :felt he "was being stopped from getting ' aB"'. 
Some difficulties arise when these results are 
compared with the predictions of stimulus sampling theory . The game 
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against nature where S has no advance information about the play 
of nature may be considered as the generalised two-response contingent* 
situation discussed by Estes (1954). Experiments designed by Estes 
and his colleagues to stuqy this situation have a typical form 
(see , e . g ., Estes ,1 954; Niemark , 1956 ; Brand , Sakoda & Wood , 1957 : 
Kochler , 1961) . S is usually asked to predict which of two events 
(E1 and E2) will occur (as in a probability learning experiment ). 
If S predicts E1, the experimenter follows this prediction with 
event E1 for a fixed proportion of the trials (11 1) and with 
event E2 for the other trials (1 - 11 1) . Similarly , if S predicts 
E2 , the experimenter fo llows this prediction with event E2 for a 
fixed proportion of the trials (~2 ) and with event E1 for the other 
trials (1 - 11 2). S is given no information about the outcome that 
would have occurred had he made the other response . Clearly , a 
special case of this situation is produced if tr1 + Tl2 = 1. 00 ; 
and this case is the contingent probability learning experiment . 
It can be shown that if all nonreinforced trials are 
considered to be wrong predictions, stimulus sampling theory predicts 
an asymptote of the response of predicting E1 to be equal to 
I ~ It}, 
( see , e . g ., Brand , Sakoda & Woods,1957 ) . It js worth noting that 
in later publications (e . g ., Estes , 1959 ; Atkinson & Estes , 1963) 
the symbology is improved; 11 11 is the probability of E1 if S 
predicts E1 (1'1 1 in the above analysis) and 1121 is the probability 
* For Estes , a situation is considered contingent if the choice of 
S cuts him off from information about the alternative outcome . 
In that sense , both 10 and 00 conditions are contingent situations . 
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of E1 if S predicts E2 (( I - 1S) in the above analysis) . The 
asympt otic value is then rewritten as 
On the other hand , nonreinforced trials may be considered as 
blank trials having no effect on the response tendencies . 
In this case , the expected asymptotic level of the response to 
predict E1 is given by 
Ti, 
( Niemark , 1956) . Experiments have been run (Koehler , 1961) to 
discover the effects of different instructions on how S should 
regard nonreinforced trials : and the results , in general , provide 
a fairly satisfactory corroboration c£ the two views . 
In the game against nature , S can be considered 
to be in a general two- response cnntingent situation in which the 
probability of reward (correct prediction is assumed to be a 
reward in the Estes ' experiments) i~ contingent upon the response 
made . The rows of the pay- off matrix provide the basis for the 
calculation of /I a (probability of reward if S chooses "a" ) 
and 11 b (probability of reward if S chooses "b" ) . For the 70/30 
group the values are 
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For the 65/ 35 group , the values are 11 a = . 57 , ITb ~ . 38 . 
It is difficult to know which of the assumptions to make about 
the nature of nonreinforced trials . A general comparison can be 
made , however , by working out both asymptotic values and supposing 
that the prediction lies in the interval formed by them . For the 
70 / 30 groups , these values are 
E L' ( ; 1 1> 0' b. (Q) -:: . S- I 
[;, l' 7:],. ?rob. Cc.) - , ~l -
For the 65/ 35 group , these values are 
[!I' PY1l\', l c, ) 
-
-S- '\ 
, ; 1 -
Pnb . (c. ') - -1,0 Ct, 
-
, :1,. 
The theory also predicts a negatively accelerating learning curve 
towards the appropriate asymptote . 
Inspection of Fig . 7 : 1 shows that there is no 
sign of an asymptote nor of negatively accelerated learning curves . 
Values of Prob . (a) for the last 40 trials are not those predicted 
by stimulus sampling theory (except , possibly, for the 00 65/35 
group ). It would , therefore , seem that stimulus sampling theory 
does not adequately predict reaction in this experimental situation , 
which is formally so close to the contingent cases investigated 
by Estes and his colleagues in the wake of their success with 
probability learning. Furthermore , consideration of individual 
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results also suggests the inadequacy of statistical learning 
theory for this situation. 
There is also little or no evidence to support a 
simple Bayesian view of the reactions of Ss (such as is discussed 
in Appendix IV) . In general , the reaction of individual 
Ss in the 00 conditions was similar to that reported in detail in 
the last experiment . Some Ss paid attention to irrelevant information 
such as pattern of outcome cards in the boxes , and many Ss held 
on to an hypothesis of pattern of states for a long time . There 
is some evidence (see Fig . 7 : 1) that if the number of trials were 
extended Ss in the 00 condition might improve their reaction . Ss 
who discarded or ignored the notion of patterns of states , tended 
to use a change criterion rule which paid attention to runs of 
non- reward cards . Fromthe accounts given by Ss , it is possible to 
construct a model of what a successful S might do in a game against 
nature . There is a logical sequence of operations which can be 
expressed in terms of a flow diagram (Fig . 7 : 2) . Such a series of 
operations would have to be gone through by a computer if it was 
required to make an appropriate reaction for every 2x2 game against 
nature . The points of greatest interest are the questions labelled 
1 to 5. How do Ss go about answering these questions? 
The first question is answered by the instructions 
and the presentation of the situation. This initial set directs 
S along one path or the other . Those Ss placed in situation 01 
in the previous experiment were immediately concerned with questions 
2 and 3. Their reports suggest that , at this point , most Ss dd 
r---- ------, r:-------... ---, r --- --- - --- .. I ENTERl----u--.: Is trw: -: T ,Is ""'. bc_: T : Is - • .".....: T 1 Play ... • 0111 
- • known? • than tM? • -: than be? i the time ~. .~. . ~ '" .. ------ -- ~ ..., .----r-- ~ "" L _____ ~-----" 
: Are .tata n. T : Is ~. bcttar • T Play "b· to "'. 
I pattern?' : than .... 1: and V to"'8-
@) , . • • ~-------~l~~~: ~. ---------;" 
.Is ~o- better: T Ploy *0- 01.' 
: than~·? : the tilM ® ~------------ ~ --
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Ploy -b- 011 
the time 
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-
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T 
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not necessarily consider these questions successively . Indeed , 
the only necessary requirement for success is that Ss keep the 
questions separate . The Ss did not answer the questions with a 
"yes" or "no". They seem to have a response preference together 
with a quickly established criterion of change of response . These 
will vary from S to S. Successful Ss also establish an alteration 
criterion , possibly later in the trials . This is a criterion that 
alters the change criterion. To be successful , this has to avoid 
producing a balanced diminishing criterion. These criteria of change 
appear to have nothing to do with the actual number of rewards 
compared with non- rewards but concentrate on runs of non-reward 
cards . The alteration criterion appears to concentrate on runs 
of reward cards . 
Ss who fail in the 01 situation do so because they 
cannot keep separate the questions 2 and 3, because they pay attention 
to irrelevant informaion (patterns in states or outcome boxes) , 
because an alteration criterion is not set up , or because an 
alteration criterion produces a balanced , possibly diminishing , 
change criterion. 
Those Ss placed in 10 situations have information 
about the pay- offs . The effect of this is to establish the answers 
to questions 2 and 3 for them. This leaves them free to concentrate 
on questions 4 and 5. The presentation of the situation is , 
presumably , an important factor : and one might hypothesise that 
the time spent on answering question 4 is directly related to it . 
It might be that question 4 is not even asked in some situations . 
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Certainly , the Ss in the 10 situations of this experiment seemed 
to spend most of their time answering question 5. Those who 
succeeded seemed to do so by using two pieces of information : 
the information provided about the pay-offs and the proportions 
of "A" and "B" in the sequence box . That is , they seem to be asking 
the que st ion "How many A t s are there compared to B t s?" In this 
experimert, response "a " was appropriate . An interesting question 
is whether these Ss would have reacted appropriately if "b" was 
required . Such a situation would test the nature of their assumptions 
about the frequency of "A" and maximum pay-off . 
Ss in the 00 situations seemed to be trying simultaneously 
to get answers to questions 2 , 3 and 4. A few decided that there was 
no pattern and started to concentrate on question 5. But for most 
Ss in these groups the set for pattern was stronger than for the Ss 
in the 10 groups . The general way of answering question 5 was 
similar to that described for Ss in the 01 situation. That is , 
they did not aim for a "yes/no" answer but operated in terms of an 
alteration criterion affecting a change criterion. This is also true 
of those Ss who were answering questions 2 and 3 unencumbered by a 
belief that there were patterns in the outcome boxes . However , 
none of the Ss was reacting appropriately by the end of the session. 
This may be because of the limited capacity of Ss for processing 
information , or because of the shortness of the experimental session . 
In order to discover something of the long-term effects 
of exposure to a game situation under conditions 00 and 10 , a further 
experiment was planned. The problem of response preference and the 
establishing of change criteria might be looked at in this context . 
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It was also planned to have a condition where the appropriate 
reaction was "b". And an opportunity was also taken of introducing 
another but similar mixed game in order to see whether the reactions 
are generalisable beyond the experimental game, with its unusual 
case of certain reward under "aB". 
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CHAPTER VIII . LONG TERM REACTIONS TO GAME SITUATIONS 
Linker and Ross (1962) , using a game between players , 
found that there was no intragame improvement in the reactions 
of ther Ss but that intergame improvement occurred. This suggests 
that perhaps the most important aspect of a game is the long term 
change in a S' s procedure for dealing with similar situations . 
In the experiments on games against nature , there is evidence 
of intragame i mprovement for most SS e There is also evidence 
from the statements of some Ss at the end of the experimental 
session that they might behave differently if faced with a similar 
situation again . It is also possible that after several sessions , 
the attention paid by some of the unsuccessful Ss to irrelevant 
aspects of the situation (such as pattern search) might diminish . 
Put into the language of experimental design , it is necessary 
to complete the general investigation into games against nature by 
testing for a general trend of improvement between game situations 
over time . It is also conceivable that the immediately preceding 
situation will have some considerable effect on the next encountered 
situa·~ion . In terms of change statistics such as were used in 
previous experiments , the terminal rate of the preceding situation 
may well affect the initial rate of the succeeding situation . So , 
it is necessary also to test for possible residual effects in one 
situation from the previously encountered one . 
The experimental design that best fits these purposes 
is a balanced Latin square design . A Latin square design is one 
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in which every S undergoes all treatments but every S undergoes 
the treatments in a different order . In this way , there is a built-
in control similar to counterbalancing in designs with two treatments 
only . This allows for a test of the effectiveness of the treatments 
and of any trend of improvement with time . A balanced Latin square 
design ensures that each treatment follows every other treatment 
an equal number of times . This makes it possible to estimate and 
test the carry-over effects from one treatment to another . 
For this experiment , the treatments referred to will be 
repeated game situations , differing only in the variable of proportions 
of states A : B. It was decided that there would be three of these . 
More than three sessions might produce difficulties of Ss not coming 
to all sessions . As it was , Ss sometimes had to be chased up and 
one S eventually had to be replaced because he consistently failed 
to turn up . The three treatments were chosen with game characteristics 
in mind. One was chosen so that response "b" would be the appropriat e 
reaction of Ss . All Ss were in the condition of playing before 
nature . This would provide some indication of whether the Ss were 
aware of the importance of the proportions of states . Some Ss 
in condition 10 in the previous experiment seemed to be making 
the appropriate reaction of response "a " on the logically ambiguous 
grounds that " 1 + t tl is greater than ' 1 +.1." i . e . that the rewards 2 6 ' 
available under response "a " are greater than those available under 
response "b" (this seemed to involve an assumption that the states 
are in equal proportions~ This treatment would test whether such 
- 154-
Ss realised that an important proviso was needed for their argument 
to be valid. The other two treatments were chosen so that response 
11a" would be appropriate , the proportions being such that response 
"a" was objectively paying more rewards and paying many more rewards 
than "b11 , respectively . Part of the purpose in this was to discover 
whether a change in the proportion in this direction would lead to 
an earlier reaction . In the last experiment a similar small 
variation did not seem to make much difference . In this experimer4 
the variation was made greater . These treatments were labelled 
X, Y and Z, respectively . 
There were two other independent variables studied in this 
experiment . The two conditions of information , labelled 10 and 00, 
were maintained , i . e . half the Ss were given information about the 
pay-off matrix and half were not . Any S who was under condition 10 
for the first session was under the same condition for all three 
sessions . Similarly , Ss under condition 00 for the first session 
were under the same condition for all three sessions . 
The third independent variable was introduced to serve 
as a check on the generalisability of the results . A new 2x2 mixed 
game was introduced which differed from, the basic game used in 
previous experiments by dropping the certain pB\Y-off for "aB". 
The original game was called "Game 1" and the new game was called 
"Game 2". Fig. 8 : 1 shows the pay-offs of the two games . 
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Fig . 8 :1 . Pay- offs of the Games Used 
Game Game 2 
A B A B 
1 1 a 1 2 a ""5" 2 6 
b 1 1 b t 1 2 6" ::r 
Fig . 8 : 2 shows the geometric analysis of Game 2 . (Fig . 3 : 2 shows the 
geometric analysis of Game 1). The point V represents the ~jnimax 
value of the game , at which point the player of A and B should mix 
his plays in the ratio of 2 :1 . This is represented by the point 
Q cutting the line AB in these proportions . Points between Q and 
A represent proportions of states with more A states and indicate 
that the appropriat e react ion is response "b". Point s between 
Q and B represent proportions of states with more B states and 
indicate that the appropriate reaction is response "a". 
There were thus four balanced Latin squares , labelled, 
respectively , 1~10 Game 1", "00 Game 1", " 10 Game 2", and "00 Game 2". 
Within each balanced Latin square , there were six Ss , as required by 
having threetreatments for each S. Fig .8 :3 shows the basic 
balanced Latin square used. The Roman capitals inside the squares 
represent the val ues of the proportions of sequence states . These 
were different for the two games . For Game 1 (minimax solution 
83 : 17 ) they were respectively 90 : 10 (X) , 70 : 30 (Y) and 60 :40 (Z) . 
For Game 2 (minimax solution 7f : lS) they were , respectively , 
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85 : 15 (X), 65 : 35 (Y) and 55 :45 (z) . These values were chosen 
somewhat arbitrarily within the conditions that treatment X should 
lead to a reaction cf response 1'b" and treatments Y and Z lead to a 
reaction of response " a", treatment Z favouring such a reaction more 
than treatment Y. They are not equivalent for the two games except 
in the sense that they should lead to similar reactions . Treatment 
X is very close to minimax proportions for Game 1 but on the side 
that favours response 1'b". Treatment " Y" in Game 2 is fair/j close 
to minimax proportions but on the side that favour response "a". 
The difference between Y and Z, in each case, was made by reducing 
the number of "A" states by ten per hundred and increasing the 
number of "B" states by the same amount . 
S1 
82 
83 
Fig .8 : 3 . Basic Balanced Latin Square . 
Session 
X 
Y 
Z 
X 
Z 
Y 
1 • Session 
Y 
Z 
X 
Z 
Y 
X 
2. Session 
Z 
X 
Y 
Y 
X 
Z 
3 . 
The choice of dependent variables presented some problems 
for this experiment . A coefficient of rate of tolerance of non-
rewards on given responses depends not only on the reaction of the 
S but also on the values in the cells of the pay-off matrix . These 
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are different for the two games and it is difficult to estimate 
what the effect of this would be . It would be possible , of course , 
to go ahead with such a statistic but if there were significant 
differences between the two games , this would be difficult to 
interpret , i . e . one would not know whether it was due to the 
different reactions of Ss under the different games or whether it 
was an artefact of the dependent variable . 
The treat~~nts within the Latin squares have been chosen 
because they lead to the same maximal reaction under both games . 
It would seem reasonable that the dependent variable should measure 
the extent to which this is achieved . This could be done by a 
simple count of the number of appropriate responses in some 
last part of the session compared to the number of such responses 
in a corresponding first part of the session. This would mean 
changing the measure from a count of response "b" under treatment 
X to a count of response "a" under treatments Y and Z. This change 
of the measure was thought to be undesirable , for it would create 
difficulties in interpreting any carry- over effects . In any case , 
it is unnecessary . The count of response "a" for all treatments 
was finally decided upon . This means that the measures relate 
directly to a change in a particular response and do not have any 
implication of "appropriateness". The "appropriateness" of a 
reaction will be indicated by the sign of this measure under the 
various treatments . This is comparatively easy to interpret . 
It was decided after the experimental sessions to use the first 
hundred and second hundred trials to obtain initial and terminal 
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rates , respectively . This was because of the rather long runs of 
particular responses made by some Ss . 
MATERIALS . The apparatus is the same as that used in previous 
experiments (See Fig . 6 : 2) . The orders of all the cards were 
randomised , the cards in both the pay- off boxes and the sequence 
box being in the proportions dictated by the experimental conditions . 
The response sheets used were similar to those of the previous 
experiments . 
Subjects . The Ss were 24 undergraduates at the University of 
Keele , 13 male and 11 female . Their average age was about 20 years . 
The Ss were experimentally naive . They were treated in two groups 
of 12 Ss each . The first 12 Ss were given Game 1 and were assigned 
at random to condition 00 or 10 and to the row of the appropriate 
balanced Latin square . The second 12 Ss , given Game 2 , were 
similarly treated. 
Procedure . The procedure was similar to that for conditions 00 
and 10 i n previous experiments (see Chapt er VI) with the exception 
that each S attended three sessions (and knew he or she would be 
required to do so from the start) . Each S was treated individually 
and each session lasted for a little under half an hour . At the 
end of each session , S was asked , as usual , to say what he had been 
doing . E then asked S " If yon had to choose either ' a ' or ' b ' 
for the next 50 trials , which would you choose?" This was noted 
down on the response sheet . After this , the reward cards were 
" cashed- in" at the rate of four a penny and S was paid this money 
plus two shillings and sixpence for participating . The boxes 
were then prepared for the next S. 
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The interval btween the three sessions varied somewhat . 
On average it was about a week between each session , but in some 
cases it was as short as one day and in other cases as long as 
two weeks . This variation was due largely to Ss not turning up 
at the appointed time . 
As in the experiment reported in Chapter VII , if S 
started to play consistently , E asked him after 50 trials of 
consistent play if he intended alw~s to pl~ that response . An 
affirmative answer ended the sequence . Similarly , if S himself 
made a declaration that he intended always to pl~ one particular 
response for all trials , E let the sequence run for ten trials 
more and then stopped the sequence if S was still quite sure of 
his int ent ion . 
RESULTS 
For each session , E had a record of S' s responses from 
trial 1 to trial 200 . There were three such records for every S, 
giving 72 records in all . On each record , the number of times 
S pl~ed "a" during the first hundred trials was counted . This 
was regarded as an initial p:-eference for response "a". The number 
of times Splayed Ha" during the last hundred trials was counted 
and regarded as the terminal preference fir response "a". The 
chief dependent variable , on which statistical tests were carried 
out , was taken to be the difference between these two values . 
It should be noted that this statistic is quite different from the 
change statistics used in previous experiments . These were based 
on the notion of tolerance f~ non- r eward cards while making a 
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particular response . t Their advantage ' LS that they tie r the Ss ' 
reactions closely to the outcomes being received by the Ss . Their 
disadvantages are their close dependence on the values of the pay-
off of the particular game matrix and their tendency to be not 
normally distributed . The more orthodox statistic used f~ this 
experiment takes account only of the response of the S (i . e ., it 
does not tie in with outcomes of the response) . However , it 
turned out , as expected , to be fairly normally distributed over the 
72 observations (see Fig . 8 :4) . This allowed an analysis of variance 
to be carried out , based on the balanced Lation square (Cochran and 
Cox , 1957 ). This design assumes that there may be a carry~er effect 
from one~eatment in time to the succeeding one and allows for a 
test of this residual effect . Table 8 : 1 gives the results of the 
analysis of variance . To supplement it , Table 8 : 2 summarises the 
data for all factors deemed to be significantly affecting the results . 
A positive score represents a change away from response "a" by the 
end of the session; a negative score represents a change towards 
response "a". Fig . 8 :5 represents graphically the pure interaction 
effect of proportions of states with matrix information . c-Further 
details of the results are contained in Appendix II(v) ) . 
The other dependent variable of interest is the long-term 
choice of S as indicated at the end of each session . This was 
scored either 1 or 0 according as the choice was appropriate or 
not . The number of right choices is shown in Table 8 : 3 for the 
diaef comparisons . It is , of course , improper to test these values 
stat ist ically . 
>-u 
20 
15 
; 10 
J 
CT 
~ 
L.. 
u.. 
5 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
po--
C 
50 40 30 20 
Value 
Figure 8:4 
CHANGE 
,....... 
,....-
~ 
r--
~ 
I I 
10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 
of change 
DISTRIBUTION OF 
IN RESPONSE ''a'' 
- 163-
Table 8: 1. Analysis of Variance Table 
Source of Variation s . s . d. f . M. s. F 
Between sequences 2555 . 74 5 
Ss within sequences 2606 .08 18 
Information 550 .01 1 550 .01 4. 24+ 
Game 7· 35 1 7. 35 
Inf .x Game 105 . 13 1 105 . 13 
Error(a ) 1943 .59 15 129 . 57 
Periods within 
Squares 311 · 56 4 
Main Effects f Direct (unadj . ) 4933 . 44 
Residual ( adj .) 1266 . 92 2 613 . 46 2· 52 
i Direct (adj .) 4642 . 13 2 2321.07 9· 54* 
Residual (unadj . ) 1518 . 24 
Interaction with Inf . 
t Direct (unadj .) 2003 . 44 
Residual (adj .) 8. 55 2 4. 28 < 1 
1Direct (adj .) 1681 . 29 2 840 .65 3. 46* 
Residual (unadj .) 330 .71 
Interaction with Game 1 Dire ct ( unadj • ) 144. 44 
Residual (adj .) 1298 .47 2 649 . 24 2. 67 
fDirect (adj .) 425 .80 2 212 .90 < 1 
Residual (unadj .) 1017 . 11 
Error (b) 7783 . 35 32 243 . 23 
Total 22871 . 99 71 
* Significant at r = .05 for level of significance I J ) 
(let4--3.r'l + IOS".11+ • r 
+ If error (a ) consists of 17 d . f . and s . s . 2056 .07 , M. S. = 120 . 95 
and F = 4. 55 which is significant at r = .05 A 
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Table 8 :2. Predictable Means for Different Conditions 
General Mean -0. 74 
Mean for Condition 10 +2 .03 
" " " 
00 - 3. 50 
Mean for treatment X +8 .08 
" " " 
y 
- 3· 75 
" " " 
z 
- 6. 53 
Mean for treatment 10 X +15 . 38 
" " " 
y 
- 5.78 
" " " 
z 
- 3· 51 
" " " 
00 X +0 . 78 
" " " 
y 
- 1.73 
" " " 
z 
- 9. 56 
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Table 8 : 3. Appropriate Long-term Choices 
under Different Conditions . 
Game 1 v . Game 2 
Condo 10 v Cond . OO 
A v. B v . C 
Session 1 v . 2 v . 3 
28/36 v 28/36 
29/36 v 27/36 
18/24 v . 19/24 v . 19/24 
19/24 v . 17/24 v . 20/24 
Discussion 
In terms of the change statistic and the model of 
the anaysis of variance , five terms are contributing to the results . 
None of these terms is due to residual effects and none is due to 
a general effect between sessions . The five terms are :-
1. The general mean at - 0 . 74 (- 0 . 735) ; 
2 . The means due to information condition alone , i . e ., 
- 2. 765 (- 3. 50 + 0 . 735) for condition 00 and +2 . 765 
(2 .03 + 0 . 735) for condition 00 (measured as deviations 
from the grand mean of - 0 . 735) ; 
3. The means due to the proportions of states alone , i . e . 
for condition X, +8 . 82 (8 .08 +0.735) 
for condition Y, - 3.02 (-3 . 75 +0 . 735) 
for condition Z, - 5 .80 (- 6 . 53 +0 . 735) 
(measured as deviations from the grand mean of -0 . 735) ; 
4 . The means due to the interaction of proportions with 
information , i . e ., 
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for 10 , condition X +4 . 53 (15 . 38 + 0 . 735 - 2. 765 -8 . 82 ) 
" " " 
y 
- 4 . 79 (- 5 . 78 +0 . 735 - 2 . 765 +3 .02) 
" " " 
z +0 . 26 (- 3 . 51 +0 . 735 -2 . 765 +5 .80 ) 
for 00 , condition X - 4 . 53 (0 . 78 +0 . 735 +2 . 765 -8 . 82 ) 
" " " 
y +4 . 79 (- 1. 73 +0 . 735 +2 . 765 +3 . 02) 
" " " 
z -0 . 26 (-9 . 56 +0 . 735 +2 . 765 +5 .80 ) 
(measured as deviations from the grand mean and the means of the 
main effects ); and 
5. A normally distributed error term to account for individual 
deviations from these means . 
These are derived from the additive assumption of the 
model of the analysis of variance and are the predictable effects of 
the various independent variables . The mean of any given experimental 
condition can be discovered by adding the different effects together . 
So , for example , the best estimate of the mean score in a replication 
study f or Ss under condition Y 00 (Game or Game 2 , first , second 
or third session , preceded by X 00 or Z 00 or nothing ) is obtained 
by adding - 0 . 735 +( - 3.02) +( - 2. 765) +(4 . 79) = -1 . 73 . 
The first term is the general mean. This shows a slight 
tendency on the part of Ss to change towards response "a". This is 
presumably a result of the particular parameters chosen for this 
experiment and is unlikely to be generalisable beyond the conditions 
of this experiment . 
The second term refers to the pure effect of the differences 
in conditions of i nformation . This variable has been shown to be 
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significant in past experiments . In this experiment , the F-value falls 
just short of the level of significance if the level is taken as p = . 05 . 
This value depends on the error term (a) which can be regarded as the 
pooled natural variation among Ss in the same conditions . Since the mean 
squares due to differences between games , and to the interaction between 
games and information are not significant , they may be included in the 
error term . The revised error term would then yield a significant 
F-value . Because this~~ term has been shown to be significant 
in earlier experiments , this approach was adopted rather than declare 
the variable not significant or alter the level of significance for 
this variable only . This was a difficult decision to make because one 
could argue that as the Ss became more familiar with the general 
situation , so the differences between Ss in different information 
conditions diminished . There is , however , no evidence to support this . 
It , therefore , seemed better to accept the already established effect 
of information condition as significant . The effect of this variable 
in this experiment is to produce a tendency in Ss who have the matrix 
information to play away from "a ", and to produce in the other Ss a 
tendency to play more for "a" at the end of each session. 
;" This is best interpreted in the light of earlier experiments 
al\d t he reports of Ss in this experiment . To begin with, Ss in the 10 
condition tend to play "a" quite readily , partly to avoid the "punishing" 
"bB" box and partly to get to the "rewarding" "aB" box . This tendency 
loses strength as the session continues . A statistic which takes the 
difference between the first and last half of the session would thus 
show a positive value . On the other hand , Ss in the 00 condition , 
even under treatment Z, are faced with more "A" states than "B" states . 
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They tend to play "b'J early on , since "b" is the more rewarding 
respnnse under state "A". In the latter half of the game , with more 
information on the "B" boxes , they seem to go through a stage of 
minimising regret similar to that undergone early by Ss in the 10 
condition. This seems to be a fairly generalisable result in its 
implications if not in the actual values produced. That is , Ss 
pay attention to the information most immediately available and base 
their first strategy on it . Later , either by daiberate searching or 
by an incidental accumulation of evidence , more information m~ become 
available which m: ight lead to a change of strategy . The information 
that so accumulates for Ss in the 10 condition relates to the question 
" Is response ' a ' better than respnnse ' b ' ?", whereas the information 
accumulating for Ss in the 00 condition seems to relate to the question 
" Is ' aB ' a better box than ' aB ' ?". Curiously enough , each session 
seems to produce the same procedure , in terms of the statistics . 
There is no carryover , apparently, from one situation to the next . 
This might , of course , be due to the fairly long interval of time 
between sessions . 
The third term shows the effects of the variation of 
proportions of states on the reactions of SS e These are in the direction 
of maximal reaction and , in general , confirm the hypothesis that Ss 
respond in an appropriate way , even if they do so slowly . Under 
condition X, Ss show a marked tendency to move from response "a" to 
response "b". Under condition Y, Ss show a tendency to move towards 
response "a", while under condition Z, Ss show a stronger tendency 
to move towards respfl1lse "a". Not only are these significant in the 
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statistical sense but they also seem to contribute a large amount 
to the final means . This result , which holds for Ss under both 
conditions , is generalisable in the form of the propo s ition that Ss 
tend to react in an appropriate way even if they do not , in general , 
end by reacting with one response only . 
The fourth term concerns the interaction between information 
and proportions . The effects of this interaction are best interpreted 
by reference to Fig . 8 :5 and Fig . 8 :6 . Fig 8 :5 gives the means under 
all six conditions excluding the main effects . The general result 
is as one would expect , i . e . Ss given information about the matrix 
do better than Ss without this information. In Fig . 8 :5 the positive 
score under condition X for Ss in condition 10 gives way to a negative 
score under condition Y and to a small positive score under condition 
Y. For Ss in condition 00 , the reverse takes place . In a sense , 
the significance of this interaction is partly an artefact~ the 
particular statistic used. The crossover from X to Y occurs because 
of the choice of change in response "a" rather than a statistic of 
appropriate change . For this reason , Fig . 8 :6 was constructed to show 
appropriateness of response rather than response "a" over the 
experimental conditions . In this Figure , the adjusted observed means 
are pl otted , adding in the effects due to information condition. 
There is one puzzling phenomenon. Contrary to what one would expect , 
Ss in condition 10 show a general decline in reaction from condition 
Y to condition Z, while Ss in condition 00 show an improvement . It 
is possible that this result is also an arte~t of the statistic 
chosen; in particular , an artefact of using one hundred trials as the 
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basis of initial and terminal rates . Ss under 10 condition may play 
"a" fairly consistently earlier under condition Z and keep playing it to 
the end. In this way , the change statistic would be lower for condition 
Z than for condition Y. Confirmation that this is , in fact , the case , 
can be found by looking at the initial rates for both conditions . There 
is a difference of 4.50 between these . In trying to generalise this 
result , it is perhaps better to translate the change statistic into 
the terms of appropriate reaction , and to disregard the details of 
the calculation of the change statistic . In that case , the interaction 
can be explained in terms of the two propositions already accepted. 
Ss do better under all proportions of states if they have knowledge 
of the matrix . It would also seem that this advantage is especially 
great near the point representing minimax proportions . 
The fifth term merely reflects the fact that there are 
deviations from these values dueto individual differences and other 
factors . 
These data are supplemented by the answers of Ss to the 
question concerning the long-term choice they would make (Table 8 :3). 
Most Ss chose appropriately 56 out of 72 answers being appropriate , 
ones . 13 Ss chose appropriately on all three sessions . Ss who chose 
inappropriately often gave no reason for their choice other than that 
induced by the instruct ions , viz ., "because I would get more reward 
cards". Some Ss who , inappropriately , chose response "b" under 
treatment Y, mentioned the fact that there were more "A" s than "B" s 
and that , therefore , they would be better off responding "b" since 
"bA" was a better box than "aA". These Ss were from both information 
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conditions . It is possible in only one case (under condition 00) to 
see what was happening to make a S choose response "a " under treatment 
X. ~s was a S who always came to a decision about the situation 
without going through the 200 trials . He was faced with the treatments 
in the order Y, Z and X. He reacted appropriately for treatment Y 
(aft er 90 trials ) and Z (after 30 trials) and came to the conclusion 
that "a" was the appropriate response for reaction to treatment X, 
too (after 20 trials) . It may be that the proportions of treatment 
X were not sufficiently removed from game proportions to enable him 
to see that response "b" was better . (One other S said that under 
treatment X it was difficult to decide on long-term play . ) On the 
other hand , it seems possible that he is one of those people who 
does not see the importance of the proportions and chooses "a" 
because "1 + 5" is greater than ,, ~ + i". He would not be able to 
put these figures to his reasoning , but he could by this time have 
come to similar beliefs . 
Looking at the reports of Ss on their own behaviour , One 
is struck by the way they tended to stick to the same procedure for 
each session. This confirms the analysis of variance finding that 
sequence effects of any kind are not significantly affecting the 
dependent variable . Their procedures were very much the same as 
those reported in earlier experiments . Sometimes , the effect of 
repeated sessions was to rigidify these procedures . One Sunder 
the 00 condition provides a striking example of this with a procedure 
which was ineffective , from an objective point of view . In the first 
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session , he claimed he was changing his response after one or two 
consecutive non- reward cards , "depending on how he felt ". His 
record shows that this was what he was doing and that his feelings 
were leading him slowly to a greater tolerance of error on the 
appropriate response . For the other two sessions , however , he seemed 
to become more inflexible and change his response every time he got 
a non- reward card. This procedure , of course , does not lead to any 
change of reaction , appropriate or not . One must assume thatthe 
rewards produced by this procedure were sufficient for S or that he 
believed he could not obtain more reward cards by changing his 
procedure . In the case of most Ss , as can be seen from the general 
results , their procedures involved alteration criteria which led them 
to a tendency to appropriate reaction . 
The failure to find improvement with increasing experience 
of the~me is rather puzzling , in view of the findings of Linker and 
Ross (1 962 ). In their experiment , Ss played variants of the "scissors-
paper- stone" game (using red , blue and yellow cards instead of 
" scissors", "paper" and " stone" ) . The pay-off matrix for player :r-
is shown in Fig 8 :7. The game is a zero-sum one . Linker and Ross 
obtained different games by having the experimen~discard one of his 
strategies and play with only two strategies . This meant that S 
was left with three strategies which led to a win or a draw , a 
win or a loss , and a loss or a draw , respectively . The interest 
of Li~r and Ross was primarily in the detection of a learning set in 
the type of experiment that Harlow uses (see , e . g ., 1949 , 1959) . 
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Fig . 8 :7 . Game Matrix of Linker & Ross (1962) 
Player I 
R 
B 
Y 
R 
o 
- 1 
+1 
Player II 
B 
+1 
o 
-1 
y 
-1 
+1 
o 
For each game , therefore , they only ran four trials at the most 
(for some experimental conditions only two trials per game were run) . 
They played 20 games in all (for some experimental conditions 40 games 
were run) . Clearly , some of these games must have been run several 
times since only three possible new games can arise out of this 
procedure . Moreover , formally every game has the same matrix , and , 
one supposes , E played a minimax strategy for all the games (although this is 
not specifically stated in their report of the experiment ). 
It is , therefore , doubtful if enough trials per game were 
given to enable a conclusion to be drawn on intragame improvement 
(their analysis appears to be an inspection of graphs ). What they 
observed as intergame improvement may be real enough (at least for the 
13-year old children) but it may be questioned whether this should be 
called intergame improvement . Since the pay-off matrices were formally 
the same for all games and the occurrence of states was not systematically 
varied between games , it may be nearer the truth to refer to this 
improvement as intragame improvement . It is interesting , in this 
connection , to note that divergence from chance reaction occurred very 
1" ___ -4-___ " ___ _ ...L .... _, __ _ ..l._ I __ ~_I 'L' , \ 
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that an inspection of the graphs of intergame improvement shows 
little change for college students over the games . The most 
interesting result of the experiment is the tendency of college 
students to react with responses mixed at minimax proportions , and 
this may be supposed to be prompted by E' s strategy (presumably a 
minimax strategy). 
The main conclusion of this experiment is that long-term 
exposure to a game against nature does not appear to make much 
difference to the way Ss react to the situation. This means that 
there was no inter- game improvement . The only evident effect of 
repeated exposure is that Ss become more aware of their procedure 
for dealing with such a situation. In general , Ss react appropriately . 
Ss given information on the pay- off matrix do better than those not 
given such information. There is also evidence that this advantage 
is greatest under proportions of states close to minimax proportions . 
Ss given information on the pay- off matrix appear to attend to this 
information and react to it for the first trials , while Ss not given 
this information attend to the information available from the situation 
itself • 
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CHAPTER IX - GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
There are three purposes to be served by this chapter . 
The first is to summarise the experimental results derived from the 
research conducted and reported in earlier chapters . In addition , 
some critical attention will be paid to the problems which attended 
that research . The second purpose is to relate the results to 
other psychological research considered in Chapter III as providing 
descriptions of change of behaviour . And the third purpose is to 
consider the research in the broader context of behaviour , both in the 
extension of the formal analysis and in the use of Ss other than 
University students . 
Experiments and Results 
The purpose of the research was to provide a basis in 
experience and observation for theoretical analyses of human behaviour 
in sequential situations . In order to achieve this end , it was 
necessary to produce a formal analysis of situations , based on 
mathematics and logic . There are several apparent advantages of doing 
this . It is perhaps a truism that there are three sets of variables 
which enter into any psychological research . These are response 
variables , stimulus variables and motivational variables . Despite 
the agreement on this , psychologists have not always kept all of 
these variables in view when experimenting . It is only recently , 
for example , that motivational variables have been taken into account 
in psychophysi cs . And it has been commonly accepted practice to make 
unspecified assumptions about motivation in other experimental areas . 
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The formal analysis proposed in Chapter II states explicitly the 
relationship between the three sets of variables . It is on this 
relationship that the maximal reaction has been calculated , making 
use of assumptions of perfect information and rationality . The 
empirical observations are made relative to the maximal reaction , 
i . e ., the observations describe the extent to which maximal reaction 
takes place . This is a procedure akin to noting errors in assessing 
syllogisms (e . g ., Janis and Frick , 1943) or failures in logical 
thinking (e . g ., Piaget , 1953) . It does not imply that Ss will 
eventually achieve maximal reaction . It should be possible , using 
this as a measure of reaction , to detect any consistent reactbn of SS e 
There are , however , three problems not settled by the formal analysis , 
which seemed to recur throughout the research . 
The first of these concerns the question of pattern 
recognition . It was anticipated that this would be a problem , 
because of the emphasis placed on it in some of the literature on 
probability learning . It was for this reason that the preliminary 
experiment reported in Chapter IV was carried out . In that experiment , 
Ss were given strings of binary digits (simultaneously) which differed 
in degree of bas and pattern. The results of that experiment suggested 
that , under these conditions , these particular Ss (University stUdents) 
could sort out patterned and semi- patterned strings from randomly 
produced strings . The difficulties of designing an experiment to 
investigate the effects of successive preserlation were pointed out , 
and it was suggested that the best way to deal with this problem was 
to pay close attention to the particular situations studied. In the 
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chapters following Chapter IV , some information about this problem 
has been accumulated. It will be as well to survey it here and try to 
come to some conclusions . The first thing to notice is that some Ss 
openly claim that they were looking for patterns in the states 
presented , both in probability learning situations and in the games 
against nature . The second point is that some Ss end up with a 
maximal reaction in these situations (where the states are not 
patterned but randomly produced). This would suggest that at least 
some Ss do look for patterns and that at least some Ss recognise 
that there is no pattern. There is evidence , particularly from the 
reports of Ss in games against nature , that some Ss start out looking 
for patterns and later realise that there is none . Of especial 
interest , is the evidence in Chapter VII that those Ss who know the 
pay- off values give up looking for patterns early while those who 
do not know the pay- off values persist to the end in looking for 
patterns . This strengthens the view that failure to perceive the 
randomness of events is due to limited channel capacity . Of late , 
experimenters with probability learning situations have been 
increasingly taking pattern-searching into account (see , e . g ., 
Rose and Vitz , 1966 ; Restle , 1967 ). Indeed , it has been suggested 
quite explicitly (Rose and Vitz , 1966 ) that any mathematical model 
purporting t o describe probability learning data will have to 
incorporate axioms dealing with short- term memory and simple coding 
of events . The chief conclusion to be derived from the experiments 
reported here is that some Ss attempt pattern recognition , and that 
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some Ss can recognise the random nature of events presented successively . 
Such a conclusion agrees with the general findings of other research 
using patterned binary event sequences (Bruner , Wallach and Galanter , 
1959 ; Wolin et al ., 1965) . 
The second recurring problem is the problem of motivation . 
In the formal analysis , motivational variables are represented objectively 
by the pay-off values entered in the cells of the appropriate matrix . 
Some of the difficulties of motivation have been avoided by the formal 
analysis and the restrictions imposed on it . In particular , the 
restriction of the reward to a unit card , obtainable at different 
rates , for outcome events avoided problems of subjective utility 
associated with non-constant reward values . For example , if the 
outcome of S' s choice is either ten units or one unit , it may be that 
S will regard the latter outcome as so small as to be equal to ~ero . 
Of course , the general argument of Chapter II could still be applied 
even if reward values were allowed to vary . That is , the purpose 
of the analysis is not to make predictions but only to serve up a 
criterion (maximal reaction on the expected value model) against 
which to evaluate observed behaviour , thus avoiding questions of 
subjective expected utilities . Nonetheless , part of the evaluation 
of behaviour might be to consider the observed motivation , in general 
terms . In this sense , it is not possible to avoid t e purposes of 
the Ss in sequential situation. Messick and McClintock (1968 ) provide 
a method for looking at these with social motives . However , the only 
method of doing this in the situations reported in earlier chapters 
was by questioning the Ss . Two motivating purposes seemed to recur 
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First , Ss seemed at some point in the course of some 
experiments to be acting as if they were minimising some regret 
function . This was obvious in the games against nature where Ss 
expressed their aims in such terms as " I wanted to avoid the ' bB ' 
box". It is interesting to note that this was , for some Ss , at 
least , a passing phase which was particularly associated with an 
attempt to predict the next state . It is this that leads one to 
think twice about Simon ' s (1956 ) attempt to reconcile game theory 
and learning theory by postulating minimisation of subjective regret 
as the basic motivational factor , in a probability learning situation. 
Indeed , it would seem from the experiments in the game situations 
that there is no simple motivational function that remains constant 
for all Ss throughout sequential situations (at least where Ss are 
deprived of certain knowledge of the next state ) . 
Second , it sometimes seemed that some Ss were not maximising 
but sufficing . This was noticeable especially in the experiment 
reported in Chapter VIII where Ss played three games against nature . 
The unexpected failure of Ss to improve generally (or to show the 
influence of the previous game against nature on the next ) could be 
accounted for by supposing that Ss adopted a generalised strategy during 
the first game and were so satisfied with their gains under it that 
they st"u.ck to it for all three games . In some instances , of course , 
it was a good generalised strategy that led to maximal reaction : 
and these Ss must be considered to b e maximising . In other cases , 
however , the strategy , although clearly stated and adhered to by Sa , 
led nowhere : and these. Ss maJ' be considered to be sufficing . The 
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interesting question is why these Ss were satisfied with their 
strategies . No answer was explicitly sought to this question but 
two possibilities may be considered. The first is that Ss were 
trying to maximise and thought that their strategies did this for them . 
This is the " logical fl Qw" answer and may be characterised by those 
Ss who stated that " 1 + i " (sum of the pay- offs under "a") was greater 
than "t + i" (sum of the pay-offs under "b") and did not realise that 
the proportion of event states had also to be considered. The second 
is that some Ss were baffled by the situation they were in and did not 
know how to deal with it but felt happier if they had a rigid rule 
(irrespective of its appropriateness) that they could follow . This 
is possibly typified by the S reported in Chapter VIII as adopting 
the (not: surprisingly) simple decision rule "When a non- reward card 
occurs , change response" - a rule which is certainly not appropriate 
in the sense that it will lead to maximal reaction . 
Perhaps the most striking thing about these problems of 
motivation is that they are intimately related with other aspects 
of the situations . This strengthens the case for continuing to treat 
them as part of the formal analysis . The fact that observed motivation 
is rather complex and may change during a sequential situation suggests 
that the objective value pay- off matrix cannot be replaced by a simple 
subjective utility pay-off matrix . 
The third recurring problem is the SIS view of the situation. 
This problem was raised by some of the results of the probability 
learning experiment , reported in Chapter V. In particular , it was 
suggested that some Ss viewed the situation as a game with E. 
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In terms of the formal analysis , the probability learning situation 
was seen as a game between players and the S believed that the states 
presented were not independent of his responses . In the probability 
learning experiment Ss did better (in terms of statistics based on 
maximal reaction) in experimental situations where the independence 
between states and responses was made more obvious . In the experiments 
with games against nature , no S said that he viewed the formal situation 
as a game between players . This suggests that the apparatus used made 
it obvious that E was not a player . In general , it would seem that 
the best way of prewenting misunderstanding of the formal situation 
by Ss lies as much in careful control of the experimental representation 
of it as in instructions to SS e This is , in fact , an important 
variable in any sequential experiment ; and it should also be possible 
to use it as an independent variable . For example , it would be 
interesting to repeat the probability learning experiments with some 
groups of Ss being encouraged (by variations in instructions and 
experimental representation of the formal situation) to believe they 
were playing a game against E and some to believe they were in a 
probability learning situation. In this way , an estimate of the 
importance of these variables could be obtained. For the experiments 
with games against nature , there is good reason to believe that the 
variables were adequately controlled , and the results from these 
experiments will be examined in this belief . 
The main results of the experiments will be summarised 
briefly and an attempt will then be made to integrate these into a 
general account of reaction to sequential situations in which S is 
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known to be able to discriminate the states . 
The presentation of the situation produced different 
reactions in the probability learning experiment . These were 
described in terms of different sets being established. In the 
presentation which used the black box the set for negative recency 
responses gave way fairly quickly to a set for positive recency 
responses . In the presentation which used the list , the set for 
negative recency responses persisted through 200 trials . In terms 
of appropriate reaction , a positive recency set will produce a 
tendency towards it . It is not clear from this experiment to what 
extent the positive recency set was induced because it was made 
fairly explicit that the state next produced was independent of 
S' s response , or because the generation of the sequence of states 
was made obvious , i . e ., that the sequence was randomly produced. 
In the game ag~st nature when S was required to respond 
to the state of nature , successful Ss adopted fairly early in the session 
change criteria for each stat e which related to the number of 
consecutive non- reward cards received under a given response . These 
change criteria usually were equal for the two responses , to begin 
with . Alterations to these crit eria were made by maans of an alteration 
criterion which referred to the number of consecutive reward cards 
received under a given response . Ss who were unsuccessful might 
have failed to develop alteration criteria which were responsive 
to their" general beliefs about the preponderance of reward cards in 
given boxes . There was also some evidence that limitation of memory 
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and an inability to keep the states separately in mind contributed 
to the failure of some of the SS e 
Situations where S is required to respond before the state 
is known are complicated by attempts on the part of most Ss to predict 
the next state . These attempts seemed largely to be governed by 
hypotheses concerning patterns of states of the sort Feldman (1961) 
reports in a probability learning situation . No attempt was made to 
discover these hypotheses by asking Ss to think aloud. Some Ss 
claimed that towards the middle and end of the session they were 
well aware of the preponderance of "A" states . Their attempts at 
predict ion , at this stage , related to the "B" state and derived from 
negative recency or positive recency considerations (e .g ., " Since 
that was a ' B', the next state is likely to be a ' B', too .") When 
Ss were placed in such situations where there was an appropriate 
reaction derivable from game theoretic considerations , their reactions 
appeared in general to be approaching an appropriate reaction . The 
extent to which ~s was true depended on other characteristics of the 
situation. In particular , it depended on whether S was given information 
about the pay-off matrix or not . The general effect of giving information 
was to weaken the set to look for patterns among the states . Certainly , 
Ss who were not given this information were more concerned with pattern 
at the end of the session than the other SS e They also showed towards 
the end some of the characteristics of the early reactions typical 
of Sa given matrix information , i . e ., they were concerned with minimising 
regret by trying to predict the next state . Those Ss who were successful 
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concentrated eventually on the two responses open to them and how 
they paid off under the prevailing proportions of states . They 
went about this task not by a counting device (although this did 
happen occasionally ) but by a rule for change which related to the 
occurrence of consecutive non- reward cards , and a rule for altering 
the change criteria which related to the occurrence of consecutive 
reward cards . 
An experiment carried out to discover any long-term or 
carry-over effects of game situations on later reactions showed 
tht there were no significant long- term or residual effects . The 
period between sessions was about a week and it is possible that a 
smaller period might produce some effects . At the same time , a 
check was made on the particular pay-off values used in earlier 
situations (with the special condition of certain reward in one 
cell) . A second game was introduced. No significant difference 
was found due to the different games . In general , Ss were found 
to be reacting in a way that tended to be appropriate for all the 
situations facing them , whether or not the required reaction was 
contrary to the apparent conclusion to be drawn from the knowledge 
of the matrix alone . (This refers to the argument advanced by some 
Ss that " 1 + i " is greater than "t + i" and , therefore , "a " must 
always be the appropriate reaction. ) There was also some evidence 
that Ss without knowledge of the matrix improved their reaction more 
than Ss with matrix information as the proportions moved from the 
minimax proportions towards ~~al proportions . In general , however , 
knowledge of the matrix helped Ss to make appropriate reactbns . 
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From these experiments , one can conclude that the reaction 
of a given S to a given situation depends largely on the characteristics 
of that situation . The finding that there are no long-term effects 
makes the task of describing reaction easier for one must assume that 
it is the present situation only that matters . The most general 
description is based on the notion of a hierarchy of hypotheses , 
each of which carries a plan for action and a method of evaluation. 
These plans specify those aspects of the situation to which Spays 
attention. The aim of S might be assumed to be to obtain a reward on 
every trial , at least to begin with . In discrimination learning 
situations where S can discriminate between the states , this is possible 
because of the structure of the situation. In probability learning 
situations , this is not possible because of the structure of the 
situation. But S does not necessarily know this . If S maintains 
this aim , then it is perfectly reasonable for S to assume that the 
sequence of states may show pattern. If found , this information 
(in the form of a code or key to the situation) would produce a 
reward on every trial because of the structure of the pay-off matrix . 
In such a case , the code or suspected code would set the change criteria. 
Because of the nature of the situation , no code will produce the 
expected reward on every trial . The evaluation of the major pattern 
hypothesis will fail because neither te hypothesis nor the evaluation 
criterion is appropriate to the situation. It may be that some Ss 
never give up the major pattern hypothesis but go on trying out minor 
hypotheses about the nature of the patterns . This process could go 
on for ever if the implications of Erickson ' s " local consistency" 
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model are accepted , i . e ., S may tryout lat er in the sequence 
hypotheses about pattern that he rejected early on . It is possible, 
however , that other major hypotheses take over the direction of S' s 
reaction . For exampl e , if S abandons the patt ern hypothesis , he may 
conclude that this didn't work because E is reacting to S' s responses 
by altering the stat es to confuse S: this could be called the "game 
against E" hypothesis . 
Such an hypothesis might, of course , be set up from the 
start of the experiment . If S operates under this hypothesis , he 
presumably accepts that he is unlikely to get a reward on every trial . 
It is difficult to know how S would then evaluat e his actions . It 
is possible that he would be satisfied if he thought he was getting 
the better of E. For many Ss , this will mean, in a probability 
l earning situation , getting more than half the predict ions correct, 
and , in a game situation ,getting a r eward oft ener than once ever y two 
trials . The strategy of the S is likely to be dominated by minor 
hypotheses centring around notions of "bluff " and " counter-bluff". 
There is very little evidence on S' s reactions under this hypothesis . 
However , once S accepts this major hypothesis and the new evaluation 
criterion , it is unlikely he will give it up. This major hypotheSis 
may be combined with the pattern hypothesis to produce minor hypotheses 
about patterns of states with E occasionally disrupting the pattern . 
Another major hypothesis that S might adopt either from the 
start or in place of the pattern hypothesis is the "game against nature " 
hypothesis . Under this hypothesis , S will adopt an evaluatbn criterion 
that pays particular attention to the outcomes of his responses , i . e ., 
he will largely ignore the future state when making a response if he 
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does not know that state . The actions of Ss under this hypothesis 
have been most closely studied in the experiments reported in earlier 
chapters . In those Ss who played after the state was known (Chapter VI) , 
no pattern hypotheses about the sequences of states occurs . These 
Ss were directed by a variant of the "game against nature" hypothesis . 
It was noted that their actions and evaluation criterion were closely 
related. In general , they set up two change criteria (one for each 
state ) to decide when to change from one response to another . 
A change criterion is a rule for changing response . The rule 
may be balanced (e . g ., change from "a" to "b" after one non-reward card; 
change from "b" to "a" after one non-reward card) or unbalanced (e . g ., 
change from "a" to "b" after one non-reward card; change from "b" to 
"a" after two non-reward cards) . For successful Ss an alteration 
criterion appeared to control these change criteria : and runs of reward 
cards in outcomes seemed the chief determinant of this . In the 
probability learning situation , Ss who reacted appropriately may well 
have adopted a similar policy with the number of consecutive correct 
predictions altering the change criterion disparately . In the games 
where Ss played before the state was known , there was evidence that 
some Ss also adopted this policy with the number of consecutive rewards 
under each response altering the change criterion disparately . 
Ss who fail to approach maYimal reaction in sequential 
situations may do so for two chief reasons , in terms of the above 
account . First , they may hold an inappropriate major hypotheSiS about 
the situation , and fail to abandon it for an appropriate one in the 
light of the information acquired during the experiment . Second , 
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they may not be able to adopt procedures within the appropriate 
major hypothesis whi ch would guarantee success . Reasons for this 
may be diverse , e . g ., limited memory span , satisfaction with any 
rule that can be applied systematically , failure to see the situation 
as a whole , etc . Such reasons have been suggested during discussions 
of the results obtained. 
Relation of Experiments to Other Research 
In the attempt to formalise experimental situations , 
discrimination and probability learning situations were considered 
together because they showed the same pay-off matrix (at least , where 
full reinforcement was given in a double discrimination situation). 
It would be nonsense to suggest that they are similar in terms of 
experimental design. This is because there are two very important 
distinctions which apply to all formal situations . These are the 
ability of S to discriminate between the states used and the presence 
or absence of the state when S is responding . The two factors are not 
unrelated , at least , so far as experimental design is concerned. Ne 
~chologist eould igfiere tlieBe faotops · and the failure of ll"yoli0-3::ogis~ 
to achiQva baolmard sO}:;lcitioniHg peillts to tfieip importance in the 
simll1ee't 2eefU;effiial situation. 
If S cannot discriminate between the states used , then the 
situation is typically a learning experiment or a discrimination learning 
experiment . If S can discriminate between the states used and S is 
given information about the pay-off functions , the learning and 
discrimination learning situations become trivial for S. It is 
interesting to note , in passing , that where the states are discriminable 
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and pay-off information is not communicable (as in animal experiments) , 
Bush , Galanter and Luce (1963) prefer to call such a discrimination 
learning situation an " identification learning" experiment on the grounds 
that the animal is "discovering the experimentally prescribed identific-
ation function", i.e ., which responses "go with" which stimuli. The 
discovery of the identification function is presumably easy for human 
Ss denied pay-off information although it is difficult to find any 
descriptive evidence from such an experiment . More interest has been 
shown in situations (such as probability learning) where S is required 
to respond before the state is known. TYPically , the probability 
learning experiments are ones where the pay-off matrix is the same 
as that for a double discrimination learning situation with full 
reinforcement . In those experiments , however , E usually employs 
stimuli or states that he knows S can discriminate . His interest is 
not in the ability of S to discriminate but in the long-term reaction 
of S. Usually , one of the states has a higher probability of occurrence 
than the other . It is this "probability" that is being learned. 
Although these distinctions are often made by psychologists , 
there have been attempts to produce an explanation of the reactions of 
Ss to the different experimental situations in the same terms . This 
is in keeping with the requirement of wide generality of theoretical 
explanation. These attempts have not been very convincing and it may 
be that the distinction maintained in experim::ntal procedure requires 
a similar distinction to be maintained in theoretical explanation. 
Whatever one may think of this distinction , there is little doubt of 
the gap between these explanations and theoretical explanation of 
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more complex sequential situations . This is the gap between learning 
theory and the largely prescriptive mathematicl models of decision-
making . 
There is one approach , however , which tries to cover all 
the sequential situations . This is the stimulus sampling theory of 
Estes and the modificaUons of it made by others . In particular , 
this theoretical approach tried to explain the behaviour of Ss in 
learning situations , in discrimination learning situations , in 
probability learning situations and in games between players . This 
is an impressive list and certainly makes the prime claim for 
consideration of this approach in the light of the results of the 
experiments reported in earlier chapters . The weakest aspect of 
this approach seemed to lie in its extension beyond the reactions of 
Ss to learning and discrimination learning experiments . No experimental 
games between players were analysed in the earlier chapters and the 
only direct basis for comparison lies in the probability learning 
results although the results of the games against nature also suggest 
criticisms of the approach . 
The account of Estes and straughan (1954) was considered in 
some detail in Ch~er V. The results obtained in .the experiment 
reported in that chapter failed to confirm the results claimed by 
Estes and Straughan. However , statistical learning theorists are well 
aware that probability matching is not always reported in these 
experiments and the development of the theory has taken this into 
account . A more general theory is reported by Atkinson and Estes 
(1963) and the theoretical formulation of Estes and Straughan (1954) 
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is taken as a special case of the general account. The most general 
formulations are the multi-element pattern models of which one-element 
models are special cases . The Estes and Straughan model can be 
considered as a special case of a one-element model . The "elements" 
referred to are elements of the stimulus situation which are assumed 
to be sampled on every trial . The theory is , indeed , more correctly 
referred to as a stimulus sahlpling theory . Atkinson and Estes (1963 ) 
claim that it is quite appropriate to apply one-element models if 
"the stimulus ni tuation is sufficiently stable from trial to trial 
that it may be theoretically represented ••• by a single stimulus 
element which is sampled with probability 1 on each trial. " It is 
later made clear that the Estes and Straughan (1954) situations and 
the Atkinson and Suppes (1958) can be so represented. 
In a two-choice situation with responses A1 and A2 , it is 
convenient for them to think of the stimulus element as being in one 
of three states ; C1, Co ' C2 • (Their use of the word "state" is quite 
different from the use defined in Chapter II . ) When the element is in 
state C1, it is conditioned to A1; when it is in state C2 , it is 
conditioned to A2; when it is in state Co' it is conditioned to neither 
response . The behaviour of S is then determined by the state of the 
element . He will respond A1 if the element is in state C1; he will 
respond A2 if the element is in state C2; and if it is in state Co' 
the assumption is usually made that either response is equally likely 
(but this may be replaced by a r eponse bias assumption) . The model 
then · specifies. the rul es f or alt erations in conditioning stat es from 
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one trial to the next . Obviously , these are made to depend on the 
actual event . (E1 or E2) occurring . Essential l y , they are probability 
rules , producing a transition matrix with several parameters . The 
model of Estes and Straughan (1954) is then best represented by letting 
one of these parameters be zero . In effect , this means that once S 
has left state C (with the element condiiioned to neither response ), 
o 
he can never return to it . In terms of experimental results , it means 
that there will be a simple exponential learning function approaching 
an asymptote equal to the probability of the more frequently occurring 
event (the probability matching result) . Moreover , the rate at which 
this takes place will be determined by a parameter similar to the 
9 - value of the equations of Estes and Straughan. 
All of this implies that stimulus sampling theory as a 
description of probability learning does not necessarily stand or fall 
on the equations of Estes and Straughan. Nonetheless , the axioms of the 
general theory do not square with the accounts of Ss of their behaviour . 
It is also difficult to understand why different presentations of the 
same formal situation shaid produce such great differences in the 
~s 
parametric values~implied by the results in Chapter V. (Presumably , 
this would be the claim of its proponents . ) No detailed attempt was 
made to try and fit stimulus sampling theory to the results obtained, 
especially since it was thought necessary to look at individual 
differences . It is quite clear , however , from some individual results 
that stimulus sampling theory would be a cumbersome way of expressing 
these results . The extreme cases are those Ss who reacted maximally 
and gave sound lo~ical reasons for doing so . It is also difficult to see 
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how stimulus sampling theory can avoid the charge of ignoring the 
pattern hypotheses that many Ss seemed to entertain. 
It may be said in defence of any mathematical theory that 
the only test is whether it fits experimental data and that the status 
of its axioms should not be judged on other than mathematical criteria. 
This would carry some weight as an argument if the theory was a simple 
one (in the sense of requiring only one or two parameters) and there 
were no other theories of similar precision and generality dealing 
with the pheomena. However , of late , other theories dealing with the 
probability learning situation have been established , which attempt to 
deal with pattern hypotheses . The model of Restle which pays particular 
attention to event runs has been examined and improved upon by Gambino 
and MYers (1967) , and by Rose and Vitz (1966 ). Indeed, the latter 
authors make it clear that a model describing the reactions of human 
Ss in a probability learning situation would have to involve short-
term memory and coding axioms as well as conditioning axioms . 
Lordahl (1970) , using hypothesis sampling to extend these notions , 
has recently produced a very complex model (40 different parameters) 
to account for data from a simple experiment on sequential predictlon 
of binary events (much simpler than a probabil ity learning experiment) . 
This seems a bit excessive and one is tempted to agree with Gambino 
and MYers (1967) in regarding this as unpleasant and possibly 
unnecessary since the event runs seemed to the~o be the most 
important consideration of SS e Restle (1967), on the other hand , 
has recently approached the problem of binary prediction in terms of 
rules and strategies . 
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This is the sort of analysis that seems most appropriate 
for the reactions to sequential situat i ons reported in previous 
chapters . Stimulus sampling theory does not do justice to the 
behaviour it purports to predict : and this is especially so in cases 
where S has to respond before he knows the state of nature . In these 
situations , especially , theoretical statements about " sampling the 
stimulus elements" hardly make any sense of any S' s behaviour . If 
mathematical theories have gained any support from the results of the 
experiments , then it is those which palf attention to short- term memory 
span and the coding of runs of events . This is not to say that 
stimulus sampling theory is not a good description of Ss t reactions 
to learning and discrimination learning situations . 
Simple Bayesian prescriptions for the processing of information 
have also failed to fit the experimental observations ( see Appendix IV 
for a simulation account of this) . There was considerable evidence 
that Ss adopted a change criterion which paid particular attention 
to consecutive errors or non-rewards , e . g ., "When I got it wrong 
twice , I changed". Any theoret ical account which giveS prominence 
to a simple count of " correct predictions " is not adequately 
describing what happens . A Bayesian account would have the advantage 
of explaining sudden and long- lasting changes of response . But the 
basis for such an account - that the feeling of certainty about an 
hypothesis is increased if an event occurs which is likely under that 
hypothesis - clear~ contra-indicates policies which ignore single 
wrong predictions or non-rewards . Of course , it would be possible 
to replace the notion of an event , as comprising a prediction or an 
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outcome card , by a more complicated notion of an event (such as 
"two predict ions of the same kind"). If one were to do just ice to 
the reports of Ss in games against nature , however , the notion of an 
event ( even if complicated) would have to alter through time ( e . g ., 
from "two non- reward cards" to "three non-reward cards" fol l owing 
"three reward cards" ) . It is difficult to see how such an interaction 
with time could fit into a simple Bayesian account . 
It would seem that the best way to describe the reactions 
of Ss in sequential situations is in terms of logical operations of 
rules and strategies . One point should be made , however , concerning 
the suggestions of other researchers who choose to describe in these 
terms . It is similar to the one made against Bayesian accounts . 
Broadbent ' s (1958 ) model postulates a " store of conditional probabilities 
. 
of past events" and that this store is susceptible to change over time 
by means of reinforcement . Evidence against this is supplied by the 
attention of Ss to consecutive errors or non-rewards . Therefore , 
insofar as reinforcement is taken to mean some gradual accumulation 
in response strength consequent upon a reward , the postulate would 
appear to be without an empirical basis . Runs of rewards and runs of 
non- rewards appear to play a considerably more important part in 
reaction than any total count of rewards or non-rewards . 
The description found most adequate to account for reaction 
derives from the general ideas of Miller , Galanter and Pribram (1960 ) 
and some of the particular ideas of Erickson (1968 ). 
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Extension and Application of Research 
The research was somewhat limited in terms of the formal 
analysis and in terms of the Ss used. In effect , this m:eans that so 
many questions are left unanswered that it is difficult to judge the 
extent to which the observations , made under specific experimental 
restraints , are important for a general theoretical account of 
behaviour . Perhaps the best way to consider this problem is by 
looking more closely at the questions that still need to be answered. 
The most obvious limitation is that little is known of the 
strategies used by Ss when they play a game between players and know 
that they are competing . The game against nature which was used in 
most of this research is easily turned into a game between players . 
The writer did this as a preliminary experiment and had several Ss 
play the game with each pair of Ss operating under different conditions 
of information (e . g ., both might know the pay-off matrix in one pair , 
one person alone might know it in another pair ). It was very difficult 
to analyse the data so collected except that , in a general sense , it 
was clear that Ss do not approach the minimax solution. An article 
has recently appeared gy Messick and McClintock (1967) in which they 
suggest a way for measuring the extent to which strategies within 
a dyad are homogeneous and the extent to which strategies between 
dyads are homogeneous . It may be that such a measure will prove 
useful for answering some questions about the reactions of Ss in 
games between players . However , in order to achieve maximum 
information about the strategies used by Ss , it~ay be necessary to 
have Ss speak their thoughts aloud every time they make a decision. 
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It seems clear from the preliminary experiment conducted and from 
other research that the minimax solution of game theory is unlikely 
even to be a good standard against which to measure the actual 
reactions of Ss , if the empirical interest lies in the interaction 
process between SS e 
The situations used in the experiments were all characterised 
by 2x2 matrices . That is , S had to choose between two responses and E 
imposed only two states of nature . It is obvious from a general 
consideration of human limitations that one cannot expect similar 
reactions of Ss for all larger arrays of pay-offs . What does S do 
if there are two responses open to him and three states of nature , 
i . e ., in a 2x3 game situation? What does S do in a 3x2 game situation? 
and a 3x3 game situation? These are questions requiring an empirical 
answer . It may be that the 2x2 game situation is , in some sense , 
basic . Ss may code the matrix into a 2x2 one , paying particular 
attention to one state or response and classing the others together . 
These situations could easily be studied using an adaptation of the 
apparatus for the 2x2 situation , although the statistical analysis 
may prove more complex for a three- response situation. 
In the discussion of the formal analysis , it was noted that 
there were at least three meanings of decision-making , only one of which 
fell inside the restrictions of a sequential situation where the states 
were not und r the control of S. The two others were the static 
decision problem (S chooses once only) and the multistage decision 
problem (in which the decisions made by S affect the pay-off matrices 
he later faces) . The terminology is Rapoport ' s (1968) . 
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The static decision problem or situation can be thought 
of as a single instance or trial in a sequential decision situation. 
An example of it that is common in psychological literature is the 
choice of Ss in the prisoner ' s dilemma game . S has to choose whether 
to co-operate~ compete with the other player . It is a doubtful 
claim that Rapoport makes when he says it is a situation in which S 
"never makes another decision based on whatever he may have learned". 
It is clear that Ss in the prisoner ' s dilemma make their choices on the 
basis of such information as they have , including , presumably , their 
past experience of similar situations . Under these circumstances , 
the static decision situation involves questions of transfer of reaction 
or the formation of learning sets over similar situations . These could 
be studied experimentally , using at least two decision situations of 
similar type . 
The multistage decision problem is at once a more complex and 
a more interesting issue . It is interesting because it is typical 
of everyday decision situations . One of the consequences of decisions 
taken is to alter the situation so that new decisions are taken under 
new pay-offs . For example , it is usually possible for an organism in 
a given situation so to decide that one of the outcomes is for S to 
leave the situation. In studying multistage decision problems , 
Rapoport (1968) paid particular attention of the "decision policies" 
of his Ss . He asked his Ss to consider themselves taxi drivers with 
three cities open to them . In each city , there were three taxi ranks 
each with differing probabilities of S being required to go to one 
of the three cities (and different rewards depending on the city 
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involved). S had to decide (sequentially ) on the basis of this 
information which taxi ranks to go to . Rapoport found that the 
Bayesian model he used was largely ineffective in predicting results . 
Not surprisingly , he found large individual differences . He did not 
present his results in terms of the rules and strategies his Ss may 
have been using . Rapoport claims that psychologists have neglected 
multistage decision problems partly because of their theoretical 
complexity and partly because of the difficulties in stu~ing them 
experimentally . That the latter is certainly true is demonstrated 
by the complexity of the instructions Rapoport had to give his SS e 
Indeed , they were so complex that one is left wondering whether the 
results refer to the abilities of Ss as decision-makers or their 
abilities to understand complicated instructions . It is difficult to 
see how ore could treat multistage decision problems experimentally 
and avoid giving complicated instructions to SS e It may be possible 
to do this by providing Ss with experience on two 2x2 games against 
nature and then add in to the outcome cards some directions to change 
games . This would have to be done in some fairly simple but systematic 
way . 
The second chief limitation on the results derives from the 
use of University students as Ss throughout . It would be worthwhile 
and fairly easy to present the same situation to other SS e If 
children are to be used, there may be some case for altering the 
motivation (sweets , perhaps , instead of money) . Presumably , there 
will be some Ss who may fail to understand the instructions and they , 
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too , may need altering. 
It is worth noting , in passing , that the author conducted , 
in collaboration with a colleague , Dr . G. Hemmings , experiments on 
decision-making in fish . Perhaps one of the most interesting results 
was the failure to conuuct a future- prediction experiment based on the 
2~2 game against nature (analagous to the condition where Ss must 
decide in ignorance of the future state). The experimental conditions 
appeared to disturb the SS e However , an experiment was set up ,using 
the same pay- off matrix as in Chapter VI , to investigate their reactions 
to a game against nature where Ss did not know the pay-off matri~ but 
did know the state of nature . Since the states used were black and 
white squares , the experiment could be considered a complex identification 
learning one in the sense that Bush , Galanter and Luce (1 963 ) use . 
The Ss (six Blue Acaras) reacted in a similar way to the human Ss , 
in terms of tendency to m~imal reaction. The parameters of the 
experiment were , of course , rather different (particularly , the trial 
sequence ). Some Ss showed a marked tendency to react m~imally while , 
for other Ss , this tendency was limited to one state only . The 
experimental conditions may have been too stressful for one S who 
died in the middle of the experiment just as he appeared to be changing 
his behavi our to a m~imal reaction . Further experiments along 
these lines , using other species , may prove interesting . 
Conclusions 
In general , one might conclude that an analysis of the 
situation into which an organism is placed provides a useful framework 
in which to study its reactions to the situation. For human Ss , placed 
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in situations which r equire d S to anticipate futur e e v e nt s , th e 
best description of their reactions was in terms of rules and strategies . 
For some Ss (who achieved mazimal reaction), their behaviour , after 
exposure to the situation for some time , caRd be predicted by a 
prescriptive theory . However , there were other Ss whose behaviour 
could only be predicted from a consideration of a complex of individual 
psychological factors operating within the formal situation. 
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A P PEN DIe E S 
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APPENDIX I - SOME MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENTS 
I(a) Questionnaire and Strings Used in Experiment Reported 
in Chapter IV (Recognition of Bias in Strings of 
Binary Digits) . 
I(b ) Record Sheet Used for Sequential Situations . 
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. I 
)( 
-o 
Z 
LIJ 
a. 
a. 
<{ 
LIST I 
00100 1 001 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 000 0 1 101 001 0 0 
100 1 001 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 101 001 000 001 1 0 1 0 0 
'~, 1 000 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 001 001 1 
LIST II 
01110 101 1 000 001 1 000 0 1 000 001 0 0 1 001 1 0 
101 100 1 0 1 1 0 000 1 1 001 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 100 1 0 1 1 0 
010 1 100 1 0 1 1 101 0 1 1 101 0 1 100 1 001 1 
~IST III 
o 1 1 000 1 100 1 1 001 100 1 100 1 101 1 1 u 1 1 100 1 
000 1 001 100 1 1 1 001 100 1 100 1 000 1 100 1 001 
1 101 1 000 1 000 1 101 1 101 100 1 1 100 1 1 
LIST IV 
o 0 1 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 0 0 
100 1 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 0 
o 1 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 0 
LIST_~ 
o 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 .1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
001 1 101 100 1 100 1 1 101 1 1 0 1 100 1 1 001 1 101 
100 1 100 1 1 101 1 001 1 1 0 1 1 101 1 1 0 1 1 0 
LIST VI 
011 001 1 0 111 o 0 1 1 001 1 o 1 1 1 1 011 00110 011 
101 00001 001 1 1 0 1 00011 o 0 1 1 001 o 0 0 0 1 001 
1 1 0 1 000 1 101 1 1 1 o 1100 1 1 o 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
LIST VI~ 
1 1 000 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 001 1 111 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 110 
0010101 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 101 000 1 1 0 000 0 
o 1 000 1 0 1 001 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 101 1 1 1 1 1 
LISLVIII 
1 111 1 1 100 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 101 1 1 1 1 101 1 1 101 1 III 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 101 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
o 1 111 1 1 1 100 1 1 1 1 1 1 101 1 1 1 111 1 1 111 
J..l.§l'_lX 
o 1 011 101 1 1 1 1 1 10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 001 100 1 1 001 0 1 
1 101 0 0 0 1 1 III 1 000 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 001 0 0 0 0 0 1 
111 101 001 1 101 100 1 1 100 001 1 1 1 100 
I.tlST X 
o 110 0 1 100 1 1 001 100 1 100 1 1 001 1 001 100 1 1 0 
o 1 100 1 100 1 1 001 100 1 1 001 100 1 100 1 100 1 1 0 
o 1 1 001 100 1 1 001 100 1 100 1 100 1 1 0 
LIST XI 
o 0 0 0 0 1 000 001 000 000 001 0 0 0 000 001 0 0 1 0 0 
000 1 0 0 000 1 001 0 0 0 001 0 0 000 0 001 0 000 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 100 1 001 000 0 0 1 000 0 0 1 001 0 0 1 0 
Example 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
PART A 
String A 
String B 
o 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 101 
1 100 001 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Since String A is more obviously patterned than String B, you would 
write IImore"opposite the question, i.e. String A v. B more. 
If you thought A was less opviously patterned than B, you would write 
"less" opposite the question. If you thought they were about the same, 
wri te ~' same" opposite the question. But try not to use the "same" 
response. 
Compare the following and decide whether the first is more obviously 
patterned than the second. 
1. String I v II 23. String III v V 45. String V v XII 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
J.o. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
~l. 
22. 
I v III 
I v IV 
I v V 
I v VI 
I v VII 
I v VIII 
I v IX 
I v X 
I v XI 
I v XII 
II v III 
J:I v IV 
II v V 
II v VI 
II v VII 
II v VIrI 
II v IX 
II v X 
II v XI 
II v XII 
III v IV 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35 .. 
36 ... 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
III v VI 
III v VII 
III v VIII 
III v IX 
III v X 
III v XI 
III v XII 
IV v V 
IV v VI 
IV v VIr 
IV v VIII 
IVvIX 
IV v X 
IV v XI 
IV v XII 
V v VI 
V v VII 
V v VIII 
V v IX 
VvX 
V v XI 
~-BLIi 
1.. Did you find the task easy? 
Did you find the task inter-
esting? 
a. How did you decide that a 
given string was less 
patterned thal ru1other? 
Very Easy 
Easy 
Very In~-
Inte~- ' erqstfng 
e-sting 
46. VI v VII 
47. VI v VIII 
48. VI v IX 
49. VI v X 
50. VI v XI 
51. VI v XII 
52. VII v VIII 
53. VII v IX 
54. VII v X 
55. VII v XI 
56. VII v XII 
57. ·VIII v IX 
58. VIII v X 
59. VIII v XI 
60. VIII v XII 
61. IX v X 
62. IX v XI 
63. IX v XII 
64. X v XI 
65. X v XII 
66. XI v XII 
Diffi- Very 
cult Difficult 
DOl::in~!" Very 
DOl'!ng 
:a 
-~ 
x 
o 
z 
UJ 
Q. 
Q. 
« 
NAME: 
INFORMATION 
CONDITION: 
No.of Trial 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
, 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
,-
Response 
, 
. 
--
SEX: 
SEQUENCE: 
I 
Reward No.of Trial Response Reward 
46 
47 I I 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
. 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 I , 
87 
88 
89 
90 
, 
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No.of Trial Response Reward I No.of Trial Response I Reward 
91 141 
92 142 
93 143 
94 144 
95 145 
96 I 146 
97 147 
98 148 
99 149 
100 150 
101 151 I 
102 152 
103 153 
104 154 
105 155 
106 156 
107 157 
108 158 
109 159 
110 160 
111 161 I 
112 162 
113 163 
114 164 
115 165 
116 166 
117 - 167 
118 168 
119 169 
120 170 
121 171 
122 172 
123 173 
124 174 
125 . 175 
126 176 
127 177 
128 178 
129 179 
130 180 
131 181 
132 182 
133 183 
134 184 
135 185 
136 186 I I 137 187 I I 138 , 188 139 I 189 I 140 I 190 I 
Noo of Trial 
191 
192 
193 
194-
195 
196 
197 
198 
199 
200 
. , '" .,. 
-3,;", 
Response Reward 
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APPENDIX II - Raw Data Collected in Experiments and 
not Presented in Text . 
(i) Experiment on Recognition of Bias in Strings of 
Binary Digits (Chapt er IV) . 
' The following table shows the number of times Ss chose 
a given string. A score of ' 1 ' is recorded each time S judges 
the given string to be more obviously patterned than the 
alternative : a score of '0' is recorded if S judges the given 
string to be l ess obviously patterned; and a score of ~5 ' is 
recorded i f S judges the string td be equal ly patterned. For 
each S, there are thus 66 poi~ts to be distributed between the 
12 strings . 
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'String Number 
Ss I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
S1 4 1 6 11 4 6 4 8 1 10 8 3 
S2 5 5 7 10 9 4 1 2 5 11 4 3 
S3 3 6 , 3 11 9 7 1 8 3 10 5 0 
S4 4 '~ 5 '· 8 10 5 5 1 5 4 11 6 2 
Ss 7 5 9 10 · 5 6 5· 5 1· 5 1· 5 2· 5 10 . 5 4· 5 2. 5 , 
S6 4 3 5 11 6 7 0 7 1 10 9 3 
S7 5 4 7 10 8 4 1 2 3 11 9 2 
S8 7 5 7 10 7 S 2 1 5 11 2 4 
S9 6 6 8 10 . 5 5 4 2 1 3 10 · 5 9 1 
S10 6 2 6 10 6 4 3 6. 5 4· 5 11 6. 5 0.5 
S11 4 4 4 11 7 6 1 5 2 9 9 4 
S1 2 4· 5 4 5 10 · 5 5 4· 5 1 9 2 ~0. 5 8 2 
S1 3 6 4 5 11 5 7 3 1 2 10 8 4 
S1 4 5. 5 2.5 6 10 · 5 9 6. 5 1 5 1. 5 10 · 5 7 1 
S1 5 3 3 6 10 · 5 6 4 1 5 4 10 . 5 9 4 
S16 7 3. 5 3 10 6· 5 6 2 0 4 . 5 10 . 5 7 . 5 5. 5 
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Ss I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
817 5 · 5 6 . 5 7 10·5 6 . 5 5 · 5 1. 5 1. 5 4 · 5 1G . 5 4 2 · 5 
S1 8 6 3 6 10 · 5 8 2 5 3 2 10.5 1 7 3 
819 7 5 7 10 8 3 1 0 2 11 8 4 
820 7 0 · 5 6 10 . 5 8 
~ 1. 5 2 · 5 4 10.5 I 9 1· 5 ./ 
I 
I 
S21 5 4 7 9 8 8 3 2 1 0 11 I 7 2 ; I 
S22 6 6 8 10 9 5 3 0 1 11 I 5 2 
S23 7 3 8 11 6 4 1 2 3 10 i 8 3 , 
824 7 5 8 ~ 0 . 5 8 5 1 2 6 ~ O. 5 I 3 0 I 
825 7 2 7 10 7 3 4 0 4 9 I 7 6 
S26 5 4 6 11 8 6 2 3 1 10 ! 9 1 I 
S27 5 2 . 5 7 . 5 10 · 5 8 5 3 2 5 10. 5 
I 2 . 5 I 4 . 5 
I 
S28 2 4 9 11 8 6 0 5 0 10 6 I 5 I 
I I 
I I 
S29 4 4 5· 5 10· 5 5 3 . 5 4 9 1 10·5 8 1 
S30 2 1 4 . 5 11 4 4 . 5 6 9 1 9 9 5 
S31 6 3 7 10 · 5 5 4 0 8 1 10 · 5 8 3 
832 4 3 8 10 
a 7 0 5 2 11 6 1 ./ 
I 
S33 4 1 5 
I 7 10 9 5 2 1 5 11 4 3 
I 
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Ss I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
S34 4 3. 5 6 10.5 9 7.5 2. 5 1 2. 5 10 . 5 6 3 
S35 8 5· 5 8 9 8. 5 5. 5 3. 5 0 . 5 1.5 11 3 2 
S36 7 3 6 10 6 6 2 0 5 11 7 3 
S37 3 4 7 10 7 3 I 1 5 6 11 9 0 I 
S38 2 I 0 7 11 9 6 I 3 5 1 10 8 4 
6 8 I 
I 
S39 4 9 1 10 •5 3 I 2 4 2 10 . 5 7 0 
S40 5 3 5 / 10.5 6 4 I 2 7 0 10 9. 5 4 
I I S41 5 4 6 9 8 I 2 I 2 6 2 11 9 2 I 
S42 8 4 8 10.5 8 5. 5 1.5 0· 5 2 10.5 5 2· 5 
S43 5 4 4 10· 5 7 3 0 6 5 10. 5 8 3 
S44 2 4 6 10·5 7 8 0 ~ 2 10 . 5 8 3 
The totals for the columns are as f ollows:-
I 225 · 5 VII 83 .0 
II 163 . 5 VIII 162 .0 
III 285 . 5 IX 119. 5 
IV 456 .0 X 460 .0 
V 311· 5 XI 303· 5 
VI 220· 5 XII 11 3· 5 
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12 Ss stated, in answer to Part B, Question 1, that 
they found the task "easy"; 6 Ss stated they found it "very 
difficult ". The 12 who found it easy were S6 , S8 , S9 , S12 , S15 ' 
S1 6 , S19 , S28 , S32 , S39 , S40 and S44 · The 6 who found it difficult 
were S10 , S18 , S27 , S34 , S35 and S37 · 
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(ii ) Experiment on Probability Learning Situations 
(Chapter V). 
The fo llowing table shows the proportion of trial s 
( in a block of 40 trials ) that 'W' was predicted in the 
different experimental groups and over the five blocks 
of 40 trials . 
GROUPS 
Tr i al I II III IV I & II II I & IV All 
Nos . (N=20 ) (N=20 ) (N=13) (N=16 ) (N=40) (N=29 ) (N=69 ) 
1- 40 0 . 4800 0 . 5200 0 . 5307 0 . 4734 0 · 5000 0 . 5082 0 · 5034 
41 - 80 0 . 5325 0 · 5412 0 . 6230 0 · 501 5 0. 5368 0 · 5559 0 . 5448 
8 1-1 20 0 . 6125 0 . 6087 0 . 6826 0 . 5906 0 . 6106 0 . 63 18 0 . 6195 
121-1 60 0 . 5787 0 . 5862 0 . 696 1 0 . ~ 609 0 . 5824 0 . 62 15 0 . 5988 
161-200 0 . 5837 0. 5962 0 . 7192 0 . 6000 0 . 5899 0 . 6534 0. 6165 
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(iii) Experiment on Reaction to Game Situations 
(Chapter VI) . 
The following table shows the proportion of trials 
(in a block of 40 trials ) that response 'a' was made by 
individual Ss in different experimental groups and over the 
five bloc~s of trials . 
Exp . 
, Trial Nos . 
Condo Ss 1-40 41 - 80 81-1 20 121-160 161-200 
01 S1 . 600 · 500 . 225 . 300 . 250 
S2 · 500 . 325 . 350 .1 50 · 175 
S3 . 375 . 450 . 475 . 475 . 525 
S4 . 500 . 550 . 425 . 200 . 575 
S5 . 575 · 575 · 500 . 450 . 475 
Median . 500 . 500 . 425 . 300 . 475 
10 S6 . 575 . 475 . 550 . 625 . 675 
S7 . 325 .000 . 000 .000 . 000 
S8 · 500 . 600 . 450 · 500 . 450 
S9 · 575 . 415 · 425 · 575 · 575 
S10 . 575 . 475 . 575 . 650 . 625 
Median 
· 575 . 475 . 450 . 575 . 575 
00 S11 . 400 . 150 . 225 . 450 . 450 
S12 . 325 . 400 . 600 . 575 . 475 
S13 . 450 . 450 . 450 . 425 . 425 
S14 · 500 · 400 . 375 . 575 . 425 
. S15 · 475 . 550 . 625 · 500 I . 575 
Median . 450 . 400 . 450 · 500 . 450 
(iv) 
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Experiment on Appropriateness of Reaction in a 
Game Situation (Chapter VII) . 
The following table shows the proportion of trials 
(in a block of 40 trials) that response ' a ' was made by individual 
Ss in different experimental groups and over the five blocks of 
trials . 
Exp . Trial Nos . 
Condo Ss 1- 40 41 - 80 81-120 121-160 161-200 
10 
65/35 S1 1 .000 1.000 1. 000 1. 000 1.000 
S2 . 400 . 800 1.000 1.000 1.000 
S3 · 550 . 650 . 625 . 650 . 575 
S4 . 6 ~0 . 725 . 875 . 850 . 875 
S5 . 450 . 425 . 525, · 500 · 575 
S6 . 450 · 525 . 400 . 375 · 575 
S7 . 400 · 725 1. 000 1. 000 1.000 
S8 · 575 . 450 . 625 . 775 . 650 
S", 
. 775 . 900 . ]25 . 600 . 700 
./ 
Median . 550 . 725 . 725 . 775 . 700 
f . 1". o. 
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Exp . Trial Nos . 
Condo Ss 1-40 41-80 81-1 20 121-1 60 161-200 
10 
70/ 30 S10 .825 . 825 1.000 1.000 1.000 
S11 . 625 · 575 . 475 . 675 . 675 
S1 2 . 675 . 350 · 500 . 400 . 475 
S13 .825 . 650 1.000 1.000 1.000 
~14 . 500 . 675 · 575 . 575 . 475 
S15 · 530 .700 . 625 .725 . 725 
S1 6 .700 . 275 · 525 . 675 . 725 
S17 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
S1 8 , . 525 . 525 . 650 . 550 . 675 
Median . 675 . 650 . 625 . 675 . 725 
00 
65/ 35 S19 . 450 . 550 . 450 · 575 . 650 
S20 .800 . 525 . 675 . 825 . 600 
S21 . 450 . 450 '. 525 . 400 . 450 
S22 . 550 . 350 . 375 . 525 . 700 
S23 . 475 · 500 . 400 . 450 . 475 
S24 . 575 · 550 . 600 . 425 · 525 
S25 ·775 .750 . 775 . 600 . 750 
826 · 525 . 600 · 550 · 500 . 500 
S27 . 675 . 650 . 500 · 525 .700 I 
Median 
· 550 . 550 . 525 · 525 . 600 1 
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Erp . Trial Nos . 
Cond, Ss 1-40 41 - 80 81 -120 121-160 161-200 
00 
70/30 S28 . 575 . 425 · 500 . 475 . 625 
S29 . 475 . 650 . 500 · 575 . 725 
~30 . 400 · 500 . 600 . 675 . 625 
S31 . 350 . 400 . 325 . 350 . 450 
S32 · 525 . 475 · 500 · 525 . 625 
S33 . 475 . 600 . 375 · 700 . 525 
S34 , . 600 . ~25 . 625 · 500 . 800 
S35 · 500 . 450 · 500 · 575 . 600 
S36 . 625 . 450 I . 375 . 325 . 350 
' Median 
· 500 . 450 . 500 . 525 . 625 I 
(v) ExpE:,riment on Long Tern Reactions to Game Situations 
(Chapter VIll). 
The ftilo~ing tables provide the raw data on whic~ 
the analysis of variance was based. The deper.dent variable was 
found by suttracting, for each reccrd,the number cf 'a' responses 
in the second 100 trials from the number of 'a' responses in the 
first 100 trials. The initial preference for 'a' is gi.ven in 
brackets. For ccnvenience, fo~.r tables have been pl'epared, 
corresponding to the four balanced latin squares used. These 
correspond to two of the independer.t varia"bles (informat ion condit ion 
and game number). Within each balanced Latin square, there are 
two 3x3 Latin squares, thus ensuring the balance required by the 
design. Within each of these squares the rows correspond to Ss, 
the columns correspond to time periods. The treat,ments correspond 
to varia.tio:t:s in proportions. The precise experimental ccndition 
'can be determined by consulting these tables in ccnjunction with 
Fig.8:3 which is here reproduced for ease of reference. For 
example, S1 was assigned to the first gamE: and was given informatior: 
about the pay-off matrix. During t.he first session, he had the 
proportions of states mixed in the ratio 90:10 (X for Game 1); 
during the second seSSion, the proportions were mixed in the ratio 
70:30 (Y for Game 1); and during the third and final seSSion, the 
proportior:s were mixed in the ratio 60:40 (Z for Game 1). Two 
summary tables are also appended, showing the means (unadjusted and 
adjusted) for the experimental conditions. 
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Records marked with an asteri sk indicat e that the last 
50 trials had approprlate reaction. 
Fig.8:3. Basic Balanced Latin Square. 
Session 1 Sessior. 2 Session ":l 
-' 
S1 X Y Z 
S2 Y Z X 
S3 Z X Y 
S4 X z y 
S5 z y X 
S Y X Z 
6 
Table A. Balanced Latin Square I {10 Game 1 ) 
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 
S1 +3 (15) -41 (37) -10 (45) 
S2 -14 (52) -4 (67) +23 (61) 
S":l -8 (52) +10 (44) -4 (57) 
..J 
S4 +34*(34) +6 (56) - 3 (56) 
S5 +13 (77) +23*(23) +4 (53) 
S6 +19 (76) -11 (56) +24 (55) 
Table B. Balanced Latin S~~e II ~OO Game 1 ) 
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 
S7 +9 (52) -8 (48) -15 (54) 
S8 +33*( 67) -13*(87) -9 (91) 
S9 +1 (49) +7 (48) -4 (46) 
S10 +13 (52) -32 (20) -1 (75) 
S11 +10 (55) -3 (62) -7 (59) 
S12 -4 (58) -8 (56) +18 (46) 
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Table C. Balanced Latin Square III ( 10 Game 2) 
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 
S13 +40 (55) +8 (35) -14 (51) 
S14 -55 (16) +4 (55) +2 (28) 
S15 -8 (54) -2 (57 ) +4 (63) 
S16 +8 (50) -1 (50 ) -28 (43) 
S17 +10 (78) +34*(34) -17*(67 ) 
S18 -9 (61) -9 (62) +42 (53) 
Table D. Balanced Latin Square IV (00 Game 2) 
Sessior.. a Session 2 Session 3 
S19 +13 (48) -3 (51) +1 (59) 
S20 -1 (53) -11 (46) -42 (4) 
S21 -27 (42) -5 (41) +21 (65) 
S22 +9 (31) +22 (77) -10 (52) 
S23 +4 (51) +6 (48) -7 (56 ) 
S24 -17 (54) -6 (53) +6 (50) 
Table E. Summary Statistics (Unadjusted Means) 
The means shown in the cells are each based on 
N = b. Approprlate reactlons requ.l1'e a positive value 
for X and negative values for Y and Z. 
Proportions 
Exp.Cond. X Y Z 
10 Game +19.5 -10.0 +1.2 
00 Game +5.8 
-7.3 -11.7 
10 Game 2 +20.7 -11.7 
-7·5 
00 Game 2 -2.2 +o.e 
-6·5 
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'I'able .11'. ~'umrrlary ::3tatunlcs (AdjUsted lVleanG) 
The means shown in the cell are based on N = 6. 
'l'hey are aa.JusteQ 1;0 taKe Cd-roe 0.1 ail,}' residuai~ffect s, 
as required by the analysis of Balanced Latin Squares 
(see Cochran and Cox, 1957). Appropriate reactions 
require a positive value for X and a negative value for 
Y and Z. 
l'roport~ons 
.l!;xp. Cona.. X Y Z 
10 np .... rn~·~' 1 +10.94 -9.15 -1.79 
00 Game +6.06 -1.24 -4.82 
10 Game 2 +15·76 -6.47 -9.29 
00 Game 2 +2.50 +4.79 -7.29 
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Appendix III - Notes on Change Statistics* 
The theoretical distribution of the change statistics was 
considered to be of some interest since it might be possible 
to use these statistics to decide whether a given S shows 
a significant change of behaviour. It will be sufficient 
to take the change statistic used in the probability learning 
experiment (Chapter V) as typical of the statistics calculated 
on the "tolerance of error" principle. The statistic used 
in Chapter'VIII is a simpler one and each component distribution 
is clearly binominal (under the null hypothesis that S responds 
"a" with a constant probability of response E. throughout the 
session). 
In the calculation of the change statistic in Chapter 
V, the symbols used were:-
b - the total number of times S was wrong during the 
n 
first and last n trials while S was predicting 
"Black": and 
w the total number of times S was wrong during the 
n 
first or last n trials while S was predicting 
"White" • 
* The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks the assistance 
of Mr. G. Fielding, Department of Mathematics, University 
of Keele, with this section. 
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The full value of the statistic was 
(
b
n 
-
b + 
n 
where the suffices land i denote respectively the initial 
and terminal n trials. Consider the null hypothesis that the 
probability of S predicting "White" is constant throughout the 
session. (Obviously, the above expression would have an expected 
value of zero). 
Let 11 be the probability that a given state is 
"White"; and let 
p be the probability that S will predict "White". 
Let c. be a random variable taking the value 1 if on 
J 
the jth trial "Black" is predicted a.l when 
in fact "White" occurs, and Q. otherwise; 
let d. be a random variable taking the value 1 if 
J 
on the jth trial,"White" is predicted when 
in fact "Black" occurs, and 0 otherwi se. 
It is clear that b 
n 
andw 
n 
And it is then clear that 
b has a binominal distribution with the statistic's 
n 
value depending on ll, the number of trials and on 
trial; 
p), the probability that c. = 1 on the jth 
J 
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w has a binomial distribution with the statistic's 
n 
value depending on g, the number of trials and on 
( I -,,)p, the probability that d. = 1 on the jth trial; 
J 
(b + w ) has a binomial distribution with the statistic's 
n n 
value depending on g, the number of trials and on 
(Tr+p_1\::>TT), the probability that c. = 1 or d. 
J J 
on the jth trial, and 
w I (b + w ) = u (i.e. given a fixed value, u,for the 
n n n -
expression (b + w )\ has a binomial distribution with n n 1/ 
the statistic's value depending on~, and on (I -If).p , 
--rr -t- p- 2..pTl 
the probability that c. = 1 on the jth trial given 
J 
u such trials with either c. = 1 or d. = 1. 
J J 
Where (b + w ) » 0, the expression [ b - w 
n n -:. n n 
b + w 
n n 
can 
easily be shown to be equal to - l.w n and the 
distribution of w n 
b + w 
n n 
b + w 
n n 
will be the same as that of the 
original expression. It can be shown that with 1\ (, - ~) .-:.. cf.,. 
and (, -IT) \? ~ ~ ,the expected value of this distribution will 
d--
be AA -= .J..-t"~. (From this it follows that the expected value 
of the expression b - w n n 
b + w 
n n 
is ) For (b n + \f ) = 0 , 
n 
h 1 f th b - w t e va ue 0 e expression E, which equals n n otherwise, 
b + w 
n n 
is defined as being equal to zero. 
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w 
n Unfortunately, the variance of the distribution of b + w 
n n 
is rather complex and difficult to establish. Approximation 
methods suggest, however, that it is large relative to the mean. 
This implies that the statistic is unlikely to be useful for a test 
of significance of the null hypothesis for the individual S. 
It does not,of course, imply that the statistic cannot be used 
for non-parametric tests of significance between groups of SSe 
There are several other problems associated with using any 
statistic purporting to measure change over time. Largely, they 
centre on the value of g, the number of trials. It has alreaqy 
been noted at various points in the text that this leads to results 
that are not consistent with some of the general aims of the research. 
In particular, such a statistic is not very good at picking out 
rational SSe This means either that ad h££ definitions are 
adopted (as in Chapter VII where all statistics with the value 
minus unity for the terminal rate of tolerance were defined as 
equal to 2.00); or that great care must be taken in interpreting 
the results of an experiment (as in Chapter VIII where many 
features of the results are artefacts of the descriptive statistic 
used). In view of these problems, other techniques should be 
investigated to deal with such situations. One which has 
recently been brought to the attention of the author is the 
cumulative sum technique recently developed for use in industry, 
(Woodward & Goldsmith, 1964). Cumulative sum techniques show up 
very early any significant changes in processes with known 
distributions. If it is possible to apply these techniques 
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to a sequential situation, it may be that the best descriptive 
stat ist ic will then be the number of t~le trial at which the 
change in process was detected. 
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Appendix IV - Notes on Simulation and Rationality. 
(i) B~yesian Solution.* 
For simplicity, the probability learning experiment only 
will be discussed. For the game situations in which S must play 
before he knows the state of nature, a similar account is 
easily given. For the situation in which S plays after he knows 
the state of nature (experimental condition 01 in Chapter VI), 
the account would be more complicated since the S's response is 
contingent upon one of two discriminable states each of which 
has a different distribution of reward-cards for S's responses. 
In the probability learning experiment, a sequence of two 
elements, "Black" and "White", is generated according to a random 
mechanism in which the probability of the jth nj~'mber of the 
sequence being "White" is constant, and its probability, 11":, is 
independent of all other members: and the probability of the jth 
member being "Black" is constant with a probability of ( \ -1\ ). 
S is required to predict which element is about to occur immediately 
before it is revealed to him: and S is instructed to get as many 
as possible of these predictions correct. The optimal policy of 
S is, therefore, one which will maximise the expected number of 
successes. Two cases may be considered. 
* The author is grateful for the advice of Mr. G. Fielding, 
Department of Mathematics, University of Keele, on this section. 
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In the first ·case, TI is known to S. Such a case was 
not examined experimentally. It is trivial to show that if 
IT '7}~ , "White" is to be predicted every time; if "IT < ~ , 
"Black" is to be predicted every time; and if IT -;. \. ,it does 
not matter what choice S makes. 
In the second case, is unknown to S. This case was 
examined experimentally in Chapter V. Mathematically, the most 
meaningful way to discuss this case is in a l~ayesian framework, 
i.e., assume a prior distribution for II A natural one for 
S to consider is that the distribution of iT is uniform (rectangular) 
on the interval (0, 1). It transpires, however, that the same 
optimal policy is appropriate if S takes a more general prior 
distribution which includes, as a special case, the uniform 
distri~on, i.e., the more general view that the distribution of 
--rr- i~ symmetrical about 11 = t . Then it is easy to show that the 
policy which gives the greatest posterior probability of predicting 
accurately at each guess is as follows:-
(1) on the first trial, predict "White" or "Black" 
arbi trarily; 
(2) on the (j + 1)th trial, for j = 1,2, ••••• ,n-
(where to. (71) is the total number of trials), 
predict "White" if there have been more "Whites" 
than "Blacks" in the first i trials, predict 
"Black" if there have been more "Blacks" than 
"Whites" in the first i trials, and predict arbitrarily 
if the number of "Whites" and "Blacks" is equal for 
the first j: trials. 
If \I == .625 (the value used in Chapter V) and a 
computer was programmed with this optimal policy, it would 
probably produce consistent "White" predictions very early in a 
sequence of trials: and would almost certainly be so doing after 
21 trials (at a 90% confidence level) or after 35 trials (if a 
95% confidence level is taken). 
It is evident, of COlli~se, that the above is the optimal 
or rational policy only if S believes that the sequence is randomly 
generated, that the value of If is constant throughout the experiment 
and that he is required to maximise the expected score (see, e.g., 
Simon, 1956). It has been argued in the text that Ss in sequential 
situatio~ which require th~m to act in ignorance of the coming 
state, tend to look for pattern in the states. This may be a 
"rational" thing to do in terms of S's past history, for e)(ample. 
It may be characteristic of human beings to look for recurrent 
regularities in events (Bruner, Wallach & Galanter, 1959). 
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(ii) Computer Simulat'ion of Pattern Searching. 
Because of the persistent, (and, arguably, reasonable) 
search for pattern among Ss, a new rational basis for behaviour 
would require computer programs which would direct a systematic 
search for pattern among the states. The author started to 
write such programs (in Algol) with the intention of simulating 
human reactbns to sequential situations. It was convenient, for 
this reason, to limit the "memory" of the computer to a span of 
five past states. The programs were written to direct a choice 
by the computer on the basis of a sequence of steps. These steps 
were such that simple patterns (alternation of states, for 
example) were given priority over more complex patterns and any 
pattern (e.g., even one of ,length 5) was given priority over no 
pattern. These general programs searched for patterns up to 
length 5 and then switched into a Bayesian solution on an assumption 
of no pattern. It was thought that these general programs could be 
altered into programs of individual variations by reducing the 
length of pattern considered (corresponding to differences in 
memory span), by using a random variable to disrupt a pattern 
search (corresponding to momentary lapses of memory) and by using 
a variable to lengthen the time spent on pattern search 
(corresponding to persistence of set). 
Unfortunately, because of difficulties outside the author's 
control, these programs were never properly tested. It still 
seems worthwhile to use this new rational basis for simulating 
human behaviour; and the author has started again to test the 
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general programs. However, the results of the experiments have 
suggested that perhaps a more direct approach to computer 
simulation is called for. In particular, the programs should 
include change criteria and an alteration criterion rather than 
a Bayesian solution once the search for pattern is over. 
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